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Article 9's Incorporation Strategy and Novel,
New Markets for Collateral: A Theory of Non-
Adoption
MICHAEL KORYBUTt
INTRODUCTION
Here is a puzzle: online auctions like eBay widely are
heralded as efficient, robust markets through which
millions of businesses and people have sold billions of
dollars of all types of property. Why then are Article 9
secured parties apparently only slowly and anemically
adopting eBay or other online auctions to sell repossessed
property (collateral) and sticking instead to conventional,
traditional sale methods? The puzzle is worth solving
because one of Article 9's central policies is for a secured
creditor to realize the highest price possible for her
collateral to pay off her debtor's obligation, and thereby
reduce any deficiency the debtor would have to pay. To
affect its price-maximization policy, Article 9 directs the
secured party to sell her collateral in a "commercially
reasonable" manner, largely by incorporating well-
recognized or commonly- accepted market-based sale
methods for the particular type of collateral. Thus, the
apparent slow and anemic adoption of eBay and other
online auctions by Article 9 secured creditors is troubling
because it suggests a failure of the commercial
reasonableness standard's incorporation strategy and its
price-maximization goal. Understanding the causes of this
failure and correcting them is important not just with
respect to secured party adoption of online auctions, but
f Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. My thanks to Dan
Keating and Gary Neustadter for their comments. Any errors or omissions are
my own.
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any new, novel efficient sale method that develops in the
future.
The Article proposes a non-adoption theory for novel,
new markets to explain the apparent failure of the
commercial reasonableness standard's incorporation
strategy. The non-adoption theory holds that for any given
new market, a wealth-maximizing secured party will suffer
varying degrees of imperfect information due to legal,
business, or empirical data uncertainties with respect to
identifying, assessing, and using that new market. Such a
secured party may fail to adopt a relatively more efficient
new market and continue instead to use the conventional,
traditional market due to the aggregate amount of this
legal, businesses, and empirical data uncertainty. For the
"riskiest" of new markets, those with the highest aggregate
degree of such uncertainty, theoretically it is possible that
no or very few secured parties would ever adopt it. For a
less risky market, one with a wider range of perceived
riskiness among secured creditors, it is theoretically
possible that a larger number of Article 9 secured creditors
would adopt it, although others would not.
The non or slow adoption of new markets which are
relatively more efficient than the conventional, traditional
market(s) for the secured party's collateral does great
normative damage to Article 9's incorporation strategy for
two reasons. First, non or slow adoption of a relatively more
efficient new market is completely at odds with a central,
stated purpose of the commercial reasonableness standard
and its incorporation strategy: to allow ex ante secured
creditors and ex post reviewing courts to adopt more
efficient markets to sell repossessed collateral as they
develop over time with the aspiration of maximizing the
collateral's price at the foreclosure sale. This undermining
of the incorporation strategy and its price-maximization
goal harms both secured parties and debtors alike. Second,
foreclosure sales of personal property have a sad history of
realizing low prices for collateral. Not surprisingly,
foreclosure sales are said to be one of the most litigated
areas of Article 9, and a central motivating factor of such
litigation has been an alleged low price. The secured
creditor community's non-adoption or too slow adoption of
relatively more efficient markets undermines the potential
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to reduce the number of low price foreclosure sales and thus
the incidence of litigation.
Given these adverse consequences, analyzing and
correcting the salient and common causes of legal,
empirical, and business uncertainty that likely will obtain
to any novel, new market is exceedingly important. The
Article performs this analytical and corrective task in the
context of the online auction channel. To be sure, there are
idiosyncratic reasons why a secured party may suffer legal,
empirical, or business uncertainty in using a new market,
including the online auction channel. The Article does not
attempt to identify and discuss these reasons because,
given their idiosyncratic nature, their explication would not
have broad application in the Article 9 community.
The online auction channel is "new" because it is the
latest significant method to become available to secured
parties to sell their repossessed collateral. What makes the
online auction channel so perplexing is that this method of
sale is over ten years old and individual online auction sites
like eBay are now ubiquitous, and yet few Article 9 secured
parties appear to be using this method of sale. The online
auction channel is "novel" because, as a method of sale, it
differs in form and function in significant legal and
business ways from conventional, traditional methods of
selling collateral. Consequently, the non-adoption theory
holds that the ensuing legal, empirical, and business
uncertainty renders the online auction channel a "risky"
market, which explains its apparent slow and anemic
adoption by secured creditors. This is a shame since, as a
market channel, online auctions may be able to sell certain
types of repossessed collateral more efficiently than any
existing, conventional, traditional market.
The Article's development of the non-adoption theory
for novel, new markets and its application to explain slow
and anemic use of online auctions is a unique contribution
to the Article 9 literature critiquing the commercial
reasonableness standard. Further, as a theoretical
enterprise, by exploring the possible reasons why a secured
party may suffer legal empirical, and/or business
uncertainty about using a novel, new market like the online
auction channel, the Article sets the stage for much needed,
and largely lacking, empirical work about what motivates
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secured parties to choose conventional, traditional markets
versus new markets for their collateral sales.
Part I of the Article discusses Article 9's commercial
reasonableness standard, its incorporation strategy, and
Article 9's price maximization goal for repossession sales.
Part II briefly discusses the myriad heralded efficiency
benefits of online auctions like eBay. Part II also provides
anecdotal evidence that while some Article 9 secured
creditors are using online auctions, their numbers appear to
be relatively few. Part III unpacks the non-adoption theory.
To apply the non-adoption theory broadly across the
secured lending community, Part III frames the theory as
three secured party/collateral neutral hypotheses. These
hypotheses are animated by seven salient and common
theoretical progenitors of legal, empirical, and/or business
uncertainty. Part IV develops each of these progenitors of
uncertainty. It also proposes corrective measures to
mitigate each progenitor's adverse effects. Part V posits
theoretical circumstances where non or slow adoption may
occur even where, in fact, the novel, new market is more
efficient relative to the conventional, traditional market(s)
for the collateral. Part VI briefly discusses alternative
reasons why a secured party may not use a relatively more
efficient market: 1) he is not a wealth-maximizer, and/or 2)
he lacks legal, business, and/or empirical data information
about continuing to use the conventional, traditional
market. Part VI's brevity is not meant to suggest these are
not credible or important issues; they are. Rather, one has
to pick one's battles given time and space constraints and
keep to the worthy goal of a focused analysis.
I. A PRIMER ON ARTICLE 9'S INCORPORATION STRATEGY
An incorporation strategy that looks to merchant
reality and evolving commercial behavior is a common
jurisprudential tool employed throughout the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). 1 Article 1 of the UCC, which sets
1. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 626 (1975) (stating that
"Article II frequently speaks as though courts should discover the law merchant
from a careful, disinterested examination of custom and fact situations. Article
140 [Vol. 55
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forth general definitions and polices governing the
remaining UCC articles including Articles 2 and 9, states
that the UCC "shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies[, including]...
. to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties .... ,,2
With respect to Article 2, "the overall tone ... suggests a
clear respect for, if not deference to, commercial practices.
Its rules speak in terms of commercial reasonableness,
commercial standards, trade customs, and commercial
understanding, all of which require courts to refer to actual
commercial practice and understanding to resolve legal
disputes.' ' 3 Indeed, "the UCC was written largely to
supplant the common law by clearing 'statute and case law
II is not, in the main, an example of legislative lawmaking, it is a guide to law-
finding. It does not tell judges the law; it tells them how to find the law. The law
is not found in doctrine, not in policy, but in directed exploration of the 'fact-
pattern of common life"); Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability,
and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1989) (stating, about the Legal
Realist movement, that "[tihe realists focused on what they perceived to be the
most serious shortcoming of the classical model-its failure to acknowledge the
actual practices of business persons. . . . Llewellyn saw no point in legal
doctrine that failed to take account of the nuances and vicissitudes of everyday
commercial practices, which were themselves always in the process of evolution
and change. Fundamentally a pragmatist, Llewellyn thought that contract
doctrine should respond to commercial reality and not, as the classical theorists
imagined, the other way around"); Joseph W. Singer, Review Essay: Legal
Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 501 (1988) (book review) (stating that "in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn hoped to formulate legal
rules that would take into account the social context in which commercial
transactions took place"); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision:
Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 494 (1987)
(discussing Llewellyn's desire to incorporate merchant reality in the law); see
also Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy,
in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATION OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAw 193
(Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999).
2. Pre-revised U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b). Article 1 was revised in 2001. Hereafter,
the Article cites only pre-revised Article 1 sections, published in COMMERCIAL
AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, SELECTED STATUTES (Foundation Press, 2004).
3. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl
Llewelllyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1149 (1985) (citations omitted).
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debris from the field so that commercial law could follow
the natural flow of commerce."' 4
A. Commercial Reasonableness, Market-Based Sale
Procedures, and the Price-Maximization Goal
In Article 9 the commercial reasonableness standard
exemplifies the UCC's policy of incorporating commercial
practices. 5 Rather than legislatively mandated, detailed
sale procedures, Professor Grant Gilmore and the other
original Article 9 drafters deliberately used the largely
undefined commercial reasonableness standard to provide
the secured party maximum flexibility to identify and use
the most efficient market-based sale procedures possible to
sell repossessed collateral. 6 The repossession sale must be
"commercially reasonable" in "[e]very aspect . . . including
the method, manner, time, place, and other terms. ' 7
Additionally, section 9-627(b)(3) provides a safe harbor for
secured parties, stating that a sale is commercially
4. Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 334
(1995) (citation omitted).
5. See Michael Korybut, Searching For Commercial Reasonableness Under
Revised Article 9, 87 IowA L. REV. 1385, 1450-55 (2002).
6. Grant Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V."
Default, 7 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 7 (1952) [hereinafter Gilmore, Article 9]
(stating that "[tihe basic policy of Article 9 is to allow disposition of the
collateral without hampering restrictions, in the hope that, as to many types of
goods, there will develop a pattern of using commercial outlets to sell goods for
the going price at the least possible cost"). Professor Gilmore and the other
original Article 9 drafters understood that earlier legislatively proscribed
foreclosure sale procedures, such as those under the Uniform Conditional Sale
Act, were terribly inefficient, yielded low sale prices, and frequently resulted in
deficiency judgments. See id. at 5-6; 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.4 (1965) [hereinafter 2 GILMORE]; see also Korybut,
supra note 5, at 1392-93.
7. Revised U.C.C. § 9-610(b). Article 9 was revised in 1999 and became
effective in 2001. Hereafter, citations to Article 9 sections shall refer in the
footnotes either to the "Revised" Article 9 or the "Pre-revised" Article 9,
published in COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, SELECTED STATUTES
(Foundation Press, 2004). Beyond this mandate, "commercial reasonableness" is
not defined in the Code, although some instruction is provided in revised section
9-627(a) and 9-627(b)'s three safe harbors. Otherwise, "[t]he duty is a vague and
fluctuating one, which cannot be meaningfully described except in terms of
particular fact situations." 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 44.5, at 1234-35.
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reasonable if the secured party uses the "reasonable
commercial practices among dealers in the type of property
[sold]. '"8 Further, some Article 9 courts9 have looked to
Comment 4 to Article 2 of the UCC, section 2-706,10 which
states:
Subsection (2) frees the remedy of resale from legalistic
restrictions and enables the seller to resell in accordance with
reasonable commercial practices so as to realize as high a price as
possible in the circumstances .... In choosing between a public
and private sale the character of the goods must be considered and
relevant trade practices and usages must be observed. 11
The thrust of these limited statutory prescriptions is
the basis for Article 9's incorporation strategy to allow the
secured party to adopt existing markets and their attendant
sale procedures to sell repossessed collateral. A secured
party is expected to act in good faith and with due diligence
to identify and use the market and attendant sale
procedures best calculated to realize the highest price
8. Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(b) (1997). Comment 2 to pre-revised section 9-507
stated that "[olne recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for
the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a dealer-a method which
in the long run may realize better average returns since the secured party does
not usually maintain his own facilities for making such sales." Pre-revised
U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt. 2.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 694 (5th Cir. 1977); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
affd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968); Beard v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 850 S.W.2d
23, 28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Bakie Logging, 824 P.2d
178, 185 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Carthage v. Eidson,
796 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
10. Article 2 was revised in 2003. Hereafter, the Article cites only pre-
revised Article 2 sections, published in COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW,
SELECTED STATUTES (Foundation Press, 2004). Pre-revised section 2-706(1)
states in part that "[wihere the [seller's] resale is made in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference between
the resale price and the contract price ...." Subsection two states in part that
the sale may be "at public or private sale" and that it may be "at any time and
place and on any terms but every aspect of the sale including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." Pre-revised
U.C.C. § 2-706.
11. Pre-revised U.C.C. § 2-706 cmt. 4. The Official Comment to pre-revised
section 9-504 cross-refers to pre-revised section 2-706. Pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-
504 cmt. 1.
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possible for the collateral. 12 By allowing secured parties to
access market-based sale procedures Professor Gilmore
hoped that foreclosure sales would realize the highest prices
possible for the collateral, thereby reducing the incidence of
low price deficiency sales where the collateral's sale price
did not cover the debtor's outstanding loan.13
12. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 44.5 (stating that that the secured party
must "act with due diligence ... use his best efforts... [and have a] 'reasonable
regard for the debtor's interest" in obtaining the highest possible price for the
collateral). For cases, see, for example, Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v.
Parsons, 820 S.W.2d 315, 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that in the face of a
low price sale, the court needed to determine that the secured party had not
neglected "the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care. In
the context of disposition of collateral, the duty to act in good faith is shown by
evidence that the secured party was punctilious as to every procedure imposed
by § 400.9-504(3) and was free of self-dealing. The diligent attention to the
rights of the creditor at every stage of the disposition of the collateral, from
declaration of default, through the notice of sale, the advertisements, the
numbers of dealers invited to bid, the encouragement and responses to informal
inquiries, all attest to a purpose to gain the best resale price and reduce any
deficiency"); Terrey, 554 F.2d at 695 (stating that "the creditor .. .has the
fiduciary duty to make a sincere effort to obtain the full market value for the
assets"); Eagle Bank & Trust Co. v. Dixon, 15 S.W.3d 695, 695 (Ark. Ct. App.
2000) (stating that "[u]ltimately, commercial reasonableness requires that the
secured party act in good faith to maximize returns on collateral"); see also Old
Colony Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. at 714-15 (noting that the "policy of Article 9 is
to provide a simple, efficient, and flexible tool to produce the maximum amount
from the disposition of the collateral"'); Id. at 712 (stating that "Section 2-706,
dealing with a seller's rights and duties to resell, has requirements of
commercial reasonableness exactly parallel to those of § 9-504(3)," and that
Official Comment 4 to Section 2-706 states "that the option between the two [a
pubic or private sale] was given to enable 'the seller to resell in accordance with
reasonable commercial practices so as to realize as high a price as possible in
the circumstances"'(quoting U.C.C. § 2-706)).
13. Gilmore, Article 9, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that Article 9's foreclosure
rules should be rules "which would promote the highest possible yield on
disposition of the collateral"); see also William E. Hogan, The Secured Party and
Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 207 (1962) (stating
that "[t]he Code sets out to accomplish two goals. First, to assure the highest
possible realization price, a considerable discretion is conferred upon the
secured party seeking to realize upon his collateral"); Donald J. Rapson,
Deficient Treatment of Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 501-02 (1997) (stating that "Gilmore was convinced 'the
price-determining function of the market' could be relied upon 'to establish the
fair value of the collateral"' (quoting 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 44.6)); Korybut,
supra note 5, at 1392-93. To be sure, commentators also have questioned
whether the commercial reasonableness standard has failed to achieve this
price-maximization goal on a variety of grounds. See id.
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Article 9's price maximization goal, however, is
tempered by other competing polices, such as the secured
party's absolution from unforeseeable or uncontrollable
events adversely affecting the sale; 14 the secured party's
interest in conducting a quick and inexpensive sale;15 the
14. Professor Gilmore maintained that the good faith, diligent secured party
should not be second-guessed where, in hindsight, he failed to realize the
highest price for the collateral due to unforeseeable or uncontrollable events.
See 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 44.5; ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT,
INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 501-02 (1977) (stating that "[fin
essence it [Section 9-507(2)] provides that the secured party should not be liable
merely because he failed to take advantage of an opportunity of which he had
no reason to know, or which was, as a practical matter, not available to him. If,
however, a substantially better price was obtainable by another disposition of
which the secured party should have known, Section 9-507(2) does not
exculpate him"). In explaining the reason for the former Section 9-507(2)'s
admonition that "[t]he fact a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a
different time or in a different method . . . is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner," Pre-revised
U.C.C. § 9-507(2), Professor Gilmore said that "[tihe secured party is not
required to be a seer or a prophet. He is not required to anticipate the course of
the market." 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 44.6; see also Korybut, supra note 5, at
1421-22.
15. See Edward J. Heiser Jr. & Robert J. Flemma, Jr., Consumer Issues in
the Article 9 Revision Project: The Perspective of Consumer Lenders, 48
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 488, 499 (1994); Homer Kriptke, Law and Economics:
Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 946 (1985); Maury B. Poscover, A Commercially
Reasonable Sale Under Article 9: Commercial, Reasonable, and Fair to All
Involved, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 244 (1994) (stating that "[b]ecause a secured
lender does not want to purchase the collateral at the sale or to store it for any
longer than is necessary, the economic pressures on the lender encourage an
expedited sale and, again, the optimum price. In general, with mercantile items
and disposable goods, the maintenance and storage costs, plus the tendency for
the value of the goods to decrease over time, makes expedited sales attractive to
secured lenders"); Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic
and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. REV. 445, 513 (1994) (arguing that "the
foreclosing creditor has a legitimate interest in obtaining repayment of the
antecedent obligation expeditiously; accordingly, it should not be required to
'hold out' for the very best price"). In striking a fair balance between this
interest and the debtor's concern with obtaining the highest price, courts and
commentators recognize (and debate the extent of) legitimate limits to the
foreclosure sale efforts the secured party must make to achieve such a price. See
ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, COMMERCIAL LAW 267-68 (4th ed.
1997) (observing that "[t]he law has long struggled with the problem of how to
strike a fair balance between the interest of the foreclosing creditor in being
able to realize on collateral quickly and cheaply and the rights of the defaulting
debtor in having a fair disposition of the property").
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secured party's lack of sophistication and resources; 16
constraints imposed by relatively inexpensive collateral;17
and cases of few or no available markets for the particular
type of collateral.15
Balancing the tension between the incorporation
strategy's price maximization goal and these tempering
policies, one arrives at an uneasy and imprecise
compromise: Article 9, (1) directs the secured party in good
faith and with due diligence to identify, assess, and use the
market sale practices that she believes are best suited to
maximize the collateral's price, but (2) holds the secured
party only to those markets and attendant sale practices
that are reasonably identifiable, accessible and usable
under the circumstances.' 9 In economic terms, the secured
16. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1423.
17. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
18. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1423.
19. See id. at 1422-23 (stating that "[v]arying with the secured party's
sophistication and resources, the value of the collateral, and the available
markets for the collateral, even a good faith, diligent secured party intent on
maximizing the collateral's price may be unable to realize a price reflecting the
collateral's true value"); Robyn L. Meadows, Warranties of Title, Foreclosure
Sales, and the Proposed Revision of U.C.C. § 9-504: Has the Pendulum Swung
Too Far?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2419, 2446-47 (1997) (stating that "[w]hile the
Code does not require the price to be maximized, the creditor is expected to
make choices regarding the conduct of the sale with the expectation that they
will result in a fair price" (footnotes omitted)); see also Clark Equip. Co. v.
Mastelotto, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding the sale
commercially reasonable, and stating that "[w]hether a sale is conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner is a question of fact and the answer depends
on all of the circumstances existing at the time of the sale. Neither the most
advantageous method of sale nor the highest possible price is demanded. This is
made clear by [Section 9-507(2)]"); Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Curley, 782 P.2d 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding the sale commercially
reasonable, and stating that "[i]t is the duty of the secured party to obtain the
best possible price for the benefit of the debtor. However, the secured party does
not have to use extraordinary means"); Appelton State Bank v. Van Dyke Ford,
Inc., 279 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Wis. 1979) (holding the sale commercially reasonable
and stating that "the secured party owed a duty to the debtor to use all fair and
reasonable means in obtaining the best price for the property on sale. The
secured party need not use 'extraordinary means' to accomplish this result"); 9C
WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-627:4
(2001); JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 15, at 288. Cf. Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc.
v. Seattle-First Nat'l. Bank, 570 P.2d 702, 711 (Wash. App. 1977) (holding the
sale commercially unreasonable, although stating that "[tihe duty of the
secured party in this instance was to obtain the best possible price it could
A THEORY OF NON-ADOPTION
party is asked to identify, assess, and use the most efficient
market reasonably available under the circumstances.
Further, once the secured party has fulfilled this task and
conducted a procedurally regular sale free from collusion,
fraud or self-dealing, 20 if in fact the collateral's price is not
maximized, that fact alone will not render the sale
commercially unreasonable. 21 As this primary Article 9
directive has been and will continue to be referred to
throughout the Article, let us call it the "General Directive"
for ease of later reference.
B. Ex Post Judicial Oversight and Case Law Guidance
Ex ante, the secured party enjoys a great deal of
discretion under the commercial reasonableness standard,
which relies upon her to choose the reasonablv available
market most suited to obtain a high price. Recognizing that
such discretion might be abused, Professor Gilmore and the
other drafters intended that ex post courts would review
whether the challenged sale's time, place, manner, and
other asnects were in fact commerciallv reasonable. 22 Thus
courts too must determine which market-based sale
practices were reasonably available to the secured Dartv
and whether the secured Dartv used the ones best
calculated to realize the highest price possible for the
collateral. 23  Doctrinally, under Article 9 and the
incorporation strategy, a sale's commercial reasonableness
is measured by its procedural regularity and
reasonableness as compared against actual market
obtain for the collateral for the benefit of the debtor. The secured party does not
have to use 'extraordinary means' to accomplish this result"); Korybut, supra
note 5, at 1422-23.
20. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1450-51, 1465-74.
21. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(a); see also Korybut, supra note 5, at 1432,
1434.
22. See Gilmore, Article 9, supra note 6, at 4, 7; see also 2 GILMORE, supra
note 6, § 44.4; JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 15, at 288 ("[A]s a balance to this
freedom of action the creditor is held to an ex post standard of 'commercial
reasonableness' in all aspects of the realization process with strict
accountability for failure to meet this flexible standard.").
23. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1432, 1435, 1451.
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practices. 24 Price is not considered a term of commercial
reasonableness, 25 and a low price alone will not render an
otherwise complying sale unreasonable. 26 A low price,
however, will trigger the court's careful scrutiny of the sale
process. 27
Where a sale is found to be commercially reasonable,
the secured party may sue the debtor for any deficiency
between the proceeds of the sale and the outstanding debt
plus reasonable expenses. 28 Thus, the sale price is used to
calculate the deficiency. Where, however, the sale is
commercially unreasonable, the proceeds received for
collateral are not used to establish the debtor's deficiency.
Section 9-626 uses a rebuttable presumption rule for non-
consumer transactions that may limit (perhaps severely)
the secured party's right to collect a deficiency from the
debtor. 29 For consumer transactions, Article 9 leaves to the
courts the decision whether to use the rebuttable
presumption rule or other rule such as the absolute bar rule
that would eliminate any deficiency. 30
Further, Article 9 states that where the sale is found
commercially unreasonable, the secured creditor also may
be liable for certain damages. 31 Under Section 9-625(b)-(f),
the secured party is liable "for damages in the amount of
any loss" caused by the secured party's noncompliance with
the default provisions of Article 9.32 In particular, where the
collateral is consumer goods, under Section 9-625(c)(2) the
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1432, 1435-49.
26. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(a); Korybut, supra note 5, at 1432, 1436.
27. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1499.
28. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-615(a).
29. Revised U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(2). To calculate the deficiency under Section 9-
626(a)(3), the debtor is credited with the greater of the actual proceeds of the
sale or the proceeds that would have been realized had the secured party
conducted a commercially reasonable sale. If a deficiency remains, the secured
party may collect it.
30. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-626(b); TIMOTHY R. ZINNECKER, THE DEFAULT
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 9, at 185-86 (1999).
31. Revised U.C.C. § 9-625(b).
32. Revised U.C.C. § 9-625(b)-(f).
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debtor may recover a potentially significant amount where
the loan amount and interest rate (credit service charge)
are large. 33
Given the negative consequences associated with a
commercially unreasonable sale, it seems sensible to say
that most secured parties would be interested in conducting
commercially reasonable sales. 34 To this end, from each
state's published opinions over the last forty years,
collectively there have emerged recognized sale factors that
may help guide secured parties planning foreclosure sales.
Summarizing case law, one court found seventeen sale
factors relevant to determining a sale's commercial
reasonableness, including publicity (advertising) of the sale;
the place of sale; the solicitation and receipt of bids; the
secured party's familiarity with type of property; the price
realized for the collateral; and whether the sale was in
accordance with reasonable commercial practices. 35
Particularly resonant of the incorporation strategy,
some courts have declared that secured parties should sell
their repossessed collateral in conformity with "prevailing
trade practices,"36 "accepted commercial practices," 37 "well-
33. Revised U.C.C. § 9-625(f); see also Heiser & Flemma, supra note 15, at
500 (arguing that the consumer goods penalty is too onerous and should be
abolished). But see Captain Darryll K. Jones, Common Sense and Article 9. A
Uniform Approach to Automobile Repossessions, 8 ARMY LAW., Dec. 1988, at 12
(arguing under former Article 9 that such penalty amount may be small).
34. But see infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
35. See In re Crosby, 176 B.R. 189, 195-96 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); see also
Marks v. Powell, 162 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993) (identifying five
factors); Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32, 39 (Conn. 1988)
(identifying seven factors); Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 970-71
(Kan. 1982) (identifying nine factors); Union Nat'l Bank v. Schmitz, 853 P.2d
1180, 1186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (identifying nine factors). Note that In re
Crosby was decided before the 2001 revisions to Article 9 under which price is
more clearly removed as a term of commercial reasonableness.
36. See, e.g., Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d
130, 137-38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that "[t]he requirement that the
property be disposed of in a 'commercially reasonable' manner seems to us to
signify that the disposition shall be made in keeping with prevailing trade
practices among reputable and responsible business and commercial enterprises
engaged in the same or a similar business" (quoting Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin.
& Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966))); see also Jackson
County Bank v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 488 F. Supp. 1001, 1011 (M.D. Tenn.
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recognized" customs and usaves. 38 or "commonlv accepted
commercial practices."39 Said one court, for example, "[t]he
requirement that the property be disposed of in a
'commercially reasonable' manner seems to us to signify
that the disposition shall be made in keeping with
prevailing trade practices among reputable and responsible
business and commercial enterprises envaved in the same
or a similar business."40 Commentators too have similarly
pronounced that under Article 9's commercial
reasonableness standard secured parties should follow
widely accepted business practices.41
1980), vacated, 698 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Four Star Music Co., 2 B.R.
454, 461 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979).
37. Bankers Trust Co. v. J. V. Dowler & Co., Inc., 390 N.E.2d 766, 769 (N.Y.
1979) (observing that "[t]he virtue of [the commercial reasonableness
standard's] lack of further particularization is that it invites consideration of
accepted business practices as a guide to what is most likely to protect both
debtor and creditor"). Official Comment 6 to section 1-205 suggests that
commercial acceptance makes out a prima facie case that the usage is
reasonable. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 6 (1995).
38. In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1989).
39. Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 505, 509 (Okla. 1978) (stating
that "[glenerally, the secured party acts in a 'commercially reasonable' manner
when, in the process of disposing of repossessed security, he acts in good faith
and in accordance with commonly accepted commercial practices which afford
all parties fair treatment").
40. Jackson County Bank, 488 F. Supp. at 1011; see also In re Four Star
Music Co., 2 B.R. at 461; Investors Acceptance Co., 454 S.W.2d at 137-38.
41. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 1.
Even though there are numerous problems arising from the use of the
term 'reasonable commercial standards,' the application of such
standards may be feasible. Evidence of commercial standards and
business practices may be obtained through the testimony of those
engaged in a particular business. Thus, if a practice is widely accepted,
a failure to follow it may indicate a failure to meet 'reasonable business
standards.'
Id. at 169 n.192; see also CHRISTINE A. FERRIS & BENNETT H. GOLDSTEIN,
DISPOSITION OF REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.2, at 3 (1990); Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article 9: Its Impact on
Tennessee Law (Part II), 67 TENN. L. REV. 329, 363 (2000).
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II. APPARENT SLOW AND ANEMIC ARTICLE 9 SECURED PARTY
ADOPTION OF ONLINE AUCTIONS
Part I established that Article 9's commercial
reasonableness standard asks secured parties ex ante, and
courts ex post. to identifv and incorporate (use) the
prevailina market(s) and attendant sale practices that are
best calculated and reasonablv available under the
circumstances to maximize the collateral's price. Part I also
described the negative conseauences of a commercially
unreasonable sale. Given these drivers, why then does it
appear that Article 9 secured creditors only slowly and
anemically are adopting generalist online auction sites like
eBay.com 42 and specialized online auction sites like
Bid4Assets.com 43 to sell repossessed collateral?
Part II briefly discusses the robust nature of Internet
commerce, with a particular focus on online auctions. Part
II then provides anecdotal evidence suggesting that Article
9 secured parties only slowly and anemically are using
online auctions to sell repossessed collateral.
A. A Robust Internet Market Place
Internet commerce is bustling. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau's Quarterly Retail E-commerce Sales
figures, e-commerce sales for the second quarter of 2006
were $26.3 billion and $86.3 billion for 2005. 44 In particular,
online auctions have emerged as a central market channel
through which to conduct e-commerce. Indeed, online
auctions are plentiful; the Internet Auction List, for
example, lists under the category "Online Auctions"
hypertext links to 85 online auctions. 45 It is estimated that
by 2007, online auction sales will exceed $100 billion
42. Ebay, http://www.ebay.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
43. Bid4Assets, http://www.bid4assets.com/(last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 2ND
QUARTER 2006 (2006), http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html06Q2.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
45. Internet Auction List, http://www.internetauctionlist.com/Results.asp?
CategoryID=13&LocationID=O (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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annually. 46 Not surprisingly then, one commentator has
said that "[e]lectronic markets based on the Internet-in
particular, online auctions-have become popular venues
for conducting business transactions .... In fact, it can be
argued that the auction-based electronic markets best
represent the changes to business inherent in e-
commerce."
47
Perhaps the best known online auction is eBay, which
opened its cyberspace doors for business over ten years ago.
There are over 100 million members of the eBay communitv
worldwide who buv and sell in its market place.48 EBav has
both a general trading platform, eBav.com. 49 through which
dozens of categories of Dropertv are sold, and specialized
trading platforms, like eBavMotors.com 50  where
automobiles, trucks, and parts are sold. In its 2005
financial report, eBay stated that the total value of all
successfully closed listings on its trading platforms was
$44.3 billion. 51
B. Heralded Benefits of Online Auctions for Selling
Distressed Property
Perhaps Article 9 secured parties are not using online
auctions because online auctions are not an efficient,
maximizing way to sell distressed property? What then does
one make of two inconvenient facts.
First, there is an abundant literature heralding the
benefits of online auctions. For example, Professor David
46. See DAVID C. WYLD, GOVERNMENT GARAGE SALES: ONLINE AUCTIONS AS
TOOLS FOR ASSET MANAGEMENT 33 (2004), http://www.businessofgovernment
.org/pdfslWyldReport3.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). This report is a research
monograph published by the IBM center for the Business of Government.
47. Edieal J. Pinker et al., Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and
Research Issues, MGMT. SCI., Nov. 2003, at 1457, 1457.
48. Ebay Community, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/community.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
49. Ebay, http://www.ebay.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
50. Ebay Motors, http://www.motors.ebay.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
51. Ebay Investor Relations, http://investor.ebay.com/downloads/2005
AnnuallAnnualReport2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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Wyld, in 2004, published a comprehensive study on online
auction use and concluded that "online auctioning is
proving to be the most effective method for disposing of
surplus, seized, used, and lost items held by public sector"
actors such as the federal and state governments. 52 From
five case studies of the use of online auctions, including
eBay and Bid4Assets, Professor Wyld identified four major
benefits of online auctions. First, online auctions can
"[o]pen up the surplus sales process to a much wider
audience and promote greater visibility and transparency
for the auction events. '53 Second, online auctions "[c]reate
greater liquidity in the sales process through increased
bidding activity among a wider group of interested parties,
heightening the chances that the auction will culminate in
the actual sale and disposal of the asset."54 Third, online
auctions "[r]aise the final selling prices of surplus items
being sold, often at price points that are considerably
higher than historical returns on similar assets."55 Fourth,
52. WYLD, supra note 46, at 81.
53. Id. at 7, 25; see also Warren E. Agin, Auctioning Repossessed Assets on
the Internet, LEADER'S EQUIP. LEASING NEWSL., May 2000, at 1 (stating that
"[i]nternet auctions possess a number of attributes that make them superior to
traditional auctions. A traditional auction requires the participant's physical
presence at the auction location at the time of the auction. Online auctions
allow anyone with an Internet connection to participate. Another advantage of
most online auction mechanisms is their ability to run over an extended period
of time, such as a week or even longer. During the auction period, participants
can continue to access the auction on the Internet and place a bid"); Michael
Korybut, Online Auctions of Repossessed Collateral, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 29, 42-59
(1999) (discussing advantages of and limitations to selling tangible goods
though online auctions).
54. WYLD, supra note 46, at 7; see also id. at 25; WARREN E. AGIN,
BANKKRUPTCY AND SECURED LENDING IN CYBERSPACE at ch. 15:8 (2005) (observing
that "the auction websites attract significant numbers of visitors . . . . The
Internet auction provides a mechanism to efficiently match the seller of the
estate asset with an interested buyer"); Korybut, supra note 53, at 29.
55. WYLD, supra note 46, at 7; see also id. at 25; United States v. Kaczynski,
446 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that "an internet sale, as
opposed to a courthouse sale, 'may increase the amounts bid for the sale items'
because the internet sale would have 'a longer period of exposure and bidding"
(quoting GOV'T STATUS REPORT, July 31, 2006, ex. A)); see also id. ("[Tihe auction
is calculated to maximize monetary return .... "); Korybut, supra note 53, at
113-16; TitleAuctions, http://www.titleauctions.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2007) (observing that "[c]urrently serving 57 credit unions nationwide,
TitleAuctions' credit union clients enjoy average sale prices $2,100 per vehicle
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online auctions "[1ower actual costs outlays, both in direct
costs and hidden indirect costs, to agencies to carry out the
sale of surplus."56 Outside the context of repossession sales
or sales of distressed assets, other commentators have
made similar arguments about the benefits of online
auctions. 57
higher than traditional remarketing channels, as well as new loan revenue and
increased Web site traffic"); TitleAuctions, Credit Union Services,
http://www.titleauctions.com/services/retail.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007)
(arguing that "[olur credit union-to-member auction platform empowers credit
unions to quickly remarket collateral to their own members, and to millions of
member [sic] and consumers nationwide. The result is often substantially
higher sale prices than traditional remarketing channels typically deliver, often
up to $2,000 more per vehicle sold. When you sell a repo directly to your own
members, you earn higher resale prices, boost loan revenue, sell MBI and GAP
coverage, and build member loyalty. Even better, the auction is quick-to-deploy,
easy-to-use and takes just minutes per day to manage"); TitleAuctions, Press
Releases, Credit Unions Earning up to 107% of Retail Value for Repos with
TitleActions Remarketing Tools, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.titleauctions.com/
press/story.cfm?nID=14 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (noting that "TitleAuctions,
Inc. announced today that credit union clients are realizing prices up to 107
percent of retail value when using CUAuctions.com for remarketing
repossessions").
56. WYLD, supra note 46, at 7; see also id. at 25. See generally AGIN, supra
note 54, ch.15:8 (arguing that "folne advantage of the Internet auction when
compared to conventional sales methods is the cost. The process is automated
and, because the auction websites attract significant numbers of visitors, the
auction cost does not have to be supplemented by advertising expenses"); Agin,
supra note 53, at 1 (stating that "[o]nline auctions are also very efficient,
because the web sites run software that automates the auction process through
online bidding. Thus, the expense per transaction can be relatively low and
auctioneers can accept fees based solely on the auction's success"); Korybut,
supra note 53, at 57-58.
57. For the proposition that online auctions reach a larger market
population than conventional market channels because online auctions are not
limited by, space, time or geography, see Ravi Bapna et al., Insights and
Analysis of Online Auctions, 44 COMM. ACM 42 (2001).
Millions of globally dispersed consumers now engage in competitive
exchange via bidding and can set prices that reflect real-time supply
and demand as efficiently as any trading floor. The physical limitations
of traditional auctions such as geography, presence, time, space and a
small target population virtually disappear in online settings. The
Internet provides a critical mass of consumers located on different
continents ....
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In the case of physical auctions ...market participants must come
together at a specific location, and such restrictions in terms of time
and place constitute a major barrier to participation. For online
auctions, however, anyone can join by using the Internet at any time
and from anywhere, and the more widely known the site becomes, the
greater number of people who would participate in the auction.
Kazuhisa Inoue et al., Pricing Strategies in the E-Business Age, 23 NRI PAPERS
1, 7 (2001), available at http:Ilwww. nri.co.jp/english/opinion/papers/2001/pdf/
np200123.pdf; see also Dan Ariely & Itamar Simonson, Buying, Bidding,
Playing, or Competing? Value Assessment and Decision Dynamics in Online
Auctions, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 113, 114 (2003), available at
http://erationality.media.mit.edu/materials/ElectronicCommerce/auctionjcp.pdf
(identifying as distinguishing characteristics that explain the growing
popularity of online auctions, authors state that "online auctions eliminate the
geographical limitation of many traditional auctions, enabling people from all
over the world to participate in any auction .... [I]n terms of duration, Internet
auctions can last for several days (usually a week) and allow asynchronous
bidding, which gives both sellers and bidders more flexibility"); Pinker et al.,
supra note 47, at 1460 (arguing that online auctions reduce "transaction costs
for both buyers and sellers;" allow "[e]asier descriptions of complex products:"
provide "[t]he ability to conduct complex auctions;" allow access to more
participants, "both bidders and sellers;" facilitate "[e]asier collection of data;"
and provide "[t]he possibility for participants to join at any time"). For the
proposition that online auctions can target specific populations of buyers for
specific types of goods, see Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, Economic Insights
from Internet Auctions, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 457 (2004), available at
http://www.atyponlink.com/AEAP/doi/abs/ 10.1257/0022051041409075.
Online auctions are one of the most successful forms of electronic
commerce. . . .The rapid development of these markets is usually
attributed to three factors [including]. . . .that online auction sites
substitute for more traditional market intermediaries such as specialty
dealers in antiques, sports cards, and other collectables. . . .Online
auctions have extensive listings and powerful search technologies that
create liquid markets for specialized product categories.
Id. at 457-58; see also Korybut, supra note 53, at 44-55. For the proposition that
online auctions increase the selling price over alternative non-Internet market
channels, see Ho Geun Lee, Do Electronic Marketplaces Lower the Price of
Goods, 41 COMM. ACM 73, 73 (1998), available at http://portal.acm.org/toc.cfm?
id=268092&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&type=issue&idx=J79&part=periodical&
WantType=periodical&title=Communications%20of/o20the%20ACM&CFID=26
32691&CFTOKEN=21896929 (finding that the "average contract price of
secondhand cars sold through AUCNET [a Japanese centralized, online
wholesale auction market] is much higher than that of traditional, non-
electronic markets").
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Second, through online auctions, sellers dispose all
manner of distressed assets, including tax-delinquent real
property,58 bankruptcy estate assets,59 seized and forfeited
assets, including automobiles, 60 excess inventory,6 1 and
To minimize the potential of quality risks, AUCNET focuses on
relatively newer secondhand cars. The difference in average car
qualities is quite likely the prime reason why the contract prices of cars
in AUCNET are higher than those in traditional and non-electronic
auto auctions. However, managers in AUCNET are confident in saying
that even cars of similar quality can receive a slightly higher price in
AUCNET than in traditional auctions because sellers can preserve
their asking prices while being able to expose their products to a wider
range of buyers. The higher contract prices have made AUCNET
attractive to many sellers and have contributed to increasing the
number of cars listed. This in turn has attracted more buyers as
AUCNET has offered more purchase choices. Buyers are willing to pay
a premium (a slightly higher price) because they not only avoid an
immense waste of time spent on attending physical auctions but also
easily locate a vehicle that best matches their preferences.
Id. at 80. But see Michael D. Smith et al., Understanding Digital Markets 3
(MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 140, 1999), available at
http://ecommerce.mit.edu/papers/ude (discussing limitations of Lee's article).
See generally Cameron Healey, EBay Motors-Is it Part of Your Internet Strategy,
GIADA NEWS, Aug. 2004, available at http://giada.cms.dealer.com/sites/g/giada/
pdf/080408.pdf (observing that "[v]ehicles on eBay Motors receive an average of
eight bids apiece, which is more than a dealer would normally see on a lot"). See
also infra note 216 and accompanying text (listing studies that support the
theory that online commerce should produce lower prices than conventional
markets due to lower transactions costs). For the proposition that online
auctions lower transaction costs for sellers, see Ariely & Simonson, supra, at
114 (stating that online auction "web sites can run auctions at substantially
lower operational costs than traditional auction houses and can thus charge
lower commission fees and attract more sellers and buyers"); Bajari & Hortacsu,
supra, at 457 (arguing that "[o]nline auctions are one of the most successful
forms of electronic commerce .... The rapid development of these markets is
usually attributed to three factors [including].... [Tihat online auctions provide
a less-costly way for buyers and sellers on locally thin markets, such as
specialized collectibles, to meet").
58. See, e.g., Bid4Assets, supra note 43; see also WYLD, supra note 46, at 60-
64 (discussing examples of sales by governmental agencies of tax-delinquent
real property through Bid4Assets and other online markets).
59. See, e.g., Bid4Assets, supra note 43.
60. See, e.g., id.; see also WYLD, supra note 46, at 60 (describing Bid4Assets
as having developed a "specialty selling seized and surplus goods for
government agencies," including automobiles seized by the U.S. Marshals
Service).
61. See WYLD, supra note 46, at 36.
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surplus goods. 62 Of eBav. one studv said the Web site had
been labeled a "liquidation machine. '63 Besides eBay, one
can find specialized Web sites like Bid4Assets, 64 that "has
developed into the largest seller of tax-defaulted properties
on the Internet"65 and "developed a specialty selling seized
and surplus goods for aovernment avencies .... ,66
Similarly, through eBay and other online actions, BKAssets
sells bankruptcy assets, and touts itself as "the only full
service internet auctioneer dedicated to the sale of
bankruptcy related assets . . .,67
C. Anecdotal Evidence of Article 9 Secured Party Slow and
Anemic Use of Online Auctions
In theory, the benefits of online auctions Professor Wyld
and others identify should accrue to Article 9 secured
creditors selling collateral. And clearly there are online
auctions through which sellers dispose distressed property.
Given the commercial reasonableness standard's
incorporation directive, and the adverse consequences of
conducting a commercially unreasonable sale, one could
reasonably expect that in 2006, over ten years after eBay
began operations, and when online auctions have become
ubiquitous, Article 9 secured parties would routinely be
using them to sell all types of collateral. Yet this does not
appear to be the case. The author says this does not appear
to be the case purposefully. The author has found no
reliable empirical study about Article 9 secured party use of
online auctions to sell repossessed collateral. But there is
62. See id. at 39-42 (discussing eBay's use by government agencies to sell
surplus goods).
63. Id. at 36 (internal quotations omitted).
64. Bid4Assets, supra note 43.
65. WYLD, supra note 46, at 59.
66. Id. at 60.
67. BKassets.com, http://www.bkassets.com/ (last viewed Mar. 3, 2007). As
the Web site states, "[t]he bankruptcy trustee appoints Bkassets.com through
the United States Bankruptcy Court, which authorizes the sale of each asset.
Past auctions include land, timeshares, real estate, autos, RV's, jewelry,
collectibles, artwork, antiques, judgments, notes and accounts receivable, oil &
gas, interests and much more!" Id.
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anecdotal evidence that while some Article 9 secured
parties are using online auctions, they are relatively few in
number.
1. Author's Experience and Qualitative Interviews. The
author has many years of experience with the secured
lending community having practiced secured lending law
for four years, researched and taught secured transactions
for nine years, been a member of commercial law
communities such as listservs and other organizations, and
spoken to many people about online auction use in the
secured lending community. From these experiences, the
author has come to the firm belief that relatively few
Article 9 secured parties are using online auctions.
In particular, in preparing the Article, the author
formally interviewed three lawyers and two online auction
representatives about secured creditor use of online
auctions. 68 The pool of interviewees was not randomly
selected. Rather, the author used a "snowball" technique 69
to build an interviewee pool by first asking an attorney he
knew representing secured creditors for names of people
who might be a good source of information about secured
creditor use of online auctions. The author contacted these
people and interviewed the willing. From these
interviewees, the author repeated the process of asking for
names, etc. In this way the author interviewed each of the
following people for one to two hours.
Lawyer #1 is based on the West Coast, and as outside
counsel has many years of experience representing secured
creditors, including with foreclosure sales.70 Lawyer #2 is
based on the East Coast, and as outside counsel has many
68. Thus, the author conducted a non-random "convenience sampling." As
such, the author considers the evidence of slow adoption of online auctions
obtained through the Interviews as anecdotal. See ROBERT S. WEISS, LEARNING
FROM STRANGERS: THE ART AND METHOD OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES 24
(1994) (discussing convenience sampling).
69. Id. at 25 (describing the snowball sampling technique).
70. Telephone interview with Lawyer #1 (May 4, 2006) [hereinafter Lawyer
#1 Interview]. Throughout the Article the author declines to indicate the
specific location of the interviewees, their names, places of employment, or
other specific identifying information in order to preserve anonymity.
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years of experience representing and advising clients in
bankruptcy, secured transactions, and Internet law. 71
Lawyer #3 is based on the East Coast, and as outside
counsel has many years of experience representing secured
creditors, including with foreclosure sales. 72  Online
Representative #1 works for an online auction site that sells
repossessed automobiles. 73 Online Representative #2 works
for a company that, for a fee, will sell property for clients
through eBay. Online Representative #2's comDanv has sold
one reossessed automobile. 74  The interviewees will
periodicallv be referred to collectively as the Interviewees,
and individually as an Interviewee.
The author asked the Interviewees three general
questions, each with additional sub-questions. 75 First, did
the Interviewee know what percentage of secured creditors
used online auctions to sell repossessed collateral? Second,
why would a secured creditor use an online auction? Third,
why would a secured creditor not use an online auction?
With respect to the first question, all Interviewees said
they knew of no empirical data addressing the question.
Thus, to the extent Interviewees answered the question,
they qualified it as a "best guess" based on their experience.
Here are the results. Lawyer #1 said that only about five to
ten percent of his/her clients use online auctions to sell
repossessed collateral. Of those clients, they tend to use
online auctions the majority of the time. 76 Lawyer #2 said
he/she could not hazard a guess about the percentage. 77
Lawyer #3 said with respect to used vehicles, including
repossessed vehicles that had come "off-lease," he/she
71. Telephone interview with Lawyer #2 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Lawyer
#2 Interview].
72. Telephone interview with Lawyer #3 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Lawyer
#3 Interview].
73. Telephone interview with Online Representative #1 (Sept. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter Online Representative #1 Interview].
74. Interview with Online Representative #2 (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter
Online Representative #2 Interview].
75. A copy of these questions is available from the author upon request.
76. See Lawyer #1 Interview, supra note 70.
77. See Lawyer #2 Interview, supra note 71.
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guessed that fifteen to twenty percent are sold through
online auctions. In particular, he/she said that some large
(unnamed) automobile finance companies are using online
auctions to sell such used vehicles. 78 Online Representative
#1 said that, in the United States, there are about 8,800 of
a particular type of financial institution that finances and
repossesses cars. Of this number, only about 100 were
actively exploring or using the Internet as a means of
selling their collateral. Of this sub-set, a number of the
institutions used Online Representative #1's online auction
to sell repossessed cars. The institutions using Online
Representative #1's online auction sold seventy percent of
their repossessed cars through the Web site. 79 Online
Representative #2 said he/she could not hazard a guess
about the percentage of secured creditor use. 80
From these interviews, it appears that secured creditors
as a whole are using online auctions infrequently. More
nuanced, it appears that some segments of the secured
lending community may be using online auctions more than
others, depending on the collateral type and the nature of
the secured party (e.g., large repeat sellers like automobile
finance companies). But even the highest use estimate of
fifteen to twenty percent by Lawyer #3 with respect to used
vehicles still suggests that the vast majority of secured
creditors selling this type of collateral do not use online
auctions.
What was also apparent from talking to these
Interviewees was the dearth of any reliable empirical data
about whether or not Article 9 secured creditors are using
online auctions. That absence of data is important because,
as discussed in Part IV, section G, under the incorporation
strategy, empirical uncertainty begets legal and business
uncertainty. 81 Finally, the Interviewees' answers to the
second and third general questions posed by the author
(why or why not secured parties are using online auctions)
are discussed periodically in Part IV.
78. See Lawyer #3 Interview, supra note 72.
79. See Online Representative #1 Interview, supra note 73.
80. See Online Representative #2 Interview, supra note 74.
81. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
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2. Author and Research Assistants' Searches. The
author and two research assistants conducting independent
searches collectively spent over 300 hours scouring Westlaw
or Lexis, the Internet generally, and online auction sites in
particular, for data about Article 9 secured party use of
online auctions.8 2 We found no reliable empirical data about
the extent to which Article 9 secured creditors were or were
not using online auctions. We did observe some ostensible
Article 9 collateral online sales, but found it difficult to
verify many sales as an Article 9 repossession sale. For
example, one research assistant on eBayMotors.com
searched under the terms "repo" and "repossessions," which
produced 85 items for sale listed by 30 different sellers. The
research assistant was able to contact 16 of these 30 sellers.
The research assistant could verify only that two of the
sixteen sellers were in fact secured creditors or working for
secured creditors. 83
From the author's and his two researchers' efforts, two
observations can be made. First, given the thousands of
automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles listed on
eBayMotors.com and other online auctions, it does not
appear that many sellers represent that they are selling
Article 9 repossessed property. To be sure, it may be that
sellers with repossessed vehicles do not want to advertise
that fact, and thus the number of repossessed vehicles may
be larger. On the other hand, it appears that some cars
listed as repossessed vehicles are actually cars being sold
for a second time through the online auction after being
purchased at a traditional repossession sale. Not only would
the online auction then not be considered an Article 9 sale,
but the seller apparently believes that advertising it online
as a repossession vehicle is advantageous, or at least not
disadvantageous.
Second, we could find no specialized online auction for
Article 9 secured creditors to sell their collateral.8 4 In
82. Memorandum from Dani Logan to author (Aug. 8, 2005) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Scott Bridge to author (Aug. 1, 2006) (on file with
author).
83. Memorandum from Dani Logan to author, supra note 82.
84. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (describing what a
specialized online auction would look like).
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contrast, there are online auctions sDecializing in the sale of
non-Article 9 distressed properties. as discussed above in
Part II. section B.8 5 Perhaps this absence is evidence of a
lack of demand from Article 9 secured creditors for such a
specialized site.
D. Explaining Apparent Article 9 Secured Creditor Slow
and Anemic Use
In the face of this anecdotal evidence of slow and
anemic secured creditor use, the author wanted to know
why this was happening notwithstanding the heralded
benefits of online auctions. The question can be answered
by proposing theoretical explanations or by conducting a
robust, random qualitative or quantitative empirical study.
The author chose the theoretical approach first, in order to
explore possible explanations for this slow and anemic use,
and thereby identify the questions empirical researchers
would want to ask which are common and salient to all
types of secured creditors considering a novel, new market
like an online auction. To inform the Article's theoretical
exploration, the Interviewees' comments are integrated in
the text and footnotes where appropriate. However, the
anecdotal evidence discussed above merely suggests, rather
than confirms, the veracity of some of the theoretical
reasons for anemic and slow secured party use set forth
next.
III. UNPACKING THE NON-ADOPTION THEORY
To explain the slow and anemic adoption of online
auctions by Article 9 secured parties, one could make a
number of arguments. Consider first two arguments the
Article will not make until Part VI, and then only briefly.
First, from the rational choice theory literature comes the
proposition that "actors will attempt to maximize their
financial well-being or monetary situation."8 6 The veracity
85. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
86. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1066 (2000).
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of this theory is hotly debated in various quarters. 87 In
87. There are divergent views and competing theories about the nature of
rationality and human decision-making. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
86, at 1063 (discussing the debate between rational choice theorists and
behavioral economists); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (responding to the
criticism of scholars of behavioral choice theory).
[Tihey complain with some justice that economists and economically
minded lawyers do not always make clear what they mean by
"rationality," let me make clear at the outset what I mean by the word:
choosing the best means to the chooser's ends. . . . No doubt my
definition lacks precision and rigor. But it is good enough to indicate
the difference in approach between rational-choice economics and
behavioral economics.
Id.; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79
OR. L. REV. 147, 159 (2000) (discussing various accounts of rationality from the
perspective of neo-classic economics, behavioral economics, and Richard Posner
("Posnerian rationality")); Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice:
Some Thoughts on the Relationship Among Rationality, Markets, and Human
Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091 (2005) (comparing rational choice theory
with rat choice theory); see also infra notes 284-300 and accompanying text
(discussing behavioral economics scholars' attack on the wealth-maximization
principle). Even within a particular account of rationality, such as rational
choice theory, depending on the scholar or commentator, seemingly different
articulations are given. As Korobkin and Ulen note,
[there is considerable debate within both the economics and law-and-
economics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is
and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the law-and-
economics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a
relatively weak, or "thin," presumption that individuals act to
maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a
relatively strong, or "thick," presumption that individuals act to
maximize their self-interest.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 86, at 1055.
Rational choice theory is the heart of modern microeconomic theory....
Unfortunately for the purposes of precise analysis, there is no single,
widely accepted definition of rational choice theory. Although the use of
the assumption that actors behave rationally is pervasive among law-
and-economics scholars, the assumption is most often implicit. As a
result, there is rarely a discussion in the legal literature about what,
exactly, constitutes rational behavior. In actuality, there are probably
nearly as many different conceptions of rational choice theory as there
are scholars who implicitly employ it in their work.
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Id. at 1060. For some examples, consider the following:
Rational choice theory is defined as a theory of instrumental
rationality; that is, the actor has a set of pre-established ends and then
decides how these ends are to be achieved. If the actor chooses the
optimal means to achieve her pre-established ends, she is rational; if
she chooses suboptimal means, she is irrational. The particular claim
of rational choice theory is that people are rational in this sense; that
is, they choose the optimal means to achieve their ends.
Rubin, supra, at 1092.
The rational choice model of human behavior postulates that
individuals "can perfectly process available information about
alternative courses of action .... can rank possible outcomes in order of
expected utility .. . [and can] choose the course of action that will
maximize [their] personal expected utility. . . ." In other words, people
should be viewed as rational actors who will seek out information
regarding alternatives, skillfully calculate utilities for each option, and
select the course of action that will maximize their wealth and
preferences.
Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 139, 156-57 (2006) (alterations in original); Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets
and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 421, 508-09 (2005) (stating that "[e]conomic analysis in general has been
dominated by rationale choice theory, the view that human beings are logical
maximizers of self-interest. Rational choice theory describes 'how people would
behave if they followed the dictates of a series of logical axioms, [and] posits
that people make outcome-maximizing decisions"').
Rational choice theory presumes that individuals always try to
maximize their expected utility, primarily through acting rationally
when making decisions involving risks and benefits. Rational-choice
theory assumes that "objective criteria exist . . . to differentiate
rational from irrational" behavior, that individual behavior is based on
rational considerations, and that individuals acting on optimal
information can and do rationally assess the risks involved in their
choices and seek to maximize utility by choosing from stable
preferences.
John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A
Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing The World, 85 Neb. L. Rev.
15, 20 (2006). The Article does not seek to resolve the debate over the meaning
of rationality set forth in this vast body of literature. In this sense the Article
has a modest (and manageable) goal: to provide theoretical reasons why a
2007] A THEORY OF NON-ADOPTION 165
particular, the wealth-maximizing proposition has been
applied to Article 9's commercial reasonableness standard
and the question of whether secured parties have the
incentive to maximize the collateral's price at a foreclosure
sale. On the one hand, some scholars and commentators
argue that secured parties systematically lack the incentive
to maximize the collateral's price.88 In particular, it is said
that secured parties lack the incentive to select the market
practices that will maximize the sale price.89 On the other
secured party who wants to maximize the value of collateral may not choose a
new market due to legal, business, or empirical uncertainty, and that this non-
adoption behavior may occur even where the new market is relatively more
efficient than the conventional, traditional market.
88. Heiser & Flemma, supra note 15, at 495 (noting that "[t]he Consumer
Debtor Advocates argue that Article 9 does not currently provide the secured
creditor with an incentive to maximize the proceeds from sale of the collateral. .
• . Some Consumer Debtor Advocates go so far as to claim that creditors want to
increase the size of deficiencies").
Proponents of the Article 9 sale procedure argue that the requirement
of a "commercially reasonable sale," backed by the threat to deny some
portion of the deficiency, gives incentives to repossessing secured
creditors to encourage bidding and seek a market price for the goods.
We doubt it . . . In fact, revised Article 9 seems to give secured
creditors the incentive to shoot for a double recovery by purchasing the
collateral at sale for less than its value, collecting the deficiency from
the debtor or guarantor, and then reselling the collateral in a
commercially reasonable sale-for its own account.
LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
86 (5th ed. 2006); see also Korybut, supra note 5, at 1424-31.
89. For example, with respect to his empirical study of a variety of methods
of automobile repossession sales and prices received therefrom, Professor
Shuchman stated:
Were the automobile repossessors to use the efficient business
practices in resale that they do in dealings with one another, there
would be no need for anything except the security of the automobile
itself. Were they to resell the repossessed car for deficiency judgment
purposes with anything like the zeal with which they originally sold
the car, they would have virtually all the profit for which they
contracted in most cases.
Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile
Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 54 (1969). In particular, at
wholesale dealer-only auctions of ninety-two cars, Professor Shuchman found
the average sale price to be ninety-three percent of the cars' wholesale price. Id.
at 45. This finding supported his argument that when they choose so, "the
[automobile] dealers can organize their affairs in a manner conducive to
maximum post-repossession sale prices." Id. at 54; see also Korybut, supra note
5, at 1424-31.
166 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
hand, some scholars, commentators, and courts argue that
secured parties do have the incentive to maximize the
collateral's net proceeds, at least up to the amount of the
outstanding debt owed by the debtor. They reason that a
secured party would rather have the certainty of the
maximum amount of resale dollars today than spend time
and money litigating a deficiency judgment that she may
not collect in full (or not at all in an absolute bar
jurisdiction) if the sale is found commercially unreasonable,
if the debtor is judgment proof, or if the debtor declares
bankruptcy. 90 While acknowledging this debate in the
90. For scholars and commentators, see Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability
of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1983).
Every dollar the creditor nets by resale reduces the outstanding debt
by a dollar; every dollar the creditor defers to the deficiency action to
collect will reduce the outstanding debt by less than a dollar because
the expected value of a litigation dollar is less than one, these dollars
being subject to risk and delay. Thus the creditor's incentive to
maximize the net gain from resale.
Id. at 127; see also William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security
Interests in Consumer Transactions, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 959, 965-66 (1986)
(noting that "Schwartz goes to some lengths to maintain that creditors who
repossess will maximize their proceeds on resale, a point with which I generally
agree.... The new owner has paid something approximating the goods' market
price").
In a world where the recovery of deficiency judgments is far from
certain.., why would the creditor not conduct a sale in a way that is
likely to bring the best net price? If the probability of a deficiency is
low, the creditor's failure to conduct a proper sale falls on the creditor,
not on the debtor. Unless we are to say that creditors are stupid (when
the debtor cannot pay the deficiency), or vindictive and mean spirited
(when the debtor can pay), we fail to understand the incentives for
taking a low price. We see strong incentives for getting a high price.
4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 454 (4th
ed. 1995).
Why would creditors routinely engage in a process that does not
produce the greatest net recovery (sale price minus expenses, including
lost profit) upon foreclosure? Surely creditors desire to maximize the
value received from collateral, particularly given the expenses
associated with collection of deficiencies and the likelihood that many
debtors will be judgment proof.
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literatures, for purposes of Parts III, IV, and V, the Article
assumes that the secured party is a wealth-maximizer in
the sense that, in keeping with Article 9's General
Directive, she, in good faith and with due diligence, seeks to
identify, assess, and use the reasonably available market
best calculated to maximize the collateral's net proceeds, at
least up to the amount of the outstanding loan. The Article
calls this the First Basic Assumption. In Part VI, this
assumption is relaxed.9 1
Second, one might argue that the slow and anemic
adoption of online auctions is due to the secured party's
James C. Marshall, Commercial Law, 44 MERCER L. REV. 99, 114 (1992); see
also Heiser & Flemma, supra note 15, at 495 (arguing that a secured party has
incentive to maximize proceeds to avoid costly deficiency actions); ZINNECKER,
supra note 30, at 93 (observing that "normally a foreclosing creditor has every
incentive to maximize disposition proceeds"). For cases, see In re Excello Press,
Inc., 890 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1989).
[Wl]hy shouldn't they [secured parties] maximize? Even if the secured
party could be assured of a judgment for the full deficiency, why would
it forgo a dollar today for the chance to enforce a deficiency judgment
tomorrow? The UCC provides that the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral are applied first to the expenses incurred in its disposition;
the remainder goes to satisfy the debt .... So even if the return after
expenses is small, the secured party will expend every cost-justified
effort because it prefers money now to judgment later. . . . Add the
uncertainty of recovery in litigation and this preference for cash grows
stronger.
In re Excello Press, Inc. 890 F.2d at 901 (citations omitted).
The secured party is required to utilize his best efforts to sell the
collateral for the best price and to have a reasonable regard for the
debtor's interest. The commercial realities are that the secured party
will generally try to obtain the highest possible price for collateral
since recovery of any deficiency is usually dubious.
Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 570 P.2d 702, 712 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1977) (citing First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Holston, 559 P.2d 440,
444 (Okla. 1976)); see also Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Elkins, 559 N.E.2d 456,
459 (Ohio 1990) (arguing that "[g]iven the economic realities of the lending
industry, a secured creditor will generally attempt to obtain the highest
possible price for the collateral since the recovery of a deficiency judgment
against a defaulted debtor is usually dubious").
91. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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lack of perfect legal, business, or empirical information
about continuing to use the conventional, traditional
market. There is a large, diverse body of literature arguing
that decision-makers do not have perfect information 92 and
that imperfect information can adversely affect a person's
ability to make efficient choices. 93 While acknowledging the
varying arguments in the literature, for purposes of Parts
III, IV, and V, the Article assumes that the secured party
does have perfect legal, business, and empirical information
about continuing to use the conventional, traditional
market. The Article calls this the Second Basic Assumption.
Further, for purposes of the Article's forthcoming analysis,
it is worth here noting two sub-assumptions. First, that for
the secured party's collateral, there is a conventional,
traditional market, and second that the secured party has
used this market at least once to sell her collateral. A
conventional, traditional market is defined for purposes of
the Article as a market that (1) regularly hosts sales of the
particular type of property the secured party is selling; (2)
has either been blessed by Article 9 precedent or is
constructed in a fashion that maximizes the possibility that
a court will find its use commercially reasonable; (3) is
considered prevailing, commonly accepted, or well-
recognized in the relevant commercial community for the
collateral type, or has a current critical mass of interested
potential bidders who will compete for such collateral; and
(4) on-average-over-time realizes reasonable net sale
proceeds (price less expenses). In Part VI, the Second Basic
Assumption and its two sub-assumptions are relaxed.
A. The Non-Adoption Theory For Novel, New Markets
The Article now proposes its non-adoption theory for
novel, new markets to explain the apparent failure of the
commercial reasonableness standard's incorporation
strategy. The non-adoption theory holds that for any given
new market a secured party will have imperfect
information due to legal, business, or empirical data
uncertainties with respect to identifying, assessing, and
92. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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using that new market. A secured party may fail to adopt a
relatively more efficient new market and continue instead
to use the conventional, traditional market due to the
aggregate amount of this legal, business, and empirical
data uncertainty. For the "riskiest" of new markets, those
with the highest aggregate degree of such uncertainty,
theoretically it is possible that no or very few secured
parties would ever adopt it. For a less risky market, one
with a wider range of perceived riskiness among secured
creditors, it is theoretically possible that some Article 9
secured creditors would adopt it and others would not.
The non-adoption theory obtains general support from
various quarters. First, there are myriad bodies of
substantive literature arguing that decision-makers do not
have perfect information,94 and that imperfect information
can adversely affect a person's ability to make efficient
94. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 445 (2005) (stating that "economists and
scholars of 'behavioral law and economics' (BLE) have come to attribute many
such rdecision-making] irrationalities to a combination of 'bounded rationality'
and cognitive fallibilities. Bounded rationality postulates that deviations from
rational choice are the result of (a) constraints on time and energy for gathering
perfect information and (b) constraints on the brain's information capacities,
wiring, and computing speed" (footnotes omitted)); Rubin, supra note 87, at
1094 (stating that "[riationale choice theory . . . asserts that the buyer is
rational if his choice is subjectively optimal, namely, as good as it can be given
the resources that are available to him . . . . The most serious resource
constraint is clearly a lack of information, either because no one has the
information or because the information is not available to the decision maker.
No one knows whether there will be an economic downturn later in the year;
each corporation knows its internal plans, but there is no way for the buyer to
discover them. Thus, evaluation of alternatives must frequently rely on
assigning uncertain probabilities to different outcomes" (footnotes omitted));
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 187 (2004)
(stating that "[hiow does the actual world differ from the idealized world of
perfect information, fully specified laws, and impartiality? First, the actual
world is characterized by the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact.
No one citizen has perfect information about the content of the law or the state
of the world. Indeed, each of us knows only a small fraction of the information
that would be required for perfect compliance with our legal obligations");
Charles J. Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View,
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259, 265 (2004) (stating that the "world of perfect
information, no transaction costs, and totally rational human beings [does not
hold] in the real world").
170 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 55
choices. 95 Second, as a general matter, much and varied
literature argues that legal and business uncertainty and
lack of predictability may stifle beneficial commercial
activity because it reduces commercial actors' ability to
assess legal risk and economic risk,96 adjust commercial
95. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security:
Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 698 (2005)
(discussing economic theory in the context of deterring cybercrime, and stating
that "the theory itself depends on assumptions that are not satisfied in the real
world. For example, the theory assumes that all market participants have
access to perfect information at no cost. The notorious insufficiency of accurate
information about the frequency, nature and cost of cybercrime, therefore,
indicates that neither government, nor market participants, would have the
information necessary to make the precise adjustments required to eliminate
externalities without the risk of over-reaction and resulting under-use of
cyberspace and information technology"); David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh,
The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization
in a World of Friction, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 61, 87 (2005) (stating that "[elconomists
only assume that transactions are efficient under conditions of perfect
information, a condition that real markets rarely meet. Transactions based on
very good information are likely to be efficient, but transactions based on very
poor information are much less likely to be efficient. This would seem
intuitively obvious" (footnote omitted)); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary
Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and
Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319, 321 (2001) (stating that
"[s]ome economists concede that individuals may fail to act in a way that
maximizes expected utility because they lack complete information" (footnote
omitted)); Schroeder, supra note 87, at 170 (stating that "Posner must obviously
reject the suggestion that any empirical human being has the type of knowledge
posited by the traditional ordered preference hypothesis-such knowledge
would only exist in some form of 'perfect market.' Actual markets are
characterized not by perfection but by scarcity. Information is often, or usually,
not readily, instantaneously and costlessly available. This implies that
economic actors are forced to act with imperfect information; thus, they may fail
to take and act upon that which is in their best interest because of ignorance (or
a misunderstanding) with respect to the consequences of their action").
96. See, e.g., Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the Process and Mistrusting the
Results: A Structural Perspective on Article 9"s Low-Price Foreclosure Rule, 9
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 351, 377 (2001) (stating that "[t]he unpredictability of
standards causes them to deter not only undesirable conduct (such as, in this
case, inequitably low bids) but also desirable conduct (such as, in this case,
participation in auctions by suspect parties with any bid at all and, ex ante,
decisions to lend in the first place)" (footnote omitted)); Raymond T. Nimmer &
Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information Property Rights, 2
HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 199-200 (1987) (stating that when a creditor is deciding
whether to make a loan, "[c]larity of law enhances the creditor's ability to assess
risks by delineating and converting the legal risks into clear statements of
relative position. Conversely, uncertainty regarding the effect of a transaction
reduces a lender's willingness to make a loan"); R. J. Robertson, Jr., The Illinois
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behavior, 97 and lower transaction costs. 98 In particular, this
non-adoptive behavior can occur in the face of uncertainty
Electronic Commerce Security Act: A Response to Martin Behn, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J.
473, 478 (2000) (stating that "contradictory judicial decisions caused
considerable uncertainty about the status of electronic records and signatures.
Business persons frequently cited this uncertainty as the basis for their
unwillingness to engage in more extensive electronic commerce activities.
Accordingly, most commentators concluded that some legislation was necessary
to remove this uncertainty by equating electronic records and signatures with
'signed writings"); id. at 489 (arguing that although "many advantages of doing
business electronically would probably lead many businesses to engage in
electronic commerce even if there were some uncertainty about the legal
legitimacy of electronic records and electronic signatures," this uncertainty may
not have been easily overcome without legislation-the Illinois Electronic
Security Act-that "removes any doubts about the legal legitimacy of electronic
records and electronic signatures. This should provide a stimulus to those risk-
averse individuals who would otherwise forgo or minimize their involvement in
electronic commerce transactions" (footnote omitted)); Task Force on Stored-
Value Cards, A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis
of Commercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic
Money, 52 Bus. LAw. 653, 655 (1997) (discussing how existing commercial law
may apply to "new electronic retail payments media," and that existing law
"should not stifle development of more economically efficient retail-payment
systems. The Task Force observes, however, that legal uncertainty may be just
as stifling to development of these products because such uncertainty makes it
difficult for developers and users to ascertain, control, and appropriately limit
risk. What is needed, in the Task Force's view, is a careful balance; there must
be sufficiently clear legal rules to assess liability and risk but the rules should
not be so constraining and costly that they amount to an iron cage"); Ginger Jin
& Andrew Kato, Blind Trust Online: Experimental Evidence from Baseball
Cards 1, 33-34 (2002), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/sempapers/Jin.pdf
(recommending that to address buyer misconception of risks of trading online,
"a complete set of property rights must be clearly defined so all parties involved
in online auctions-buyers, sellers, auction sites, and credit card companies-
have well specified responsibilities .... Buyers who do not understand their
legal rights cannot be expected to take full account of the risks involved"
(footnote omitted)). See generally Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A
(Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. Pirr. L. REV. 89, 108 (1999)
(stating that "[i]n addition to considerations of efficiency and fairness, the
doctrine of stare decisis has also been justified on the basis of a need for
certainty in the law. Under this theory, individuals should be able to predict the
legal consequences of their behavior and that ability would be seriously eroded
if courts were free to disregard precedent" (footnotes omitted)); Wiseman, supra
note 1, at 513-15 (reporting that Llewellyn's merchant tribunal's "decisions
would have 'no precedent building character,"' and that "depriving the panel's
decisions of precedential value ... [came at the] cost of diminishing the positive
use of merchant tribunal decisions as a basis for planning, for certainty, and for
friendly law").
97. See. e.g., John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of
Llewellyn, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 350 (2000) (stating that "[t]he ability to
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introduced bv electronic commerce and new business
practices. 99 Finallv. everv Interviewee identified some tvpe
of legal or business uncertainty that could adversely affect a
secured party's decision to use an online auction. 100
predict the legal consequences of one's actions is of course a primary benefit of
the rule of law. Without the greater freedom that predictability brings, citizens
cannot plan with confidence for the future. They 'may simply be unable to carry
out complex social arrangements that are dependent on legal sanctions being
predictable in their application.' As Llewellyn succinctly stated, 'inadequate
legal theory makes for uncertainty in the results of legal cases. In transaction-
law at least, this is a heavy debit item" (footnotes omitted)); Hillinger, supra
note 3, at 1165 (stating that "[i]f you could not predict a court's behavior, you
could not adjust your own").
98. See, e.g., Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of
Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391, 393 (2006) (stating that "[tihe
transaction costs resulting from these uncertainties affect the open source
software community and are potentially substantial obstacles to broader and
more rapid adoption of CC licenses" (footnotes omitted)); Thomas R. McLean,
The Future of Telemedicine & Its Faustian Reliance on Regulatory Trade
Barriers for Protection, 16 HEALTH MATRix 443, 461 (2006) (stating that "unified
regulatory schemes have the potential to reduce transaction costs by the
elimination of regulation uncertainty" (footnote omitted)); Kurt A. Strasser,
Piercing The Veil In Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 642 (2005)
(stating that "[tihe standards by which veil piercing is effected are vague,
leaving judges great discretion. The result has been uncertainty and lack of
predictability, increasing transaction costs for small businesses" (quoting
Stephen M. BainBridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 481
(2001))). See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and
Economics of Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 72 (stating that
"technology can increase uncertainties and transaction costs under certain
conditions" (footnote omitted)).
99. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 96, at 199-200; Robertson, supra
note 96, at 478; Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, supra note 96, at 655.
100. With respect to legal and business uncertainty, Lawyer #1 identified
the open question of whether online auctions are commercially reasonable-in
particular the issue of how to inspect collateral in cyberspace-and the lack of
familiarity with online auctions. Lawyer #1 Interview, supra note 70. Lawyer
#2 identified the commercial reasonableness question and the concern that if a
repossession sale resulted in a low price, the debtor would be more likely to
challenge the sale if it was through an online auction rather than a
conventional method. He/she also cited the uncertainty of what legal liability a
secured creditor would have if it listed collateral on an online auction, bidders
have registered their bids, and while the auction was still ongoing the debtor
filed for bankruptcy triggering the automatic stay. Could the secured creditor
legally and functionally stop the ongoing online auction with current bids
outstanding? Lawyer #2 Interview, supra note 71. Lawyer #3 indicated that the
commercial reasonableness question was an issue. Supplemental Telephone
interview with Lawyer #3 (Sept. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Lawyer #3 Supplemental
Interview]. However, Lawyer #3 did allow that, with the right facts, he/she
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B. Applying the Non-Adoption Theory
Because secured parties come in varying levels of
sophistication and size, 101 and collateral types vary from
the common and inexpensive to the unique and
expensive, 10 2 the degree of legal, empirical data, or business
thought the secured party could win a lawsuit challenging the sale. Lawyer #3
Interview, supra note 72. Online Representative #1 identified the commercial
reasonableness question, in particular stating that in one large state a
spokesperson for an association of secured creditor financial institutions had
said that he/she thought that under that state's laws, including Article 9, use of
an online auction would not be commercially reasonable, while in another large
state the lawyer from a similar association of secured creditor financial
institutions thought such use would be commercially reasonable. Online
Representative #1 Interview, supra note 73. Online Representative #2 indicated
that potential sellers were unfamiliar with online auctions and were concerned
about fraudulent bidding schemes. Online Representative #2 Interview, supra
note 74.
101. Consider two extremes of secured parties: those that normally engage
in the business of selling the collateral type (a merchant secured party) and
those that do not (a nonmerchant secured party). A car dealer, for example,
repossessing a car and selling it under Article 9 is a merchant secured party
since he normally sells cars, even repossessed ones. Professor Gilmore, in the
context of an Article 2-314 warranty of merchantability, stated that a financier
would not be a merchant while a car dealer would be a merchant. 2 GILMORE,
supra note 6, at 1239. In contrast, a credit union repossessing and selling a
consumer's car may be a nonmerchant secured party where it normally does not
sell such collateral type. Between these two extremes lie a rich mix of secured
parties with differing levels of experience, capabilities, and resources in selling
the collateral type. Where a secured party is not a merchant of the collateral
and is not otherwise familiar with or in possession of the market sale channels
for that collateral, she may lack the sophistication and resources to identify and
implement the proper market or sale procedures for the collateral. See also
Poscover, supra note 15, at 247 (stating that "[i]f the secured lender is
inexperienced or the collateral is unusual, the secured lender may not be aware
of the best way to dispose of the collateral for the optimum price"). Indeed, some
commentators and courts acknowledge this handicap by allowing the
nonmerchant secured party more leeway in selecting proper sale procedures.
See 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1183-84 (stating that "[wihat is 'commercially
reasonable' vis-A-vis a businessman who knows the facts of life is not
necessarily 'commercially reasonable' vis-A-vis a consumer or small
businessman"); Connex Press, Inc. v. Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 51,
(1977) (secured party with expertise in selling collateral type held to higher
standard); Korybut, supra note 5, at 1457.
102. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 76-79 (defining a range of collateral
from "general collateral"--common, widely used, or relatively inexpensive
goods-to "specific collaterar'-large, expensive, or unique goods.). See generally
Zubrow, supra note 15, at 471 (discussing the uncertainty of resale given that
different property requires different marketing approaches).
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uncertainty that any given secured party will experience
with respect to a novel, new market will differ. Some
secured creditors will see the new market as raising a high
degree of legal, empirical data, and/or business uncertainty
and thus consider it a very "risky" market. Others will see
the same market as less risky. Further, given the range of
secured parties and collateral types, there surely are many
idiosyncratic reasons why a secured creditor would suffer
legal, empirical data, and/or business uncertainty with
respect to a novel, new market.
The Article seeks to apply the non-adoption theory
broadly across the Article 9 secured lending community
rather than narrowly to a particular type of secured
creditor selling a particular type of collateral. Thus, the
Article frames the non-adoption theory as three hypotheses
that can be applied to any secured party selling any type of
collateral in any new market. First, the more legally and
commercially novel a new market is when compared to the
conventional, traditional market(s) the secured party
normally uses, the more legal, empirical data, and/or
business uncertainty that the secured party likely will
experience with respect to using the new market to sell
repossessed collateral. Part IV sets forth seven interrelated
progenitors of such legal, empirical data, or business
uncertainty that should be salient and common in varying
degrees to most, if not all, types of secured creditors selling
any type of collateral in any new market. Accordingly, the
Article does not attempt to identify and discuss
idiosyncratic reasons for legal, empirical data, or business
uncertainty. Second, for any secured party, as more of these
progenitors in number and degree pertain to a new market,
the more the secured party will experience uncertainty
about using the new market for the first time. In other
words, as more progenitors of uncertainty in number and
degree obtain to any given secured party, the more she will
perceive the new market as "risky." Third, that for any
given secured party, at some point the legal, empirical data,
and/or business uncertainty may become too great, and she
will forgo the too risky new market and cling instead to the
"safer" conventional, traditional market.
The three theoretical hypotheses attempt to explain
secured party behavior, a task fraught with difficulty and
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limitations. 103 As indicated in Part II, section D the Article
aims to explore possible theoretical explanations for slow
and anemic use of online auctions, and thereby identify the
questions empirical researchers would want to ask which
are common and salient to all types of secured creditors
considering a novel, new market like an online auction.
Thus, in Part IV each of the seven progenitors is posed as a
question a secured party might have with respect to a new
market. For each question, the Article explores the legal,
business, and empirical data problems that could make its
answer uncertain, and thus theoretically cause the secured
party not to adopt a relatively more efficient new market
and continue instead to use the conventional, traditional
market. Necessarily, a robust empirical study using these
questions and others raised by the Article must be
conducted to test the veracity of the theoretical hypotheses
and the seven progenitors of uncertainty.
IV. PROGENITORS OF LEGAL, EMPIRICAL, AND BUSINESS
UNCERTAINTY AND THEIR CORRECTIVE MEASURES
In seven sections, Part IV analyzes the non-adoptive
effect(s) of seven salient and common progenitors of legal,
empirical, and/or business uncertainty. In each section, the
Article first describes the progenitor and then applies it
through the first and third hypothesis to explore the
progenitor's theoretical, non-adoptive effect. In Part V the
Article will apply the second hypothesis. As a
developmental vehicle, Part IV largely uses the online
auction market channel as an example of a novel, new
market. Finally, in each section, the Article then discusses
legal, empirical, and/or business corrective measures to
mitigate each progenitor's uncertainty and its theoretical
non-adoptive effect with respect to the novel, new market.
Three preliminary points are necessary. First, as stated
in the Article's introduction, the online market channel is
"new" in the sense that it is the latest significant market
channel to develop as an alternative to conventional,
traditional markets for collateral. Second, online auctions
103. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 86, at 1063.
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are "novel" in significant legal and commercial ways from
traditional methods of selling goods like conventional public
auctions. 10 4 For purposes of Part IV, consider in particular
that conventional repossession sales take place in the real
world bounded by time and space. In contrast, online
auctions take place in an abstract, boundless
"cyberspace."10 5 Further, interaction between the seller and
potential bidders is done through an Internet Web site
using computers rather than face-to-face (or phone-to-
phone) contact. While there are many other differences,
these are illustrative and they acutely affect the seven
progenitors of legal and/or business uncertainty to varying
degrees. Third, one might argue that the online auction
channel is only one form of new market, and a particularly
novel one at that. Thus using it as the Article's illustrative
new market proves too little and too much. The criticism
misses the point that the non-adoption theory and its three
hypotheses are secured party, collateral type, and new
market neutral. To be sure, as discussed in Part IV, the
online auction channel creates pronounced legal, business,
and empirical uncertainties, but it is precisely for this
reason that it is useful to explicate as fully as possible the
non-adoption theory, its three hypotheses, and the seven
uncertainty progenitors. To use a new market that does not
evoke such uncertainty hardly seems worth the academic
effort. Further, many of the corrective measures discussed
in Part IV transcend the market type. Finally, using online
auctions allows the Article to address the current non-
adoption puzzler.
A. Will a Sale Through the New Market Be Commercially
Reasonable?
The most important legal question the secured party
will ask is whether using the new market is commercially
reasonable. For new markets, to varying degrees the
answer to that question will be uncertain for doctrinal and
104. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 61-63.
105. See id. at 106-07.
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empirical reasons. 106 Without this legal certainty and
empirical certainty, the secured party will not know
whether the sale likely will be challenged by a debtor in
court, found commercially unreasonable by a reviewing
court, or result in the secured party's inability to collect a
deficiency and the imposition of possible additional
penalties. Concomittantly, the secured party will be
uncertain about whether, and the extent to which, he would
need to incur litigation costs like attorneys fees, which
under certain circumstances the secured party might not
recover from the debtor. 107 These uncertainties may lead to
non-adoption.
1. Tension With Article 9 Jurisprudence. The non-
adoption theory's first hypothesis is that the more legally,
empirically, and/or commercially novel a new market is
when compared to the conventional, traditional market, the
more uncertainty a secured party will feel about using the
new market to sell repossessed collateral. To refine the
point, the more a new market in form and function differs
from the markets and their attendant sale practices which
have been blessed under Article 9's robust body of
commercial reasonableness jurisprudence, the greater the
secured party's ex ante legal uncertainty will be about
whether the new market ex post will be found commercially
reasonable.10 8 That is so for two preliminary reasons.
106. The Article considers only Article 9, although other laws may give rise
to legal uncertainty about using a new market. For example, in California, the
secured party must comply with both the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales &
Finance Act and the California's Uniform Commercial Code to obtain a
deficiency judgment after the sale of a repossessed vehicle. Bank of Am. v.
Lallana, 960 P.2d 1133 (Cal. 1998).
107. Reimbursement for litigation costs may not occur where (1) under the
security agreement the secured party is not entitled to such reimbursement, or
(2) the secured party is entitled to such reimbursement, but the debtor is not
locatable, is judgment proof, or is in bankruptcy. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
108. The debate about whether a commercial reasonableness standard can
accommodate new electronic commercial technology and concomitant legal
issues is not isolated to Article 9 and online auctions. See Robertson, supra note
96, at 495-96 (criticizing one commentator's assertion that with respect to
evaluating electronic commercial security procedures "the standard of
'commercial reasonableness' provides insufficient predictability 'because the
marketplace has not yet established sufficient customs and practices necessary
2007] 177
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
First, within the Article 9 literature there still is debate
about how easy it is to plan any Article 9 sale, let alone one
using a new market. When adopted by the states over forty-
five years ago, Article 9's commercial reasonableness
standard was criticized as providing the secured party with
too little guidance as to how to conduct a commercially
reasonable sale. 10 9 But as discussed in Part I, section B,
over the years a robust body of published judicial opinions
on what constitutes a commercially reasonable sale has
developed. From this Article 9 jurisprudence, doctrinal
factors of commercial reasonableness have been
established, including publicity (advertising) of the sale; the
place of sale; solicitation and receipt of bids; the secured
party's familiarity with type of property; the price realized
for the collateral; and whether the sale was in accordance
with reasonable commercial practices. 110 Secured parties (or
their advisers) planning sales and courts reviewing them
consult these doctrinal factors." 1  Some commentators
maintain that this robust bodv of Article 9 repossession sale
jurisprudence provides secured parties sufficient
guidance." 2 Yet other commentators disagree. 1 3 This
to provide substance to [the] factors [used to determine commercial
reasonableness], nor have the courts had an adequate opportunity to properly
evaluate the marketplace' (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
109. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 335-36 (1973); Imad D. Abyad, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl
Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 442
(1997) (stating that "[t]he main criticism of using deliberately vague standards
in the Code was the belief that doing so would inevitably lead to uncertainty
and lack of uniformity" (footnote omitted)); Poscover, supra note 15, at 246
(stating that "Article 9 sales are not without their disadvantages. The secured
lender lacks the absolute certainty and security of following precise guidelines
as set forth in real estate foreclosure statutes").
110. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; Paul H. Shur, New Article
9-A Commercial Lawyer's Synopsis, 116 BANKING L.J. 843, 927-28 (1999)
(discussing the factors of commercial reasonableness from the perspective a
commercial lawyer). See generally FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at v
(stating that their book is "useful to lawyers who represent creditors and
debtors, including counsel at banks and other financial institutions, and to loan
officers and other nonlawyers responsible for planning and implementing the
disposition itself").
112. See Heiser & Flemma, supra note 15, at 495 (stating that "through
years of judicial interpretation, the courts have fleshed out Article 9's
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disagreement itself suggests that planning a commercially
framework for disposing of collateral in a way that is workable for sales of many
types of collateral in many different markets"); Poscover, supra note 15, at 246-
47; see also Howard Ruda, Article 9 Works-How Come?, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
309, 319 (1995) (stating that "[Article 9] neither defines 'commercially
reasonable' nor does it spell out the criteria of reasonableness. However, the
uncertainty that this would seem to engender does not exist in practice. A
secured party can avoid attack by behaving in a way that is unarguably
reasonable. In a given fact situation, the proper course of action is not hard to
identify."). Ruda also argues that sale costs are limited because the creditor has
the incentive to maximize recovery and because "the creditor's conduct is tested
by the objective facts of its procedural compliance, and the creditor can make a
record of its conduct, avoidance of litigation, much less loss, is almost always
achievable" Id. (footnote omitted).
113. See, e.g., Ralph C. Clontz, Guide to a Secured Creditor's Remedies on
Debtors' Default, 7 UCC L.J. 348, 371 (1972) (stating "[t]he drafters of Article 9
and particularly section 9-504 have left the foreclosure path completely
uncharted. There is no guidance to the attorney representing either a secured
party or debtor who must advise his client as to the elements required for a
disposition to be 'commercially reasonable"'); Bennett H. Goldstein, Sale of
Repossessed Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Building a Record
for Trial, 89 CoM. L.J. 180, 186 (1984) (discussing uncertainty of planning- a
foreclosure sale that case law may exacerbate rather than alleviate); Alvin C.
Harrell, UCC Article 9 Revisions Confront Issues Affecting Consumer Collateral,
49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 256, 260 (1995) (discussing the request of consumer
representatives during the Article 9 drafting process that the commercial
reasonableness standard provide a "laundry list" of factors to provide more
guidance); John I. Karesh, Repossession of Collateral and Foreclosure of
Security Interests in Leveraged Lease Aircraft Finance Transactions, AIR &
SPACE LAw, Fall 1995, at 9, 13 (stating that "[b]ecause the standards for
determining whether a particular disposition of collateral is commercially
reasonable are fluid and fact specific, predicting the outcome of a challenge to
the commercial reasonableness of any particular disposition is difficult, and the
resulting litigation is burdensome, even if successful" (footnote omitted));
Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About
the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's
Observations, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 249, 258-59 (1995) (arguing that the
undefined commercial reasonableness standard breeds uncertainty, and "has
invited too much litigation and fails entirely to ... provid[e] a guideline for the
conduct of behavior. Consequently . ..without a guideline as to what that
behavior should be, there can be no meaningful criteria for determining the
propriety of that behavior." (footnote omitted)); Zubrow, supra note 15, at 471
(discussing the uncertainty of resale given that different property requires
different marketing approaches); Raymond E. Dunn, Jr., Comment, The
Standard of Commercial Reasonableness in the Sale of Repossessed Collateral
by Secured Creditors in North Carolina, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 73-80
(1979); see also N.C. Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 256 S.E.2d 388, 391 (N.C. 1979)
(stating that "[t]he concept of commercial reasonableness has been notoriously
difficult to define and has therefore been unevenly applied by courts and
juries").
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reasonable sale is not always an easy, certain, or
predictable endeavor.
Second. given this general uncertaintv arisina from
Article 9 iurisprudence, it should not be surDrisina that a
secured Dartv mav feel additional and increased
uncertainty about using a new market which differs in form
and function in important respects from conventional,
traditional market channels for repossessed collateral, and
thus raises myriad novel doctrinal questions under these
commercial reasonableness factors. 114
Given these sources of legal uncertainty, the first
hypothesis predicts that the secured party will see the
novel, new market that differs in form and function as
legally "risky," and the conventional, traditional market as
legally "safer" where the latter market either has been
specifically blessed by a court in factually on-point case law
precedent, or at minimum does not run afoul of the generic
doctrinal factors of commercial reasonableness described
above. 115 Applying this first hypothesis to the online auction
channel, consider two ways the online auction channel is
significantly different in form and function from real-world
sales and thus raises serious doctrinal questions of
commercial reasonableness.
Under Article 9, the secured party must provide the
debtor, and certain third-parties, with notice of the sale
that contains certain information, including the sale's
location." 6 The notice's contents differ depending upon the
sale's characterization as "private" or "public."11 7 Article 9
does not define these terms; thus, case law has filled the
gap. 1 8 From this case law, one can extract the requirement
that for a sale to be considered "public," the general public
must have unrestricted access to the sale site." 9 This
requirement contemplates a physical, geographically bound
114. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 61-63.
115. See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text.
116. See Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-611(b), 9-613(l)(E).
117. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-613(l)(E).
118. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 61-63.
119. See id.
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real world space. In the boundlessness of cyberspace, who is
"the general public," where is the sale "site" located, and
what does "unrestricted access" to a cyberspace sale site
require are all legitimate and serious doctrinal questions. 120
Relatedly, consider the case law requirement that for a
public sale of tangible collateral, the secured party must
give potential bidders a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the collateral prior to the sale. 121 Suppose the secured party
uses an online auction to sell the repossessed inventory of a
defunct computer store located in Santa Clara, California.
How exactly does a secured party satisfy the inspection
requirement in a cyberspace market? Are pictures of the
collateral posted on the Web site sufficient? Can the debtor
successfully challenge the sale by arguing that potential
online bidders outside of California did not have a
reasonable opportunity to inspect the collateral? 122 Again,
these are legitimate and serious doctrinal questions.
Secured parties face other thorny doctrinal questions
with respect to the commercial reasonableness of online
auctions.123 The author has discussed these issues and
recommended solutions elsewhere, and thus this Article
does not repeat such analysis. 124 Rather, the point here is
that, absent case law which specifically addresses these
doctrinal questions in the context of online auctions, ex ante
120. See id.
121. See id. at 106-07.
122. See id. Some commentators have suggested answers. See, e.g., AGIN,
supra note 54, ch.15:5 (stating in the context of selling bankruptcy estate assets
that a "website provides an ideal medium for disseminating detailed
information about an asset and the sale process; it can deliver not only written
information, but also pictures, video, and more complex data forms. For
example, a website could contain a three-dimensional walk-through of a
building available for sale or make a spreadsheet containing financial data
available for download"); Jin and Kato, supra note 96, at 5 (stating that "eBay
announced a special quality assurance program for automobiles, featuring
escrow service at the expense of $22 and third party vehicle inspection at $99").
123. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 31 (listing novel questions raised by
online auction use including whether through an online auction "a reasonable
purchase price [will be] realized," whether "legally appropriate advertising of an
online auction to the relevant group of potential bidders [can] occur over the
Web," and whether it is "ever 'commercially reasonable' for a secured party to
employ an online auction to dispose of repossessed collateral").
124. See id. at 65.
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secured parties may suffer great uncertainty about whether
their use of a "risky" online auction will be found
commercially reasonable by a court. Indeed, several of the
Interviewees provide anecdotal evidence that suggests this
hypothesis. 125
Unfortunately, to date, there is not a single published
case discussing the question of whether an Article 9 secured
party's use of an online auction is commercially reasonable,
let alone resolving the specific legitimate doctrinal
questions discussed above. While there are bankruptcy
court cases where the bankruptcy judge has approved the
trustee's request to use an online auction to sell bankruptcy
assets, none of these cases wrestle with the question of
whether using an online auction is commercially reasonable
under Article 9.126
One notable exception within the bankruptcy context is
In re A. W. Logging, Inc.127 A.W. Logging, Inc. filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Les Bois Leasing, a creditor,
received permission from the bankruptcy court to sell
certain heavy equipment leased to A.W. Logging, Inc., but
the court apparently did not prescribe a method of sale. Les
Bois Leasing used the online auction site Iron Planet 128 to
sell the heavy equipment. A.W. Logging, Inc. challenged the
sale's reasonableness for a variety of reasons, including an
alleged low price and use of an incorrect online auction
site. 129
125. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 268 B.R. 468, 470
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the Chapter 7 trustee used "an extensive
internet marketing effort" to sell assets); In re Phoenix Med. Tech., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 00-07253-W, 2001 WL 1806975, at *1-2 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2001)
(describing how the Bankruptcy Court granted debtor's application to use an
Internet auctioneer to help advertise and sell debtor's business, a manufacturer
of disposable latex, vinyl, and nitrate gloves); In re AIOC Corp., Nos. 96 B
41895, 96 B 41896, 1999 WL 1327910 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1999)
(authorizing a Chapter 11 trustee to sell some assets through eBay, and finding
that "[t]he Sale of the Art by auction in an online trading forum administered
by eBay is likely to yield a price that is per se fair and the product of good faith
and arm's-length dealings").
127. Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2860808 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2006).
128. http://www.ironplanet.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
129. Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2860808 at 7 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2006).
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The bankruptcy court reviewed the sale. Because the
equipment was leased, the court noted that Article 9 did not
directly govern the transaction. However, the court
consulted "the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code, and cases
interpreting its provisions, for guidance as to what
constitutes a commercially reasonable sale .. . ."130 In
particular, the court reviewed the commercial
reasonableness of Les Bois Leasing's choice to use Iron
Planet rather than another online auction, the Sawmill
Exchange, 131 to sell one of the two pieces of heavy
equipment, a sawmill. The court's discussion on this matter
was relatively brief:
Debtor [A.W. Logging Inc.] argues that Creditor's [Les Bois
Leasing] use of Iron Planet to auction the equipment was not
commercially reasonable. In his testimony, Mr. Wolske [Debtor's
principal] expressed his belief a better result would have been
obtained by using an auction website devoted specifically to this
type of equipment, called the "Sawmill Exchange." As the Court
understands this testimony, then, Debtor's concern is not that the
equipment was sold via the internet, but with the particular online
auction service selected by Creditor to conduct the sale.
The evidence showed that Iron Planet is a well-respected auction
website that specializes in the sale of heavy equipment. While
perhaps potential purchasers would first consult the sawmill sale
site, the Court is not persuaded that, by listing the equipment for
sale on the Iron Planet site, the Sawmill was not exposed a to [sic]
broad market. The fact that several bids were placed indicates
individuals looking to purchase this type of equipment utilize the
Iron Planet website. While Debtor would have preferred a
different electronic auction service be utilized, under these
circumstances, the Court concludes Creditor has met its burden of
showing that the sale of the Sawmill on Iron Planet, a website
specializing in heavy equipment auctions, was reasonable.
132
No doubt the court's opinion is welcomed bv those
advocating for the use of online auctions to sell renossessed
collateral. But the brevitv of the court's discussion
potentially narrows greatly the opinion's impact and leaves
130. Id. at 7.
131. http://www.sawmillexchange.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
132. Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2860808 at 7-8 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2006).
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much to be desired. A.W. Loaaina. Inc. araued that if the
creditor had used the Sawmill Exchange rather than Iron
Planet, "a better result would have been obtained bv using
an auction website devoted sDecificallv to [sellina
sawmills]."133 As the court noted, "the Debtor's concern is..
. with the particular online auction service selected bv
Creditor to conduct the sale." Havine framed the issue in
this manner, one would have exnected the court to compare
the two sites. Indeed, as discussed below, 134 under Article 9
where the debtor (or her expert witness) provides credible
evidence (1) of a low price, (2) that ex ante the secured
party had had multiple possible markets (in this case two
online auctions) from which to choose and through which
similar goods are frequently sold, and (3) that one online
auction is relatively more efficient for selling such
collateral than the other online auction actually used by the
secured party, the court should carefully examine whether
the secured party considered using the more efficient online
auction and whether it was reasonably available under the
circumstances.
In evaluating the efficiencv of Iron Planet. the court
said it was a "well-respected" auction web site through
which the eauiDment was exposed to a "broad market."'135
Yet the court did not discuss the evidence that convinced it
that Iron Planet was a "well-respected." In Part IV. section
B. the Article discusses how courts condone markets that
are "well-recognized" or "commonly accepted," and that the
secured party must provide evidence of such. 136 Further,
the onlv evidence the court seems to cite for the assertion
that Iron Planet would expose the eauipment to a "broad
market" was that the sawmill had received "several bids."
Worse, even though the court conceded that "perhaps
potential purchasers would first consult the sawmill sale
site" it made no apparent effort to determine whether the
Sawmill Exchange would have been the more efficient
online auction to use. For example, the court could have
133. Id. at 8.
134. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
135. Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2860808 at 8 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2006).
136. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
184 [Vol. 55
A THEORY OF NON-ADOPTION
asked whether sawmills similar to A.W. Logging. Inc.'s
sawmills had been sold through the Sawmill Exchange. in
what number and freauencv. and at what prices. 137
Further. the court could have asked whether there was a
current critical mass of interested bidders in sawmills at
the specialized sawmill site. and, if so. whether such a
critical mass likelv would have produced more vigorous.
competitive bidding (and concomitantlv a higher price)
than the "several bids" and price realized on Iron Planet. 138
Perhaus the court made this inauirv and simplv did not
mention it in its opinion. Or perhaps A.W. Logging. Inc.
had not provided credible evidence to support "its belief'
that the Sawmill Exchange was the more efficient online
auction. Either way, the opinion is silent on these issues.
Finally, perhaps the court's abbreviated discussion was
the result of its determination that in fact the price
received at the Iron Planet sale was not low. and thus the
court did not engage in a careful scrutiny review. While
A.W. Logging, Inc. had presented expert testimony to show
a low price was received for the equipment because the
creditor had used Iron Planet, the court did not find the
testimonv credible. 139 "Any complaints Debtor mav have
about the resulting sale price, in the Court's opinion, are
attributable to market factors and the condition of the
eauiDment, and not the result of Creditor's sale
methods."140
Whether In re A.W Loooina. Inc.. a recent case
(October. 2006), will have a catalytic effect on Article 9
secured creditor use of online auctions outside of the
bankruptcy context remains to be seen. But given online
137. See infra notes 223-36, 261-63 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 178, 242, 259-60 and accompanying text.
139. Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2860808 at 2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2006).
140. Id. at 6.
Debtor presented testimony that comparable, operable sawmills, could
be expected to command a price of somewhere between $42,000-
$54,000. However, the Court regards this opinion with some
skepticism, considering that over five years ago the Sawmill was
purchased by Creditor for $52,000. The Court questions the notion that
the equipment has suffered little significant depreciation in value.
Id. at 8.
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auctions' novel nature when compared to conventional, real
world market channels, the near complete absence of on-
point case law addressing the thorny doctrinal questions
discussed above, and the Interviewees comments, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize that secured parties may
perceive acute legal uncertainty with respect to whether
using online auctions is commercially reasonable under
Article 9.
2. Non-Adoption Effects. The non-adoption theory's
third hypothesis holds that for any given secured party, at
some point the legal, empirical, or business uncertainty will
become too great, and she will forgo the too risky novel, new
market and cling instead to the "safer" conventional,
traditional market. To rephrase the point, with respect to
the first uncertainty progenitor, the legal uncertainty a
secured party ex ante experiences about whether a new
market will ex post be found commercially reasonable by a
reviewing court may have a non-adoptive effect on her use
of a sale method she perceives as legally "risky." Comments
by several of the Interviewees suggest this is true.141
Applying this hypothesis to online auctions, it seems
reasonable to say that faced with the acute legal
uncertainty described above, a secured party may choose to
forgo the legally "risky" online auction and stick with a
doctrinally "safer" sale method. In this sense, consider that
the duality of doctrinally "risky" versus "safer" markets
affects a sort of lock-in/lock-out precedent effect. To see this,
consider the argument that between rules and standards,
as standards are given content through case law precedent,
141. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Clontz, supra note
113, at 371 (advising secured parties to use public sales for most types of
collateral to avoid the difficult "angles" of a complying private sale); David B.
McMahon, Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments Under
UCC Article 9: An Analysis of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP.
64, 65 (1994) (stating that "[i]nstead of choosing an aggressive sales method,
litigation conscious secured parties may elect the sale methods that will be least
susceptible to a factual or legal challenge regarding the commercial
reasonableness of the sale"); Ruda, supra note 112, at 319 (stating that "[Article
9] neither defines 'commercially reasonable' nor does it spell out the criteria of
reasonableness. However, the uncertainty that this would seem to engender
does not exist in practice. A secured party can avoid attack by behaving in a
way that is unarguably reasonable" (emphasis added)).
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they may eventually become more rule-like. 142
Consequently, one can argue that as a standard like
"reasonableness" becomes more rule-like, it may gain the
benefits rules enjoy of precision and predictability, but
concomitantly may lose the benefit enjoyed by standards of
accommodating changina factual circumstances and
patterns of behavior.143 Under these circumstances the
ossified standard can lock-in inefficient commercial norms
and practices. 144 Concurrently, in effect, the standard's
abundant case law locks-out new norms and practices
which are passed over in favor of the standard's judicially-
blessed norm or practice.
With novel, new markets like online auctions, this lock-
in/lock-out effect theoretically will be most pronounced.
Consider, for example, that there is plenty of case law on
alternative methods of selling repossessed automobiles.
Courts have blessed or struck down auto repossession sales
that were by public auction, 45 private sales, 146 private
142. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577-79 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral
Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 29-
30 (2000)..
143. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 40-44
(1987) (recounting the general arguments for rules and for standards); Gregory
E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 558 (2000) (discussing uncertainty
from use of open-standards in the U.C.C. (including Article 9) and the fear that
such standards produce litigation, and that recent revisions to the U.C.C.
(including Article 9) stress "certainty over flexibility" by moving "away from
open-ended standards"); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
379, 400 (1986) (discussing virtues and vices of rules versus standards).
144. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 1, at 217-18 (describing the encrustation
critique of the incorporation strategy due to precedents); see also Clayton P.
Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
288-305 (1985); Schlag, supra note 143, at 413; David V. Snyder, Language and
Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54
SMU L. REV. 617, 630 (2001).
145. See generally In re Galligan, 10 B.R. 841 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (finding
sale commercially reasonable); Teeter Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 543 S.W.2d
938, 942 (Ark. 1976) (finding sale commercially reasonable); Greg Coats Cars,
Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (finding sale commercially
reasonable); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Greiner, 405 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)
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dealer-only auctions, 147 and retail and wholesale sales on a
dealer's lot.148 Such abundant case law can lock-in the
judicially blessed sale methods because the secured party
feels more legally comfortable using such sale methods.
Concurrently, this case law may lock-out the use of online
auctions to sell repossessed cars. A risk-adverse secured
party, for example, may choose a conventional "dealer-only"
auction in her home state over an online auction like eBay
to sell a repossessed automobile since he knows he's on
precedential ground with the former but not the latter.
To all this some critics may argue that eventually
online auctions will be incorporated into Article 9
jurisprudence just as other new market channels have been
in the past. That may be true, but that is not the real issue
here. The real issue is that this incorporation process
appears to be happening very slowly which normatively is
bad since this undermines and delays realization of the
incorporation strategy's price maximization goal. Ten years
after eBay opened its doors for business, online auctions are
ubiquitous and are used to sell all manner of things, and
yet few Article 9 secured parties appear to be using them.
Given the commercial reasonableness uncertainty and a
(finding sale commercially reasonable); Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580
P.2d 505 (Okla. 1978) (finding sale commercially unreasonable).
146. See generally Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961 (Kan. 1982)
(finding sale commercially unreasonable); Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc.,
452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970) (finding sale commercially reasonable); Mann v.
United Mo. Bank, 689 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding sale
commercially reasonable); Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 203 N.W.2d 728
(Wis. 1973) (finding sale commercially unreasonable).
147. See generally Daniel v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 612 So. 2d 483 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1992) (finding sale commercially reasonable); Garden Nat'l Bank v. Cada,
738 P.2d 429 (Kan. 1987) (finding sale commercially reasonable); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Russell, 519 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding sale
commercially reasonable); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mathis, 660 So. 2d 1273
(Miss. 1995) (finding sale commercially unreasonable).
148. See generally Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326
(M.D. Fla. 1979) (finding sale commercially reasonable); In re Britt, 78 B.R. 514
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding sale from storage facility commercially
reasonable); Teeter Motor Co., 543 S.W.2d at 938 (finding sales were
commercially reasonable); Harold Gwatney Chevrolet Co. v. Cooper, 850 S.W.2d
19 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (finding sale commercially reasonable); Jones v. Union
Motor Co., 779 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) (finding sale commercially
reasonable).
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pronounced lock-in/lock-out precedent effect, unless
corrective measures are taken, it may still be a very long
time indeed before a satisfactory level of adoption occurs.
3. Corrective Measures. How to address the problem of
legal or doctrinal uncertainty about whether using online
auctions is commercially reasonable under Article 9? The
most direct and uniform way would be through uniform
legislation to all fifty states' Article 9 code. 149 But given that
the arduous seven year drafting process for the Article 9
revisions ended in 2001, undergoing a similar (albeit
smaller) project would be unlikely to garner much
enthusiasm soon. This leaves case law development in each
state. Towards this end, this subsection 3 discusses the ex
post review courts should undertake that is both proper
under Article 9's current jurisprudence and which would
increase the likelihood that courts, and thus eventually
secured parties, would consider online auctions
commercially reasonable.
i. Creating Precedent: Careful Judicial Scrutiny. Where a
challenged foreclosure sale has produced a low price, Article
9 directs courts to carefully scrutinize the sale process,
including the method and manner of sale. 150 Where the
debtor (or her expert witness) provides credible evidence (1)
of a low price, (2) that ex ante the secured party had had
multiple possible markets from which to choose including
an online auction through which similar goods (even non-
repossessed ones of the same type) are frequently sold, and
(3) the online auction is relatively more efficient for selling
such collateral than the market used by the secured party,
the court should carefully examine whether the secured
party considered using the online auction and whether it
was reasonably available under the circumstances. Recall
149. See, e.g., Coles-Bjerre, supra note 96, at 382 (recommending that "[in]
order to further this goal of generating a more substantial market, reformers
should consider requiring details of impending foreclosure auctions (and
perhaps even the auction process itself) to be funneled into one or a small
number of Internet sites" (footnote omitted)).
150. Revised U.C.C. § 9-610(b), cmt 2; see also Korybut, supra note 5, at
1478-1502 (discussing the nature of this careful scrutiny review).
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from Part I, section A,151 Article 9 directs the secured party
in good faith and with due diligence to identify, assess, and
use the market sale practices that she believes are best
suited to maximize the collateral's price. However, Article 9
holds the secured party only to those markets and
attendant sale practices that are reasonably identifiable,
accessible, and usable under the circumstances. In economic
terms, the secured party is asked to identify, assess, and
use the most efficient market reasonably available under
the circumstances. 152
Currently, although not yet with respect to online
auctions, some courts in their published opinions do make
this inquiry where there are multiple possible markets. 53
Less careful courts ask the secured party only whether she
used a regularly-used market channel, but fail to inquire
151. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
152. Recall also that there are reasonable grounds for a secured party's
failure to consider, or to reject, an alternative market. It may be that due to
such variables as the nature and value of the collateral, the costs of
identification and implementation, and secured party unsophistication, the only
sale channel reasonably available was a distress market or other less efficient
market. See supra note 14-18 and accompanying text.
153. For example, some courts review the secured party's choice to use a
distress market where a non-distress market was available, particularly with
expensive collateral whose high value justifies the cost of selling it in a non-
distress market. See, e.g., In re Frazier, 93 B.R. 366, 370-71 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1989); Gambo v. Bank of Md., 648 A.2d 1105, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); cf.
Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 968 (D. Minn. 1979); Dougherty v.
425 Dev. Assocs., 462 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (App. Div. 1983); Sumner v. Extebank,
452 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (App. Div. 1982). Similarly, some courts have required
the secured party to prove that its choice to use a public sale rather than a
private sale was commercially reasonable. See FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note
41, at 159-62. Finally, parties may choose to use a retail versus a wholesale
market. See, e.g., FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 158-59; WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 90, at 457-58; Schwartz, supra note 90, at 130-32. Some
courts have reviewed this choice. See, e.g., Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370
N.E.2d 918, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a retail sale is unreasonable
when the costs of the sale exceed the difference in market prices); Mount
Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 570 P.2d 702, 712 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding the same). In all these circumstances, secured parties are
facing multiple possible markets for their collateral, and essentially courts are
asking these secured parties to demonstrate that they selected the reasonably
available market best calculated to maximize the sale price. See also Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1993); In re
Hamby, 19 B.R. 776, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); Farmers Bank v. Hubbard,
276 S.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Ga. 1981).
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further whether the secured party ever considered, or
unreasonably rejected, an alternative market. 154 Even
worse, other courts simply do not ask whether the secured
party tried to identify and use the most reasonably
available efficient market.155
Robust careful judicial scrutiny of the market selection
process may help create case law precedent that overcomes
more quickly the doctrinal non-adoptive effects of the first
progenitor of uncertainty. So, for example, imagine the
secured creditor uses a "safe" or "less aggressive" non-online
auction market channel, and the sale results in net
proceeds that are insufficient to cover the sale's expenses
and the debtor's outstanding loan. The secured party then
sues the debtor for the deficiency. The debtor argues that
she owes no (or less of a) deficiency because the sale was
commercially unreasonable. She provides evidence of a low
price thus triggering careful scrutiny review of the sale
method, and provides further evidence that eBay was
reasonably available and through which property like the
collateral is commonly sold for prices higher than that
received at the challenged sale. Under these circumstances,
the trier of fact might be convinced that the secured party
did not carry her burden of proving that she, in good faith
and with appropriate due diligence, tried to identify and
select the reasonably available market best calculated to
maximize the sale price, 156 and thus might find the sale was
commercially unreasonable. If published, this opinion
154. See, e.g., In re Galligan, 10 B.R. 841, 845 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (holding
a public sale of a car, at which the only attendee was the secured party who
bought the car, commercially reasonable in part because it "was in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among wholesale dealers in used cars,"
but not discussing whether there were other reasonably available, regularly
used market channels); Sec. State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah
1987) (finding the sale of a truck through a used car lot commercially
reasonable, relying in part on secured party's expert who testified that "selling
repossessed vehicles through a used car lot was in conformity with usual
commercial practice," but not discussing whether there were other reasonably
available, regularly used market channels).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Champion Sprayer Co., 500 F. Supp. 708, 710
(E.D. Mich. 1980); In re Nellis, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1318, 1318 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1977); see also Korybut, supra note 5, at 1473-74.
156. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1481-82 (discussing sufficient evidence of
procedural compliance in the face of a low price sale).
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should ease the legal uncertainty of using an online auction,
and thus hopefully spur secured parties to use online
auctions, or at least consider them seriously.
Several things might retard this common law process.
First, courts might not buy into the notion that they must
aggressively review Article 9 cases to ensure that relatively
more efficient markets are at least considered by secured
parties. After all, some courts currently do not engage in
this type of scrutiny, and thus may not be persuaded to
change their minds. 157 Second, as discussed in the balance
of Part IV, there is legal, business and/or empirical
uncertainty about obtaining evidence of, and proving such
matters as, whether a sale method is commonly used or
whether an online auction like eBay will get a better price
than the conventional, traditional market for the collateral
type. 158 Third, debtors may not have the sophistication or
resources to marshal this evidence and challenge the low
price sale. 159
Finally, consider a stifling paradox. From the anecdotal
data collected and set forth in Part II, clearly there are
some Article 9 secured parties using online auctions.
Suppose though, that given the efficiency benefits of online
auctions also discussed in Part II, these secured parties in
fact have realized higher net proceeds than any
conventional, traditional market would yield. Under these
circumstances, it is possible that their debtors will be less
likely to challenge the sale's commercial reasonableness.
Yet absent legal challenges which produce written
precedent, no published case law will emerge to address the
legal uncertainty restraining what appears to be a vast
majority of risk-adverse secured parties who will not act
157. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (Part IV.A.3.ii); infra
notes 178-84 and accompanying text (Part IV.B); infra notes 201-02 and
accompanying text (Part IV.C.2); infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text
(Part IV.D.3); infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (Part V.E); infra notes
250-71 and accompanying text (Part IV.G).
159. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
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unless the commercial reasonableness of an online auction
becomes more legally certain and predictable. 160
One might say this is no problem at all; if online
auctions are so efficient that no debtor ever challenges the
sale, then eventually secured parties will begin to learn this
and use online auctions, even absent case law precedent.
Perhaps. But the anecdotal data in Part II suggest that
even though eBay went public over ten years ago, and
Internet commerce generally and online auctions
specifically have blossomed, widespread Articled 9 secured
party adoption does not appear to be the case.
ii. Using the Section 9-627(b)(3) Safe Harbor. At least
where new markets like online auctions are being used by
dealers of a particular type of property similar to the
secured party's collateral, one might argue that secured
parties may be able to use the safe harbor of section 9-
627(b)(3) to avoid the doctrinal uncertainty of whether use
of the new market is commercially reasonable or not. Recall
from Part I that section 9-627(b)(3) states that "[a]
disposition of collateral is made in a commercially
reasonable manner if the disposition is made . . . in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among
dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the
disposition."'16 1  Section 9-627(b)(3) thus creates a
commercial reasonableness safe harbor for the secured
party: if she uses the reasonable commercial practices used
by dealers to sell the particular type of collateral, then a
repossession sale using these practices is commercially
reasonable.
There are, however, several doctrinal and normative
problems with this suggestion. As to the first doctrinal
problem, the dealer's commercial practices must be
"reasonable." Article 9 on its face offers no guidance on how
to identify when dealer commercial practices are reasonable
160. Perhaps this explains the current lack of case law regarding the
commercial reasonableness of online auctions. Or perhaps it is because
disgruntled debtors have challenged online auction sales, but then settled their
lawsuits.
161. Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(b).
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within the meaning of section 9-627(b)(3) and when they
are not, thus reintroducing uncertainty about whether any
particular dealer practices will enjoy protection under the
safe harbor. Second, the safe harbor is expressly limited to
the commercial reasonableness of the "manner" of sale. This
leaves open the question of whether the other aspects of
commercial reasonableness, including those enumerated in
section 9-610(b) (method, time, place, and other terms), also
enjoy protection under the safe harbor. Third, the safe
harbor speaks of "dealers" in the plural. 162 How many
dealers must use the particular commercial practice in
order for it to enjoy protection under the safe harbor? 5%?
25%? A majority? Even if one selects a percentage, say 25%,
is this 25% of all similar dealers in the United States, the
state where the collateral is located, or the county or city
where the collateral is located? Further, even if one decides
upon a geographical constraint, say 25% of dealers in the
county where the collateral is located, does the geographical
constraint make sense in the context of online auctions
which have no geographic boundaries? 16 3
Remarkably, there is very little commentary on the safe
harbor generally, or these doctrinal issues specifically. 16 4
162. Under the pre-revised Article 9, section 9-507(2) (which was replaced
by revised section 9-627(b)(3)), one court defined "dealer" as "a person who
normally trades in the collateral property as his business." Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
163. See generally Korybut, supra note 53, at 122-28 (discussing similar
issues of cyberspace boundlessness).
164. See FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, § 6.1, at 144 (calling the safe
harbor a "conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness" under which
the secured party "must present evidence of commercial practices typical in the
industry, and show both that those practices are reasonable and that the
disposition was conducted in conformity with those practices. The mere fact
that the collateral was sold by a dealer does not satisfy this standard" (footnotes
omitted)); HAWKLAND, supra note 19, § 9-627:2 (stating, with respect to the safe
harbor, that it "is a bit less certain than [the other two safe harbors] .... Of
course, this section provides that conforming to the practices among dealers will
only qualify as a commercially reasonable disposition if those practices are
themselves reasonable"); ZINNECKER, supra note 30, at 189-90; W. Rodney
Clement, Jr., Enforcing Security Interests In Personal Property In Mississippi,
67 MiSS. L.J. 43, 89 (1997) (stating that in Mississippi, the safe harbor's
presumption of commercial reasonableness can be rebutted under the general
commercial reasonableness standard of 9-610(b) (old section 9-504)); Bradley Y.
Smith, Secured Transactions, 40 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1531 (1985) (stating that if
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The Article does not seek to resolve them. Rather, given
that this section A's focus is legal uncertainty created by
the commercial reasonableness standard, the point here is
to observe that the scope of the safe harbor itself is
uncertain, especially in the context of online auctions, and
thus may not provide as much legal comfort to a secured
party as initially thought. That this conclusion is true is
suggested by the anecdotal evidence that few secured
parties appear to be using online auctions.
As to the first normative problem, assume away the
three doctrinal questions discussed above and imagine that
secured parties find broad and largely unchallenged
protection under the safe harbor whenever they use dealer
commercial practices. Thus, to the extent that dealers use a
new market like an online auction to sell property similar
to the secured party's collateral, by using the safe harbor
secured parties will significantly reduce their uncertainty
about whether their use of the online auction will be
commercially reasonable. This presumably would increase
secured parties' use of online auctions. But such a reduction
in uncertainty also carries a paradoxical cost: fewer debtor
challenges to these online auction repossession sales. This
in turn means the likely reduction of precedent explicating
the commercial reasonableness of online auctions. This
harms those unfortunate secured parties for whose
collateral no or few dealers are selling through the online
auction and thus for whom the safe harbor is unavailable.
For these unlucky folks, they are both plagued for lack of
precedent by the legal uncertainty of using the online
auction and dismayed by the fact that due to the
unchallenged, safe harbor sales there is a reduced
likelihood that such precedent will emerge. Thus, again
assuming away the doctrinal questions discussed above,
the safe harbor "is met, the jury cannot substitute its own criteria of commercial
reasonableness"); Zubrow, supra note 15, at 511 (applying commercial
reasonableness factors to the safe harbor); Ellen B. Corenswet, Note, I Can Get
It For You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of Automobile Deficiency
Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (1975) (stating that a "[slale in
conformity with automobile dealer practices is not per se reasonable merely
because the practice is widespread. It is no protection for the dealer that many,
or even most, automobile retailers sell repossessed cars on the wholesale
market. Whether resale on that market is in fact a reasonable practice is a
decision which must be left to the courts" (footnote omitted)).
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while the safe harbor may provide benefits to some secured
parties, it may also deprive others of another benefit.
Second, if robustly applied, the safe harbor has the
potential to insulate secured parties' continued use of
conventional, traditional dealer sale practices that are less
efficient than new market practices. Consider this
hypothetical. Imagine a secured party who in the past has
used a conventional, car dealers-only auction that satisfies
the requirements of section 9-627(b)(3). The secured party
is thinking about using this dealer-only auction again, but
has recently identified in good faith and after due diligence
an online market for selling used automobiles, although
none or a minority of the sellers have been dealers of such
goods, but rather non-dealer businesses getting rid of old
equipment (cars) and consumers. Finally, assume that the
secured party has evidence suggesting that the online
auction on-average-over-time realizes higher prices for used
cars than the dealer-only auction. Fearful of using the
online auction because she feels that the low percentage of
dealer participation jeopardizes the application of the
section 9-627(b)(3) safe harbor, the secured party uses the
"safe" dealer-only auction. Under these circumstances use
of the less efficient market is perpetuated.
How to correct for this problem? On the one hand, a
court could hold that in the face of evidence that the new
market, like an online auction, is clearly more efficient and
reasonably available to the secured party, then the
conventional, traditional market is no longer a "reasonable"
commercial practice which enjoys protection under section
9-627(b)(3). Indeed, a rationale for the safe harbor is that
"the collateral will bring a fair (if not the best) price if it is
disposed by reasonable commercial practices through
normal channels, thus negating any need to review the
commercial reasonableness of the secured party's actions.
However, the reasonableness of a dealer's commercial
practices remains subject to judicial scrutiny."165 If the safe
165. ZINNECKER, supra note 30, at 190; see also Revised U.C.C. § 9-507(2)
cmt. 2 (stating that "[olne recognized method of disposing of repossessed
collateral is for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a dealer-a
method which in the long run may realize better average returns since the
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harbor is shieldina inefficient dealer practices, then one
should consider whether this rationale is no lonver beina
sufficientlv served. To Parauhrase Karl Llewellvn. where
the reason for a rule stops, so should stop the rule's
application. 166 On the other hand, a court's holding under
these facts that the dealer practices are "unreasonable"
erodes further the certainty of the safe harbor's protection
beyond the three doctrinal issues discussed above. Which
harm would be greater is not obvious, and would require an
empirical study of the extent to which secured parties use
the safe harbor to the exclusion of relatively more efficient
sale methods versus the benefits of the safe harbor to
secured parties (such as reduced risks and costs of
investigating, assessing, and using a new market, including
potential litigation costs). But it is plausible that shielding
and perpetuating the use of less efficient markets and
stifling the incorporation of the new, more efficient markets
causes the most harm over time.
Finally, consider a slight but important variation of the
hypothetical. The secured party has not used the dealer-
auction or the relatively more efficient online auction
before. The secured party is intrigued about using the
online auction. Does the fact that dealers, people who
normally buy and sell used cars, have created an exclusive
market channel mean that the secured creditor must use it
under these facts? One can imagine that a relatively novice
secured party who does not routinely repossess and sell cars
might think that if dealers sell used cars in this way, that
must be the correct way to sell them, especially if there is
no legal precedent blessing the online auction.
The doctrinal response here is that, although section 9-
627(b)(3)'s safe harbor elevates to a special status the
"reasonable commercial practices among dealers,"1167 Official
Comment 3 to section 9-627(b) and Comment 2 to pre-
revised section 9-507(2) state that with respect to the
subsection's three safe harbors, none are "required or
secured party does not usually maintain his own facilities for making such
sales").
166. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
217 (1962) (stating that "where the reason stops there stops the rule").
167. Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(b).
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exclusive."'168 Thus, nothing in Article 9 on its face requires
the secured party to use only commercial practices of
dealers whether or not the secured party herself is also a
dealer. Instead, when faced with multiple markets such as
a conventional, traditional market versus a new market,
Article 9's General Directive requires that the secured party
identify, assess, and use the market that she, in good faith
and after due diligence, believes is best suited to maximize
the collateral's price and is reasonably available under the
circumstance. 169 Having selected the market, the secured
party must conduct a procedurally regular sale, free from
collusion, fraud, or self-dealing. 170 Under the facts of this
hypothetical, given that the secured party has evidence that
the online auction is the most efficient market for her
collateral, if the secured party has reasonable access to the
online auction she should use it.
B. Is the New Market Prevailing, Well-Recognized, or
Commonly Accepted?
There is one legal reason and one interrelated business
reason for secured parties to ask this question, and
concomitantly doctrinal, empirical, and business
uncertainty about its answer. As to the legal reason, recall
that some courts hold that secured parties should sell their
repossessed collateral in conformity with "prevailing trade
practices," "accepted commercial practices," "well-
recognized" customs and usages, or "commonly acceuted
commercial practices."' 71 One can see this requirement as a
doctrinal strand of the Article 9 General Directive that,
when faced with multiple possible markets for her
collateral, a secured creditor must, in good faith and with
due diligence, identify, assess, and use the market best
calculated and reasonably available under the
circumstances to maximize the collateral's price. One can
reframe the doctrinal incantations to use "prevailing trade
168. Revised U.C.C. § 9-627(b) cmt. 3; Pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-507(2) cmt. 2.
169. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
170. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1450-51, 1465-74.
171. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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practices," "accepted commercial practices," "well-
recognized' customs and usages. or "commonly accepted
commercial practices" as iudicial attempts to prompt
secured parties to identify the most efficient markets
possible for the collateral. That is. unpacking the italicized
adiectives reveals that the courts emplovina them consider
it important how many businesses use particular markets
and how lonv those markets have been used. One can see
these courts as signaling their belief in a kind of market
Darwinism: widelv used and lona-lastina market channels
are so because thev are relativelv efficient market channels.
If they were not, they would perish. 172  As Judge
Easterbrook wrote:
172. See generally Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 382-83 (1997) (stating that "it is
difficult to argue that commercial practices are not [subject to evolutionary
forces]. All other things being equal, commercial actors with efficient practices
are more likely to succeed, stay in business, and continue those practices than
actors with inefficient practices. In short, this 'market-based evolutionary'
account holds that efficient practices will be favored in the marketplace"). See
also Bankers Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler & Co., 390 N.E.2d 766, 769 (N.Y. 1979)
(stating that commercial reasonableness requires the secured party to
implement accepted business practices, and that "[c]ustoms and usages that
actually govern the members of a business calling day-in and day-out not only
provide a creditor with standards that are well recognized, but tend to reflect a
practical wisdom born of accumulated experience"); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act:
A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 285
(1998), stating that:
merchants carry on their trade against a background of trade custom
and usage. These trade usages, like folkways, compete under a social
Darwinistic model of human behavior to gain acceptance. As stated by
Karl N. Llewellyn folkways are 'like products of natural forces which
men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive
ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a
final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed
down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to
meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and
without rational reflection or purpose.'
(quoting Karl N. Llwellyn, This Cut Rate American Culture (1927), microformed
on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers B.V.3.j. (on file with SMU Law Review)); see also
Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafting of UCC Articles 2 and 9: Model Codes or Model
Dinosaurs?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 191, 207 (1994) (stating that "[t]here could also
be an unreasonably low value at a sale simply because a custom and practice
now exists in which everyone knows that only dealers will be bidding," thus
suggesting the lack of attendance and competitive bidding at public
repossession sales by non-dealers is due not to improper sale procedures but
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[A] court must decide what a reasonable business would have done
to maximize the return on the collateral. It must consult
"[clustoms and usages that actually govern the members of a
business calling day-in and day-out [that] not only provide a
creditor with standards that are well recognized, but tend to
reflect a practical wisdom born of accumulated experience."
17 3
For a secured party thinking about using any market for
the first time, identifying it as "prevailing," "well-
recognized," or "commonly accepted" suggests at least to
these courts that it is an efficient market.
As to the interrelated business reason, a perfectly
rational, maximizing secured party wants to identify the
most efficient market for her collateral. From the market
Darwinism perspective, figuring out if a market is
"prevailing," "well-recognized," or "commonly accepted" does
just that. Further, anecdotal evidence from an Interviewee
suggests that secured creditors thinking of using a new
market engage in this business reasoning. 174
The first hypothesis holds that the more legally and
commercially novel a new market is when compared to the
conventional, traditional market(s) the secured party
normally uses, the more legal, empirical, and business
uncertainty the secured party likely will feel about using
the new market to sell repossessed collateral. Under this
hvothesis, consider the effect of the second progenitor of
uncertaintv which arises for two reasons: temporally new
markets and empirical data uncertainty.
custom). Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697 (1996).
173. In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
174. Online Representative #1 said that when he/she is soliciting new
secured parties to sell their repossessed cars through his/her online auction,
some ask whether similar secured parties are using the Web site to sell their
repossessed cars. Online Representative #1 stated that these inquiring
prospective customers typically lack experience with repossession sales. They
figure if other-especially larger and well-known-similar secured parties are
using the online auction, it means these secured parties have investigated the
web site and found it to be a better way to sell the cars than any alternative
method. Online Representative #1 Interview, supra note 73.
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1. Temporally New Markets. Almost by definition, a
temporally new market channel will not be prevailing,
commonly accepted, or well-recognized. Doctrinally, the
absence of this factor alone should not necessarily mean
that a court should find the new market channel
commercially unreasonable. 175  Yet coupled with the
interrelated market Darwinism business reason, its
absence still may cause a secured party some uncertainty
about using the new market rather than the conventional,
traditional market.
Critics may say that in 2006 the online auction channel
is clearly a "prevailing," "well-recognized," and "commonly
accepted" commercial practice for many commercial and
consumer actors. Therefore, secured parties should not
suffer much legal or business uncertainty when using an
online auction. The criticism, however, is too imprecise for
the purposes of Article 9. As discussed in Part I, section A,
Article 9's General Directive holds that the secured party
must identify the particular market(s) best suited and
reasonably available to sell her particular type of collateral
to the relevant commercial and/or consumer community
interested in buying the collateral.176 Thus, the secured
party's focus is not on the online auction market channel as
a whole, but on the proposed particular online auction
through which she wants to sell the particular type of
property. Under this rule, the criticism that the online
auction channel generally is "prevailing," "well-recognized,"
and "commonly accepted" will not have purchase in certain
circumstances. 177 Consider the following hypotheticals.
175. Courts consider this only one of many factors of commercial
reasonableness. Where other factors are regular with respect to a market, the
failure of this factor alone might not necessarily amount to a commercially
unreasonable sale. Along with other factors like a low price, it very well might.
176. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
177. It will have purchase in two situations. First, imagine an online
auction like eBay through which inexpensively obtained data can be obtained
that shows the online auction to be a "prevailing," "well-recognized," or
"commonly accepted" market for many commercial and consumer actors selling
the type of property the secured party holds as collateral. Here, there is little
uncertainty, and, thus, the second progenitor of legal uncertainty is weak if not
non-existent. Second, assume that inexpensive data shows that the online
auction is a "prevailing," "well-recognized," or "commonly accepted" market, but
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In hypothetical #1, assume that inexpensive data shows
that an online auction is not a "prevailing," "well-
recognized," or "commonly accepted" market but also shows
that there is a sufficient number of current potential
bidders for the secured party's type of collateral that
competitive bidding would occur and a fair price for the
collateral likely would be realized. Courts look favorably on
markets which have competitive bidding among bidders
interested in the type of collateral the secured party is
selling.178 This set of facts might occur, for example, with a
temporally new online auction that has not had the chance
to become "prevailing," "well-recognized," or "commonly
accepted" but has quickly become a competitive market for
the collateral type. Here there is tension between (1) the
unsatisfied doctrinal strand and business consideration
that merit a "prevailing," "well-recognized," or "commonly
accepted" market, and (2) alternative evidence of market
efficiency. Thus, the secured party may experience legal or
business uncertainty about whether to use the market.
For hypothetical #2, assume that the empirical data
that might show the online auction to be a "prevailing,"
"well-recognized," or "commonly accepted" market for the
secured party's collateral either does not exist or is
prohibitively expensive to obtain relative to the value of the
collateral. As discussed in Part II, section A, and Part IV,
section D.3, some online auctions provide information
respectively about their user-base179 and types of items sold
through the Web site.18 0 But others do not, including
not for the type of collateral the secured party holds as collateral. Courts look
favorably on markets which have competitive bidding among bidders interested
in the type of collateral the secured party is selling, and disfavorably on those
that do not. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 73, 83, 87-89. If the online auction
has no history of sellers selling the type of property the secured party has
repossessed, nor any other indication that there will be a sufficient number of
potential bidders to spark competitive bidding for the secured party's collateral,
then the secured party puts itself at grave legal (and business) risk should it
use that market. Again, there is little uncertainty in this situation.
178. See id.
179. For Part II.A, see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text discussing
eBay. For Part IV.D, see infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text discussing
eBay and Title Auctions.
180. See supra note 179.
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temporally old online auctions. EBay, for example, does not
publish historical data for eBayMotors.com, its specialty
automotive auction. 81 Without this data, the secured party
will not know whether the online auction is a "prevailing,"
"well-recognized," or "commonly accepted" market for her
particular type of collateral, thus triggering both legal and
business uncertainty.
2. Empirical Data Uncertainty. Under the first
hypothesis, consider how the need to obtain empirical data
itself affects uncertainty. As hypothetical #2 illustrates,
empirical evidence sufficient to legally convince a court and
commercially satisfy the secured party that a particular
new market is prevailing, commonly accepted, or well-
recognized for the secured party's collateral may not exist.
Alternatively, depending on the nature of the secured party
or collateral, it may be too difficult or costly to obtain. 8 2
With empirical uncertainty, doctrinal and business
uncertainty flourish.
The non-adoption theory's third hypothesis holds that
for any given secured party, at some point the legal,
empirical, or business uncertainty will become too great
with respect to a novel, new market, and she will fail to
adopt the too risky market and cling instead to the "safer,"
conventional, traditional market. The doctrinal, business,
and empirical data uncertainties affected by the second
progenitor alone (or in conjunction with other progenitors of
uncertainty) may stop a secured party from investigating,
assessing, or using a novel, new market like an online
auction.
What corrective measures can be employed with respect
to the legal, business or empirical data uncertainty
discussed in this Part IV, section B? With respect to the
181. Ebay, Frequently Asked Questions About Marketplace Research,
http://pages.ebay.com/marketplace-research/faq/index.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
182. See supra note 158 and accompanying text; infra notes 201-02 and
accompanying text (Part IV.A.3.ii); infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text
(Part IV.C.2); infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text (Part IV.D.3); infra
notes 242-43 and accompanying text (Part IV.E); infra notes 250-71 and
accompanying text (Part IV.G).
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doctrinal tension described in hypothetical #1, consider once
again that one can reframe the doctrinal incantations to use
"prevailing trade practices," "accepted commercial
practices," "well-recognized" customs and usages, or
"commonly accented commercial practices" as iudicial
attempts to assist secured parties in identifvina the most
efficient markets possible for the collateral. If these
incantations do function merely as proxies for relatively
efficient markets, 183 then if the secured party can provide
other evidence that a market, including a temporally new
market, is the best market reasonably available under the
circumstances to realize the highest price for the collateral,
then simply because it is not well-recognized, commonly
accepted, or prevailing should not remove it from the
secured party's reach. To do otherwise would put form over
function. The conundrum, however, is that the alterative
evidence of market efficiency itself may not exist, or be too
costly or difficult to obtain for a novel, new market. Once
again, empirical uncertainty begets legal uncertainty.
The conundrum pertains to hypothetical #2 also. If the
secured party for lack of empirical data cannot show that a
market is prevailing, well-recognized, or commonly
accepted, alternatively he should be able to provide other
evidence of the online auction's market efficiency. But that
empirical task may itself be difficult and costly, thus raising
uncertainty about using the online market in the fist place.
Part IV, sections D, E, and G explore further the
reoccurring empirical data uncertainty issue and its
corrective measures. 184
183. While one can dispute the usefulness of these incantations as proxies
for identifying maximizing markets, that is not the task the author here
undertakes. The author has discussed problems with the evolutionary market
forces argument of market Darwinism elsewhere. See Korybut, supra note 5, at
1460-61. Rather, the Article takes these proxies as it finds them articulated by
the courts.
184. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text (Part IV.D.3); infra notes
242-43 and accompanying text (Part V.E); infra notes 250-71 and
accompanying text (Part IV.G).
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C. Are There People Like Me Using the New Market?
Why would a secured party ask this question?
Doctrinally, the incorporation strategy directs secured
parties to use market-based sale practices to sell
repossessed collateral. Secured parties necessarily must
figure out whether and how other commercial actors are
selling assets similar to the secured party's repossessed
collateral. But which commercial actors? Businesses
generally, dealers of the type of property, other secured
parties (whether dealers or not)? Anecdotally, evidence from
Online Representative #1 suggests that secured parties do
want to know whether people like themselves are using the
new market before they use it.185
Using two hypotheticals, this section C explores some
circumstances where these questions may cause legal,
business, or empirical uncertainty. The non-adoption
theory's third hypothesis predicts that the secured party
may be hesitant to use a new market to sell his collateral if
either he believes there are too few people like himself
using the new market to sell similar property, or
empirically he is uncertain about the answer to the
question. In other words, a secured party may choose not to
use a new market he perceives as risky because it is used
predominantly by dissimilar people and will cling instead to
a conventional, traditional market that is safer because it is
used by similar people.
Before discussing the two hypotheticals, consider that
the uncertainty about whether people like the secured party
are using the new market is not necessarily mitigated by
showing that the new market is "prevailing," "well-
recognized," or "commonly accepted" where the commercial
or consumer actors using that market are not like the
secured party. Neither will the uncertainty necessarily be
mitigated by showing that dissimilar people are selling
similar collateral in the new market where the secured
party wants to know how similar people are selling
collateral similar to the secured party's.
185. See supra note 174.
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1. Hypothetical #1. Imagine a credit union (CU) in
State X that makes secured consumer car loans to its
customers and periodically sells repossessed cars. As such,
assume the CU would not be considered a car dealer. 8 6 The
credit union is member of the State Credit Union
Association (SCUA).187 Imagine that none of the other
credit unions within the association use online auctions to
sell repossessed cars and instead use traditional auctions or
private sales. Imagine further that the CU identifies, in
good faith an after due diligence, what appears to be a
relatively more efficient online market for selling its
repossessed consumer automobiles for prices on average
better than prices realized through the conventional,
traditional markets. But no credit unions, let alone ones in
the SCUA, are using the online auction. Should the secured
party be worried that because no other credit unions
generally, or SCUA members in particular, are using the
online auction to sell cars that the CU's use of it will be
commercially unreasonable? 188
The answer is no. Neither section 9-610(b), which
contains the commercial reasonableness standard, nor its
Official Comments require or limit the secured party to the
particular commercial practices of any type of person.
Further, under Article 2's commercial reasonableness
section 2-706,189 Official Comment 4 states that the seller is
enabled "to resell in accordance with reasonable commercial
practices so as to realize as high a price as possible in the
circumstances,"'190 thus also not limiting the seller to any
186. Under pre-revised Article 9, section 9-507(2) (which was replaced by
revised section 9-627(b)(3)), one court defined "dealer" as "a person who
normally trades in the collateral property as his business." Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
187. For examples of state credit union associations, see the Illinois Credit
Union League, http://www.iculeague.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); Missouri
Credit Union Association, http://www.mcua.org/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
188. Recall that Online Representative #1 indicated that some of his/her
prospective secured party customers expressed this concern. See supra note 174
and accompanying text.
189. Pre-revised U.C.C. § 2-706.
190. Pre-revised U.C.C. § 2-706 cmt. 4.
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particular person's practices. Some courts reviewing Article
9 sales have looked directly to this comment for guidance to
define commercially reasonable sale practices. 191 Indeed,
courts have articulated a range of possible, permissible
sources of commercially reasonable sale practices, moving
from the more limited source of "dealers,"'192 to "trade
practices among reputable and responsible business and
commercial enterprises envaaed in the same or a similar
business,"193 and even more widely to "a reasonable
business."'194 When a secured party has multiple, possible
markets for her collateral from which to choose, she must
heed the General Directive. Under the first hypothetical's
facts, because the secured party has evidence that the
online auction is the most efficient market for her
particular type of collateral, if she has reasonable access to
the online auction, she should use it.
2. Hypothetical #2. Imagine a secured party who, in
good faith and after due diligence, identifies what appears
to be a relatively efficient online market for selling her type
of collateral, although only a relatively small number of
such sales have been for similar repossessed goods. The
secured party has also located a conventional, liquidation
market for her type of collateral. Is it commercially
reasonable for a secured party selling repossessed collateral
191. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. at 698.
193. See, e.g., Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d
130, 137-38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that "[t]he requirement that the
property be disposed of in a 'commercially reasonable' manner seems to us to
signify that the disposition shall be made in keeping with prevailing trade
practices among reputable and responsible business and commercial enterprises
engaged in the same or a similar business" (quoting Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin.
& Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966) (emphasis in
original)); accord FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 3; Lloyd, supra note 41,
at 363.
194. See, e.g., In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 906 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "[a] court must decide what a reasonable business would have
done to maximize the return on the collateral. It must consult '[c]ustoms and
usages that actually govern the members of a business calling day-in and day-
out [that] not only provide a creditor with standards that are well recognized,
but tend to reflect a practical wisdom born of accumulated experience"
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); accord FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 41, § 1.2, at 3; Lloyd, supra note 41, at 363.
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to use the online auction even though it infrequently sells
repossessed goods similar to hers? Or perhaps the secured
party should use the online auction precisely because it
does not appear to be a liquidation market for the type of
goods? In other words, to the extent that there are different
markets and attendant sale practices for selling repossessed
goods versus the same or similar non-repossessed goods,
which should the secured party use?195
Doctrinally, that these questions are relevant is
suggested by cases where the court has condemned the
secured party's use of a distress sale market where a non-
distress market was available, such as where the collateral
was expensive and, thus, would support the time and cost of
selling it in a non-distress market. 196 But far more often,
courts make only vague pronouncements about whether
and when a secured party may use the reasonable
commercial practices among entities selling repossessed
collateral versus the reasonable commercial practices
among entities selling the same, non-repossessed
collateral. 197 From these disparate doctrinal strands, one
195. These differences exist. See generally JONATHAN SHELDON & ROBERT A.
SABLE, REPOSSESSIONS 243, 244 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "the three major
automobile creditors have signed agreements with the FTC to sell repossessed
cars in the same manner as they sell other similar used cars"); see also Korybut,
supra note 5, at 1426-27; Shuchman, supra note 89, at 54 (arguing that
automobile repossessors use less efficient selling resale methods than when
they deal with each other).
196. See, e.g., In re Frazier, 93 B.R. 366, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989);
Gambo v. Bank of Md., 648 A.2d 1105, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). Cf.
Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 968 (D. Minn. 1979); Dougherty v.
425 Dev. Assocs., 462 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (App. Div. 1983); Sumner v. Extebank,
452 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (App .Div. 1982).
197. Courts have held that the secured party may use the accepted
commercial practices of a business or dealer not necessarily engaged in the sale
of repossessed collateral. See Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 467 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (noting that, under section 9-507(2), where a
bank sold a motorhome in private sale, one of several issues of fact left
unresolved was "what the reasonable commercial practices among dealers of
motorhomes are"); Morrell Employees Credit Union v. Uselton, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) 269, 274-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that a "disposition must
be made in keeping with prevailing trade practices among reputable and
responsible business and commercial enterprises engaged in the same or
similar business," and that the sale must be in "conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among automobile dealers"). Some Courts have suggested
that repossession sale practices are sufficient. See United States v. Terrey, 554
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can imagine that a secured party may be uncertain about
the legal relevance of whether a new market like an online
auction has commercial actors selling repossessed collateral
or not of a type similar to the secured party's.
The doctrinal corrective measure here is the same as for
the first hypothetical: heed the General Directive and use
the most efficient market reasonably available for the
secured party's type of collateral. 198 Thus, imagine a
secured party with a repossessed tractor wants to sell it on
eBay, which in fact lists used tractors for auction. 199 Even if
no secured parties selling repossessed Article 9 tractors
have ever used eBay before, the secured party should be
able to use the online auction if she, in good faith and after
F.2d 685, 695, (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that the choice of a public sale by the
SBA could have been found to be commercially unreasonable by a jury because
it disregarded its own relevant trade and usage practices of liquidating a
computer parts business, because it made no history of the business, did not
take inventory, conducted no appraisal, contacted no competitors of the failed
business, and held a public sale); Jackson County Bank v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 488 F. Supp. 1001, 1011 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), vacated, 698 F.2d 1220 (6th
Cir. 1982) (holding that, under section 9-507(2), for a secured party selling
repossessed vehicles, the relevant inquiry to determine commercial
reasonableness of a private sale and a public sale was what the reasonable
commercial practices are among dealers for inventory liquidation or vehicle
sales); In re Braten Apparel Corp., 68 B.R. 955, 965 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(finding that, in assessing bank's efforts to collect and sell defaulting debtor's
account receivables under section 9-507(2), "conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among others collecting receivables would establish that a
collection effort was done in a commercially reasonable manner"); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Mathis, 660 So. 2d 1273, 1276-77 (Miss. 1995) (holding that a
private wholesale automobile dealer auction was commercially reasonable
because it was the usual manner of selling repossessed automobiles and
conformed to reasonable commercial practices among dealers in repossessed
automobiles); Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536,
538-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing, under Utah's version of section 9-
507(2), commercial reasonableness of private sale of automobile against the
reasonable commercial practices among car dealers who dispose of repossessed
vehicles). To the extent there are different types of sellers and dealers and
concomitant selling practices for non-repossessed goods versus the same
repossessed goods, the case law ambiguity muddies the analysis of whether the
secured party conformed to the relevant commercial practices. Evidence for
differing practice exists. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1461 n.300; supra note
182.
198. See supra notes 19-2 1.
199. On September 3, 2006, eBay.com listed 467 items under its category
' Tractors & Farm Machinery," including tractors. http://business.search.
ebay.com/tractorTractors-FarmMachineryWOQQsac atZ91952.
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due diligence, marshals evidence that it is the most efficient
market reasonably available to sell the used tractor. 200
Further, limiting the Article 9 secured party to only those
markets which have been used by at least one other Article
9 secured party selling similar collateral would be illogical
since no secured party would ever be able to go first.
Having invoked the General Directive, the uncertainty
of the availability and cost of empirical data required to
prove the new market's relative efficiency over the
conventional, traditional market appears as it did in Part
IV, section B.201 Where the information does not exist or is
too expensive to obtain relative to the collateral's value,
then doctrinal and business uncertainty is reintroduced,
proving once again that empirical uncertainty is doctrinal
or business uncertainty. Absent cheap reliable data of the
new market's relative efficiency, a secured party may
choose to continue using the conventional, traditional
market, especially where it has been blessed by legal
precedent. Part IV, sections D, E and G explore further the
empirical data uncertainty issue and its corrective
measures.
202
D. Will a Sale of My Collateral Through the New Market
Realize Higher Net Proceeds Than Through the
Conventional, Traditional Market?
For obvious business reasons the perfectly rational,
maximizing secured party will want to know what the
benefits are of using the new market. To such a secured
party, perhaps the most important benefit would be the
new market's ability to produce higher net proceeds (price
less costs) 20 3 for the collateral than the conventional,
200. See supra notes 19-21.
201. See supra notes 182, 184 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text (Part IV.D.3); infra notes
242-43 and accompanying text (Part IV.E); infra notes 250-71 and
accompanying text (Part IV.G).
203. After a foreclosure sale, the secured party may first deduct from the
sale proceeds "reasonable expenses," including attorneys' fees, if so provided by
agreement between the secured party and the debtor and not prohibited by
210 [Vol. 55
A THEORY OF NON-ADOPTION
traditional market. In particular, there are three main
reasons why such a secured party ex ante would want to
know whether a new market would obtain higher net
proceeds for the collateral than the conventional,
traditional market. First, she would rather receive the
highest price possible from the sale to quickly recover all
her loan money in order to re-lend it again rather than
resort to a time-consuming (and possibly fruitless) pursuit
of the debtor for a deficiency. 204 Second, it seems sensible to
hypothesize that a debtor is less likely to contest a high-
price sale than a low-price sale. Finally, although price is
not a term of commercial reasonableness, a low price will
trigger the reviewing court's careful scrutiny of the sale
process, including the secured party's choice of sale
method. 20 5
The non-adoption theory's first hypothesis holds that
the more legally and/or commercially novel a new market,
when compared to the conventional, traditional market, the
more legal, empirical, or business uncertainty a secured
party will feel about using the new market to sell
repossessed collateral. In the context of online auctions, the
hypothesis' explication can be bifurcated into whether there
is any uncertainty about whether (1) the online auction
channel as a whole, or (2) a particular online auction
receives higher net proceeds for the type of repossessed
property the secured party wants to sell when compared to
conventional, traditional markets. Because Article 9
doctrine holds that in selecting the commercially reasonable
market the secured party must consider the particular type
of collateral to be sold, the focus is better placed on
particular online auctions and the type of property sold
thereon. 206 However, evidence that the online auction
channel itself is a mechanism to realize higher prices could
be useful absent data on specific online auctions.
state law. Then the secured party may allocate the remaining proceeds toward
payment of the outstanding debt. Revised U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1).
204. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 19-21, 177 and accompanying text.
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1. The Online Auction Channel. Despite the popular
notion that online auctions like eBay are an efficient means
to sell all sorts of property, the Article 9 secured party may
be uncertain about whether a sale through the online
auction channel will produce higher net proceeds for the
type of repossessed property the secured party wants to sell
rather than a sale through the conventional, traditional
market(s). One can find theoretical and hard and soft
empirical literature suggesting that the online auction
channel is better at realizing higher net proceeds than
conventional markets, and other literature suggesting that
it is not. This literature ultimately is limited by the fact
that no reliable study of which the author is aware
specifically addresses the question of whether the online
auction channel generally is better than conventional
markets with respect to selling repossessed Article 9
collateral generally, let alone specific types of Article 9
collateral. Similarly, two Interviewees believed online
auctions fetch better prices than alterative sale methods,
but another said that there was uncertainty about this
issue.207
For distressed property, the most salient reliable study
of which the author is aware is Professor Wyld's, discussed
in Part 11.208 In the context of surplus, seized, used, and lost
assets held by public sector actors such as the federal and
state governments, Professor Wyld concluded that "online
auctioning is proving to be the most effective method for
disposing" of such assets.20 9 From five case studies of the
use of online auctions, Professor Wyld argues that online
auctions can "[r]aise the final selling prices of surplus items
being sold, often at price points that are considerably
207. Perhaps not surprisingly, Online Representative #1 and Online
Representative #2 each said they felt online auctions would get better prices.
Online Representative #1 Interview, supra note 73; Online Representative #2
Interview, supra note 74. Lawyer #2, however, said people can be uncertain
about what an asset will fetch through an online auction and they feared that a
debtor would be more likely to challenge the low-price sale if it was through an
online auction rather than a conventional method. Note that Lawyer #2 did say
that eBay sales do sometimes get good prices. Lawyer #2 Interview, supra note
71.
208. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
209. WYLD, supra note 46, at 81.
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higher than historical returns on similar assets [and]
[1]ower actual cost outlays, both in direct costs and hidden
indirect costs, to agencies to carry out the sale of
surplus. 210 In other words, for the sellers and online
auctions Professor Wyld examined, they generally sold such
assets for higher prices and lower transaction costs than
conventional market channels.
But extending Professor Wyld's conclusions to Article 9
repossession sales may be inappropriate for two reasons.
First, it is not apparent from the study itself whether
Professor Wyld examined Article 9 secured creditors selling
distressed goods through these online auctions. To the
extent there were such creditors, the study's price
conclusions clearly do not separate out the price results
from Article 9 collateral sales. This is important because
Professor Wvld's studv, at least in Dart, observed online
auctions getting better prices when comuared to inefficient
foreclosure laws, and those foreclosure laws mav well have
been less efficient than the markets Article 9 secured
creditors access through the commercial reasonableness
standard.
For example. Professor Wvld studied the online auction
Bid4Assets.com. through which government tax authorities
sold tax-delinauent real Dropertv.211 Traditionally, these
sales are governed bv legislativelv mandated rules which
venerallv have been criticized as being verv inefficient and
resulting in low prices. 212 Not surprisingly, Professor Wyld
210. Id. at 7; see also id. at 25.
211. Id. at 60-65.
212. Professor Wyld alludes to this fact, stating that "the online auction
mechanism will likely produce far better results than the traditional auctions
held on the 'courthouse steps,' both in terms of the number of properties sold
and the prices paid for them, due to the increased reach that the Internet brings
to the process." WYLD, supra note 46, at 61; see also id. at 62 (stating that "Kern
County [California] had sold delinquent properties through physical auctions,
held three times a year in the chambers of the county's board of supervisors").
See generally Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent
Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933,
961 (1985) (describing inadequate advertising requirement for real estate
foreclosure sales); Martha Lassiter Sewell, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales
Under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Balancing of Interests, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1027-30 (1992); John L. Woodruff, Certiorari to In re BFP:
The Eve of Decision to a Dozen Years of Durrett Conflict-Will Resolution of the
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observed that the online auction sales realized much better
prices than the conventional auctions. What is not clear,
however, is whether the same maanitude of price increase
would result if prices for Article 9 personal proDertv sold
throuah an online auction like BidAssets.com were
compared to prices realized throuah conventional.
traditional markets for Article 9 collateral. Professor
Gilmore replaced the riaid and inefficient foreclosure sale
rules of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) with
Article 9's commercial reasonableness standard in order to
allow access to more efficient market-based sale practices
and thus improve the low prices received under the
UCSA.213 Whether Professor Gilmore's goal has been
realized is hotly debated.214 Nevertheless, it is possible that
historical prices for market-based Article 9 sales are on
average better than those under the tax-delinquent real
propertv auctions studied bv Professor Wvld. Thus, it is also
possible that the price differentials Professor Wvld observed
in his studv would be larver than that which would be
observed between Article 9 sales through online auctions
versus conventional, traditional markets.
Second, the extension of Professor Wvld's price
conclusions to Article 9 collateral sales is problematic in
that some of his observed sales were of distressed real
property. Real property cannot serve as collateral under
Article 9.
Issue Solve the Real Problem?, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 773, 790 (1994);
Comment, In re BFP: Mortgage Foreclosures and Bankruptcy Code's
"Reasonably Equivalent Value," 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 227, 236, 243 (1996).
213. See Gilmore, Article 9, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that "the tight system
of mandatory regulation adopted in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act had
failed. In the context of commercial financing it set up burdensome formal
requirements, compliance with which did no one any good; in the consumer
context the requirements had not been successful as deterrents to fraud. The
Act's insistence on a public auction sale-thus depriving the vendor of the use of
commercial channels open to him-had proved a sure guaranty that the
property would go for less than it was worth"); see also 2 GILMORE, supra note 6,
§ 44.4, at 1227 (stating that "[t]here is general agreement that the UCSA
provisions worked very badly indeed. . . . A better system for guaranteeing
deficiency judgments could hardly be designed"); Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute
Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription for Waste, 40 UCLA L. REV.
695, 704 (1993); JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 15, at 267-68.
214. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1424-31.
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Given the lack of on-point studies comparing prices for
Article 9 repossessed collateral sold through online auctions
versus conventional, traditional markets, a secured party
might venture a bit farther afield to the rich body of
theoretical and empirical economic literature examining
whether Internet prices (including those realized through
online auctions) are higher or lower than those in
conventional retail markets. Much of this literature
attempts to prove or disprove one of the oft-cited economic
predictions about Internet commerce: that due to lower
transaction costs it will be "frictionless," or at least less
frictioned than conventional market channels. 215  The
theoretical result of such a frictionless market would be
that buyers would enjoy lower prices when compared to
conventional markets, and sellers would enjoy higher net
proceeds (price less costs) due to lower transaction costs. 216
215. See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless
Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers, 46
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 563 (2000), available at http://www.atypon-
link.com/INF/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.46.4.563.12061; Ho Geun Lee et al., Is the
Internet Making Retail Transactions More Efficient?: Comparison of Online and
Offline CD Retail Markets, 2 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS
266, 276 (2003), available at http://www. sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=Article
URL&_udi=B6X4K48TM2CG2&_user=681891&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2003
&_rdoc=l &_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C00037419&_versio
n=l&_urlVersion=O&_userid=681891&md5=7357ba8581513cbd8f2aae81367a61
2c (stating that "[i]t has been widely speculated that [sic] Internet will make
retail transactions more efficient by lowering search costs that buyers must
incur to obtain information on products and prices"); Lee, supra note 57, at 73
(discussing the reduced price hypothesis of electronic marketplaces).
216. See Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra note 215, at 564-65 (reviewing
literature supporting and refuting the proposition that prices on the Internet
are lower than on conventional market channels, and whose study concluded
that for books and CDs, prices "on the Internet average 9-16% less than
identical items sold via conventional channels," and that this and other studies'
results "provide support for the hypothesis that the Internet is a more efficient
channel in terms of price levels and menu costs. However, the price dispersion
results suggest that retailer heterogeneity with respect to factors such as
branding, awareness, and trust remain important factors to understanding
Internet markets"); Lee, supra note 215, at 276 (stating that "[o]ur analysis
indicates that Internet retailers [of CDs] charge lower prices than conventional
retailers"); Anindya Ghose, Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Comment,
Internet Exchanges for Used Books, 30 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=584401
(stating that "prices of used books sold on the Internet are 38-75% lower than
comparable prices in physical stores."); Arup Daripa & Sandeep Kapur, Pricing
on the Internet, 2 (2001), http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0312/O312007.pdf
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While the frictionless market hypothesis has been
challenged, 217 it also finds support in the literature. 218
While much of this literature focuses on Internet retailers,
rather than online auctions, and thus may have limited
application to this Article's inquiry,21 9 it suggests some
uncertainty about a number of questions. First, whether
sellers, by virtue of this frictionless environment, will enjoy
a sufficiently large reduction in selling costs to offset a
reduced online price such that the net proceeds of the sale
(price less costs) are higher with online auctions. If not,
perhaps this might help explain why secured parties are
not using online auctions. 220 Second, would a lower net-
(stating that with respect to internet markets other than online auctions "[iln
some sectors such price transparency has resulted in intense price competition
and substantially lower prices for consumers"); Bernhard Rumpe, E-Business
Experiences with Online Auctions, 109-10 (2003), http://www4.in.tum.de/
-rumpe/ps/IRMARumpe.pdf (stating in the context of a business' procurement
process that "[o]nline auctions ... have proven their immediate effects. It is
possible to reduce the price paid for commodities, as well as for strategic
materials and goods, within hours, after only a few days of preparation").
217. See Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra note 215, at 564-65 (reviewing
literature supporting and refuting the proposition that prices on the Internet
are lower than on conventional market channels); see also Daripa & Kapur,
supra note 216, at 7-11 (discussing reasons why Internet markets, other than
online auctions for homogeneous goods, might produce possibly higher prices
than expected); Lee, supra note 57, at 73 (discussing the reduced price
hypothesis of electronic marketplaces); WYLD, supra note 46, at 36 and
accompanying text.
218. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
219. See Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan & Michael Smith, The Great
Experiment: Pricing On The Internet, 8 (2001), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/
wpapers/detail.jsp;jsessionid=1914601161351859144?id=424 (last visited Apr. 9,
2007) (reviewing the literature on prices on Internet markets other than
auctions versus conventional markets other than auctions, and stating that
"[miarkets with price discrimination and auction markets may have different
efficiency metrics than the consumer markets discussed [in their literature
review]"); Smith et al., supra note 57, at 3 (discussing limitations of Lee's article
cited in supra note 57, and stating that "[alt first glance, this finding [of higher
online prices] seems opposed to the efficiency hypothesis. However, two aspects
of his study are important to note. First, Lee studies an auction market and the
characteristics of auction markets are different than retail markets. In auction
markets efficiency results when the good is sold to the bidder with the highest
valuation. Thus, higher prices may be a signal of more efficient auction markets
ceteris paribus").
220. See generally Rumpe, supra note 216, at 113 (stating in the context of a
buyer's procurement process and its use of an online auction to purchase
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proceeds effect pertain to all types of collateral or only
some?221 If only some, perhaps this might help distinguish
the relatively few Article 9 secured parties using online
auctions from those who are not.
Given their empirical nature, the author cannot resolve
these questions here. Rather, given the absence of any
robust theoretical or empirical studies comparing prices
received for Article 9 collateral through online auctions
versus conventional market channels, the limitations of
extending Professor Wyld's study to Article 9 repossession
sales, the economic literature's open questions, and the
Interviewees' statements, the relevant observation is that a
secured party cannot conclude from this body of literature
with theoretical or empirical certainty that online auctions
generally fetch better net proceeds for Article 9 repossessed
collateral. 222  Given this uncertainty, the non-adoption
theory's third hypothesis, that predicts that a secured party
may fail to adopt the online auction channel, seems
plausible.
2. Specific Online Auction. One can also find studies
about the efficiency of specific online auctions. For example,
Professor Wyld did case studies on eBay and Bid4Assets.
But the limitations of extending Professor Wyld's
supplies that sellers (suppliers) may not want to use an online auction to sell
certain materials given that online auctions lower the price for such materials
and thus the profits enjoyed by the sellers).
221. There is literature suggesting that the type of goods sold on the
Internet is an important variable in setting the price. See Clay et al., supra note
219, at 7 (reviewing the literature on prices on Internet markets other than
auctions versus conventional markets other than auctions, and stating that
"[m]arkets for more expensive products [than books, CDs, and software] may
have different search intensities and therefore different efficiency
characteristics").
222. See id. at 18 (reviewing the literature on prices on Internet markets
other than auctions versus conventional markets other than auctions, and
stating that "[w]e do not yet have definitive answers to the questions of whether
Internet markets are more efficient than their physical counterparts or whether
Internet markets are themselves becoming more efficient over time. The
primary barrier to addressing these questions is obtaining data that covers a
wide range of products sold in both Internet and physical stores over a
reasonably long time span. Early studies suggest that prices are lower on
average online. At least for some products, lower online prices appear to put
pressure on offline prices, narrowing differences between the two channels").
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comparative price conclusions to Article 9 collateral pertain
here too. And apart from Professor Wyld's study, no other
robust study of which the author is aware analyzes
comparative prices for distressed property, let alone Article
9 collateral, sold through online auctions versus
conventional markets.
3. Corrective Measures. The corrective measure is an
empirical one placed upon the secured party who must
assemble her own comparative net proceeds data for a
particular online auction and the particular type of
collateral being sold, or hire someone to do so. This
approach keeps faith with the twin Article 9 doctrines that
(1) for selecting a commercially reasonable method of sale
the particular collateral is the touchstone, and (2) the
secured party in good faith and with due diligence should
try and identify, assess, and use the reasonably available
market calculated to fetch the highest price possible under
the circumstances. A secured party with comparative net
proceeds data about whether a particular online auction
with a history of selling the same or similar property held
by the secured party goes a good distance in performing this
task.
For some types of collateral on some online auctions,
obtaining this comparative price data is possible. For
example, eBay, for a fee, provides its customers with
historical data for categories of items sold through eBay,
presumably because customers want, and will pay for, this
information.223  "EBay Marketplace Research enables
research on up to 90 days of completed items data and
provides consolidated metrics on those items."224 Sellers
and buyers can obtain data about how much their item is
worth ("the average selling price for the item you're selling
or bidding on") and "how many items [similar to the seller's
item] were listed and how many of those sold successfully
within a selected time period."225 Further, eBay's "Top
223. EBay, http://pages.ebay.com/marketplaceresearch/index.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
224. EBay Marketplace Research Overview, http://pages.ebay.comlmarket
placeresearch/tutorial.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
225. Id.
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Searches" feature provides data about "exactly what buyers
are looking for on eBay, within a certain category or on the
entire site. ' 226 Having obtained this information for some
types of items, like computers, the secured party should be
able to obtain comparative published retail and wholesale
valuations. 227 Armed with these sets of comparative price
data, the secured party can evaluate whether the online
auction is likely to fetch higher net proceeds.
Unfortunately, eBay does not publish historical data for
eBayMotors.com, its specialty automotive auction,228 and
for which there are various automotive appraisal books
with which to compare prices. 229 Similarly, Bid4Assets.com
(studied by Professor Wyld) provides some historical price
data through its "Power Search" application, but the data is
less robust than eBay's. 230
226. Id.
227. See, for example, the Orion Blue Book, that publishes used good prices
for various equipment, such as cameras, computers, guns, and videos. Orion
Blue Book, http://www.orionbluebook.comlorionnew/index.asp (last visited Mar.
3, 2007). Orion Blue Books for each category of equipment are available online
for fees ranging from $600 to $38. See id. The IRON Official Guide also lists
used farm equipment values. See IRON Guides Home Page,
http://www.ironguides.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
228. EBay FAQ About Marketplace Research, http://pages.ebay.com/
marketplaceresearchfaq/index.html#15 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
229. See, e.g., N.A.D.A., OFFICIAL USED CAR GUIDE, available at http://
www.nadaguides.com. Courts consult this and similar guidebooks for
automobile valuation purposes. See Lee v. Trust Co. Bank, 418 S.E.2d 407, 408
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (using Black Book of wholesale automobile values);
Wombles Charters, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(CBC) 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (using National Bus Trader "Round Up" price
list to value bus); Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(CBC) 124, 130-31 (Pa. Com. P1. 1965) (consulting the Green Guide Book for the
sale of a crane); see also Russell L. Wald, Secured Party's Failure to Sell
Collateral in Commercially Reasonable Manner, 4 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §
14 (2002). But see Carter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 347 S.E.2d 264, 267 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986) (including a secured creditor's testimony that N.A.D.A. valuation of
mobile home was inaccurate); Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 678 P.2d 1115,
1125 (Kan. 1984) (stating that "the Court wasn't helped a whole lot by the
welter of the different figures by black, red and whatever other color books are
used by the various dealers"); Jones v. Morgan, 228 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975) (finding lower court did not commit reversible error by disallowing
expert testimony of car's Blue Book value where no adjustment was made to
reflect the car's poor condition).
230. See Bid4Assets, http://www.bid4assets.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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Another online auction, TitleAuctions, provides a
different source of comparative price data. TitleAuctions
sells Article 9 cars repossessed by credit unions.231 Its Web
site asserts that "TitleAuctions' credit union clients enjoy
average sale prices $2,100 per vehicle higher than
traditional remarketing channels, as well as new loan
revenue and increased Web site traffic. '232 Further, the
Web site provides four case studies of sellers receiving
higher prices for their automobile sales through the online
auction than they had historicallv received through
alternative, conventional markets. 233 While its comparative
price data is anecdotal and not particularlv robust.
TitleAuctions is at least trving to aid Article 9 secured
parties in their quest to identifv markets that will
Dotentiallv maximize the collateral's price and be found
commercially reasonable. 234
For online auctions that do not have robust historical
price data, an Article 9 secured creditor could try to
assemble the data herself or hire an expert to do so. Even if
the secured party or expert was permitted access to the
online auction's database (an unlikely occurrence),
compiling that data would be time-consuming and
expensive. Except for expensive collateral, or secured
parties who are repeat repossession sellers and thus can
amortize the costs over future sales, these costs may be
prohibitive. 235 Absent reliable and inexpensive data about
a specific auction, it seems sensible to hypothesize that a
231. See TitleAuctions, http://www.titleauctions.com (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
232. About TitleAuctions, http://www.titleauctions.comlabout (last visited
Mar. 3, 2007). TitleAuction's Web site does not provide or explain the raw data
from which this assertion is based.
233. See TitleAuctions Credit Union Services, http://www.titleauctions.com/
services/retail.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
234. See TitleAuctions Press Room, http://www.titleauctions.com/press/
story.cfm?nID=14 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (stating that "[online] [a]uctions
that result in better than wholesale prices demonstrate the credit union has
made an extra effort to remarket the collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner, which mitigates legal risks" (emphasis added)).
235. See infra note 267.
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secured party may choose not to use that online auction. 236
In the end, reliable and inexpensive empirical data, not
doctrinal fixes, will damper the uncertainty affected by this
fourth progenitor of the non-adoption theory.
E. Which Manifestation of the New Market Channel Should
I Use?
Consider the dealer-only market channel for used cars.
That market channel is now well-established and has
manifestations in every state, indeed, likely more than one
in each state. A variety of factors would inform a potential
seller which manifestation, which particular dealer-only
auction, she should use to sell her car. These might include
the business considerations discussed in Part IV, such as
which dealer-only auction is well-recognized and which will
realize the highest net proceeds. Another important factor
would be geographical location of the dealer-only auction.
For business reasons, a maximizing secured party might
not use a dealer-only auction that is geographically remote
from the collateral. For example, the maximizing secured
party will not incur transportation costs to get the car to
the remote market unless he knows these costs will be more
than off-set by a higher price he will get at the remote
market versus the local market. Further, Article 9 case law
doctrine requires that, for relatively inexpensive collateral,
secured parties advertise the repossession sale to the
general public living within a reasonable distance from the
sale site since only such people would be willing to travel to
attend the sale. 237 Thus, doctrinally, for such collateral,
geography eliminates the secured party's need to
investigate using markets outside of this geographic
area.238
236. Alternatively, in part, the secured party could try and obtain data that
the particular online auction is a commonly accepted, prevailing, or well-
recognized Web site to sell the secured party's type of property. Recall these are
proxies for market efficiency, as discussed in Part IV.B. The rub is that this
user data itself may not exist or is prohibitively expensive to purchase or
assemble.
237. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 72-75.
238. See id. at 125-26.
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The non-adoption theory's first hypothesis is that the
more legally and/or commercially novel a new market
channel when compared to the conventional, traditional
market, the more legal, empirical and business uncertainty
a secured party will feel about using the new market
channel to sell repossessed collateral. The fifth progenitor
holds that faced with multiple manifestations, the secured
party may feel uncertain about which particular
manifestation of the new market channel to use. In the
context of online auctions, the uncertainty is particularly
acute because online auctions are conducted in a boundless
cyberspace with no geographical constraints.
As discussed in Part II, one of the heralded benefits of
Internet commerce generally, and online auctions in
particular, is that sellers remote from their potential buyers
have an inexpensive means to reach these buyers, even for
inexpensive goods. Thus, for online auctions, market
manifestation elimination by geography is less effective:
initially, all online auctions, regardless of geography, are
potentially available to the secured party.239 The Internet
Auction List, for example, lists under the category "Online
Auctions" hypertext links to eighty-five online auctions. 240
Additionally, there are online auctions not listed on The
Internet Auction List. 241 From this pool of online auctions, a
secured party will have to identify the auction she feels is
the best suited to sell her collateral.
Given this task, and recalling Part IV, sections A-D,
from this pool of potential online auctions, the secured
party, at a minimum, must determine (1) which of these
online auctions are constructed in a fashion that maximizes
the possibility that a court will find the site's use
commercially reasonable, for example, by allowing the
secured party to post digital pictures of her collateral so
that bidders can "inspect" the collateral; (2) which of these
online auctions is considered prevailing, commonly
239. See id.
240. The Internet Auction List, http://www.internetauctionlist.com/Results.
asp?CategoryID=13&LocationID=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
241. See, e.g., TitleAuctions Press Room, http://www.titleauctions.com/press/
story.cfm?nID=14 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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accepted, or well-recognized in the relevant commercial
community for the collateral type, or has a current critical
mass of interested potential bidders who will compete for
such collateral; and (3) which, if any, of these online
auctions on-average-over-time produce net sale proceeds for
property similar to the secured party's that is higher than
what could be realized in the conventional, traditional
market.242 Further, if more than one online auction meets
these requirements, the secured party should choose the
best one reasonably available under the circumstances.
Thus, the problems discussed in Part IV, sections A-D, that
give rise to uncertainty with regard to answering these
questions, coalesce with the secured party's need to select
an online auction. Additional uncertainty and costs arise
when one considers that answering these questions requires
empirical data which may be unavailable or prohibitively
expensive.
Under the non-adoption theory's third hypothesis, it
seems plausible that a secured party who must answer
these questions for multiple manifestations of a new market
channel, in particular the online auction channel, might
instead choose to forgo the new market channel and use the
conventional traditional market. The corrective measures
here are twofold. First, because these questions raise the
doctrinal, business, and empirical uncertainty problems
discussed in Part IV, sections A-D, the respective corrective
measures discussed in each section apply here too. Second,
with respect to the problem of the costs and uncertainty of
acquiring empirical data to answer these questions, further
corrective measures are discussed in Part IV, section G.
F. How Do I Sell My Collateral in the New Market?
For any new market, the secured party will need to
learn the process of selling her collateral in that new
market. The non-adoption theory's first hypothesis holds
that the more legally and commercially novel a new market
is when compared to the conventional, traditional market(s)
the secured party normally uses, the more legal, empirical,
242. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 86-128; AGIN, supra note 54, at ch. 15:9.
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or business uncertainty that secured party likely will feel
about using the new market to sell repossessed collateral.
Consider again the case of online auctions.
Assume the secured party wants to use an online
auction, and must do the investigative work to identify one
that, at a minimum, meets the requirements of the General
Directive. 243 Assume also that while she has some
familiarity with using the Internet, the secured party is a
first-time online seller through an online auction. In these
circumstances she will need to be able to access the Internet
generally, review online auction Web sites, and eventually
select a particular online auction. Then she will need to
subscribe in some form to the Web site and learn the
process of selling items through it. This process will include
the secured party creating her own auction on the Web site,
taking digital pictures of the collateral and uploading them
to the auction's site, setting the duration of the auction, and
setting a minimum bid. Some first-time online-selling
secured parties may find these tasks daunting and
expensive, 244 raising uncertainty about whether they can
perform them,245 or even whether they are willina to
perform them. 246 Under these circumstances, the third
hypothesis holds that such a secured partv may chose to
forgo the new market and stick to the conventional,
traditional market process she knows. Indeed, several
243. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
244. See WYLD, supra note 46, at 75 (discussing the costs of using an online
auction).
245. Id. (quoting an analyst at Jupiter Media Metrix, noting that "[s]etting
up an online auction yourself can be difficult and time-consuming"). But see
Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra note 215, at 569 (stating that "[o]ne widely
discussed aspect of Internet channels is low entry costs for Internet retailers.
According to this view, an Internet retailer needs only a web page and a
relationship with book or CD distributors to effectively 'enter' the market").
246. See Rumpe, supra note 216, at 110 (explaining why businesses may be
reluctant to improve the purchasing process through online auctions, and
stating that "some people are interested in improving the purchasing process,
whereas others would like to stay with the old, approved paths, because they do
not wish to revise their habits or opinions").
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Interviewees made comments revarding online sale process
issues that deter secured party use.247
G. How Much Time and Money Do I Need to Spend
Answering All of These Questions?
Part IV, sections A-F have posed questions that a
secured party may ask with respect to a new market for her
collateral. Each section has described the respective
doctrinal, business, and/or empirical uncertainties and their
corrective measures that accompany each question. With
this in mind, the secured party will want to know how
much of her time and money she must spend answering
these questions.248 This last question itself acts as a
247. Online Representative #1 said that one deterrent for sellers using
online auctions is unfamiliarity and lack of access to the Web. Online
Representative #1 Interview, supra note 73. Online Representative #2 said that
one obstacle to having secured creditors and other sellers use online auctions
was unfamiliarity with the Internet generally and online auctions in particular.
Online Representative #2 Interview, supra note 74. Lawyer #1 said one reason
his/her clients may not use online auctions is lack of familiarity. Lawyer #1
Interview, supra note 70. Lawyer #2 said that some people do not have a
computer or Internet access. Lawyer #2 Interview, supra note 71. Lawyer #3
said that some dealers of automobiles may not have access to the Internet and
thus could not participate in online sales. Lawyer #3 Interview, supra note 72.
But in a supplemental telephone interview, Lawyer #3 also said that as time
goes on, fewer people are ignorant of online auctions. Lawyer # 3 Supplemental
Interview, supra note 100.
248. See generally Rubin, supra note 87, at 1095.
In many situations, a decision maker can reduce uncertainty by
gathering more information, or spending more time analyzing the
problem at hand. To assume that additional information gathering or
analysis is always warranted, however, is an error ..... Information
gathering and analysis always has costs; if these costs exceed the
benefit, it is not rational for the decision maker to incur them,
assuming once again that his pre-established goal is to maximize his
wealth. In the case of an individual, the trade-off between the cost and
benefit of information gathering can be computationally complex,
because it requires the person to determine the value of his time. The
issue can be simplified however, by considering an organization;
because the organization can only act through human agents, whom it
needs to pay, the cost of information gathering or analysis is
automatically monetized in this situation.
Id.; see also Schroeder, supra note 87, at 170-71.
Information is often, or usually, not readily, instantaneously and
costlessly available... [which] implies that it may also be rational not
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progenitor of uncertainty due to which the secured party
may fail to adopt the new market.
Consider a secured party who is in the early stages of
thinking about using an online auction for the first time.
Part IV, sections A-E have described the considerable
amount and degree of legal, business, and empirical
uncertainty that a secured party may experience about
investigating, assessing, and using an online auction.
Under these circumstances, the secured party may not be
able to predict with sufficient certainty how much time and
money it will take to answer the questions posed by the
preceding six progenitors and then mitigate their
cumulative and interrelated uncertainties, or even whether
this can be done to an acceptable level of risk regardless of
how much time and money she spends. In the face of this
preliminary uncertainty about time and money costs and
the efficacy of its expenditure, it seems sensible to
hypothesize that a secured party may choose to forgo
spending more time and money investigating further the
use of an online auction and stick to the conventional,
traditional, market she knows.
Consider three illustrative, not exhaustive, examples
drawn from Part IV.
1. Legal Costs. A secured party may hire a lawyer to sell
the repossessed collateral through a new market. In the
context of an online auction, counsel will have to opine
whether, given the nature of the collateral and the
particular online auction, the sale through the Web site
likely would be considered commercially reasonable. Given
the lack of on-point precedent about whether online
auctions are commercially reasonable, the lawyer will have
to carefully apply the General Directive and the seventeen
to seek whatever information would be necessary in order to make an
informed decision. That is, if search "costs are positive" the economic
actor may calculate that the expected costs of obtaining such
information would exceed the expected costs to the actor of guessing
incorrectly. As Posner himself acknowledges, people are not
omniscient, but incompletely informed decisions are rational when the
costs of acquiring more information exceed the likely benefits in being
able to make a better decision.
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guiding factors of commercial reasonableness to the online
auctions that might be proper to sell the secured party's
collateral. 249 Accordingly, he will need to obtain the types of
empirical data discussed in Part IV, sections A-E. 250 Even if,
early on, the lawyer can provide his secured party client
with an estimate of how much time and money his
investigation will take, given the vexing doctrinal
commercial reasonableness questions discussed in Part IV,
section A251 and the difficulty and costs of obtaining
empirical data discussed in the next subsection, he might
also tell the client that no matter how much time and
money he spends he will not be able to eliminate all the
uncertainties and thus the risks of using the online auction.
For some secured parties, that alone could prevent the use
of the online auction.
2. Empirical Data Costs. Article 9's commercial
reasonableness standard and its incorporation strategv
reauires an empirical investigation of merchant realitv:
how do commercial or consumer actors sell the particular
type of property repossessed by the secured party? More
specifically, for the doctrinal reasons discussed in Part IV,
secured parties will need to conduct a variety of empirical
inquiries. In this sense, Article 9 does not so much tell
secured parties or courts what the law is, but rather how to
find the law. 252 Indeed, Professor Danzig's observation
about Article 2 also can be applied to Article 9's commercial
reasonableness standard: "The law is found not in doctrine,
not in policy, but in directed exploration of the 'fact-pattern
of common life."' 253 Given the incorporation strategy's
reliance on empirical inquiry to discover the law, empirical
249. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 158; see also supra notes 166-67 and accompanying
text (Part IV.A.3.ii); supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text (Part IV.B.1 &
B.2); supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (Part IV.C.2); supra notes 222-
36 and accompanying text; (Part IV.D.3); infra supra notes 242-43 and
accompanying text (Part IV.E); supra notes 251-71 and accompanying text (Part
IV.G).
251. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
252. See Danzig, supra note 1, at 626.
253. Id.
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uncertainty about market-based practices is doctrinal
uncertainty. Further, given there are legitimate business
reasons for a secured party's empirical inquiry (as discussed
in Part IV), empirical uncertainty is also business
uncertainty. This subsection explores those uncertainties
and non-adoption behavior.
Recall the General Directive: when faced with multiple
markets such as a conventional, traditional market versus
a novel, new market, Article 9 requires that the secured
party identify, assess, and use the market that she, in good
faith and after due diligence, believes is best suited to
maximize the collateral's price and is reasonably available
under the circumstance. 254 How exactly does a secured
party perform this investigation? A number of sections in
Part IV described disparate doctrinal strands and
corresponding empirical data-gathering tasks that fall
under the General Directive's umbrella.
In sections B25 5 and E, 256 the Article discussed the
secured party's need to determine whether a new market
was prevailing, well-recognized, or commonly accepted for
the secured party's type of collateral. This is an empirical
inquiry. As also discussed in section B, in the context of
online auctions, this data may or may not exist and could be
cumbersome, difficult, and costly to obtain.257 That is also
true for other types of markets.258 In sections B259 and E, 260
254. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
258. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1481. In discussing how to make a case of
commercial unreasonableness, Sheldon and Sable's advice to debtor attorneys
suggests a high level of sophistication and cost necessary to obtain data about
the regularity and reasonableness of repossessed car sale practices.
[D]ebtor attorneys must look at the pattern of a dealer's sale of used
cars-comparing the percentage of repossessed cars versus the
percentage of other used cars that are sold at wholesale auction. Until
1987 in the case of Ford and 1988 in the case of General Motors (GM),
the FTC order required Ford, GM, and Chrysler dealers to keep records
of the percentage of repossessed cars sold retail and wholesale. These
dealers should also have the same breakdown for the other used cars
they sell .... Faced with a dealer that sells most repossessed cars at
wholesale auction, debtor attorneys should determine if the same sales
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the Article argued that a secured party may need to provide
empirical evidence that the new market has a critical mass
of current, interested potential bidders who will compete for
such collateral. As discussed in sections B261 and E,262 in
the context of online auctions, this data may or may not
exist and could be cumbersome, difficult, and costly to
obtain. In section D, the Article discussed the secured
party's desire for comparative net proceeds data for the
conventional, traditional market and the new market. 263
Relatedly, as discussed in section A, the secured party must
be sure that the new market is not prone to fraudulent or
collusive bidder behavior. 264 Because both sets of data may
or may not exist and/or could be cumbersome, difficult, and
costly to acquire, empirical data uncertainty may not be
quelled.
The collective uncertainty of the time and money costs
surrounding these disparate empirical inquiries may
contribute to the secured party's failure to adopt an online
auction. The third hypothesis holds that for any given
secured party, this uncertainty alone, or in conjunction with
the other progenitors of uncertainty, may render the new
market too risky.
3. Direct Transaction Costs of Using a New Market.
Using an online auction as its example, Part IV, section F
described the potentially daunting tasks a secured party
may have to undertake to learn and implement the process
of selling her collateral through the new market for the first
time. The costs associated with that process may too be
pattern holds for other used cars sold by that dealer.
SHELDON & SABLE, supra note 195, at 245.
259. See supra notes 178, 182-83 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 177, 182-83 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 20, 170 and accompanying text. Also, Online
Representative #2 indicated that potential sellers were concerned about
fraudulent bidding schemes instigated by bidders. Online Representative #2
Interview, supra note 73.
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uncertain early in the secured party's investigation of
online auctions, thus ending the inquiry.
4. Corrective Measures. There are several corrective
measures for the ex ante uncertainty that a secured
creditor may feel about time and money costs associated
with identifying, assessing, and using a new market. First,
the secured party could hire an expert like a lawyer or
auctioneer. 26 5 As discussed in Part IV, section G, subsection
1, in some cases with novel, new markets for which there is
no legal precedent, hiring a lawyer may not sufficiently
quell the uncertainty. But for other types of costs it should.
So, for example, in the context of online auctions, the
secured party could hire a third party intermediary to set
up and conduct the sale. 266 Further, the intermediary may
265. Where the collateral's value is sufficiently high to justify the expense,
some courts require that the secured party hire a person familiar with selling
the collateral, such as a professional auctioneer. See, e.g., United States v.
Conrad Publ'g Co., 589 F.2d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 1978) (inexperience of auctioneer
contributed to finding of commercial unreasonableness); Equibank v. Auer, 103
B.R. 700 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Elkins, 559 N.E.2d
456 (Ohio 1990); Am. State Bank v. Hewson, 411 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1987). Cf.
Wainright Bank & Trust Co. v. Railroadsmen Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 806 F.2d
146 (7th Cir. 1986) (in real estate foreclosure sale, the failure to use
professional auctioneer was insufficient to overcome totality of circumstances of
an otherwise commercially reasonable sale). Using an experienced auctioneer is
particularly important where the collateral is unique and/or expensive, and
where such use is the industry custom. See Pers. Jet, Inc. v. N.D. Callihan v.
Paris Jet, Inc., 624 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1980).
266. See, for example, AGIN, supra note 54, ch. 15:8, discussing
BKAssets.com,
an online auction service that tries to simplify selling items on eBay for
the bankruptcy practitioner. BKAssets provides services similar to
those of any auctioneer, except that it uses eBay as its auction forum.
BKAssets does all of the work of setting up the auction, running the
auction on eBay, and closing the sale transaction. BKAssets provides
stock language for trustees to include in their sale motions and uses
sale notices on the eBay listings to make sure that potential purchasers
know that the assets are being sold subject to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction and come without warranty.
See also WYLD, supra note 46, at 76; Hiring a Trading Assistant-FAQ,
http://pages.ebay.com/tradingassistants/questions.html#l (last visited Mar. 3,
2007) (discussing the decision as to whether a customer conducts the online
auction herself or uses a third-party service provider, eBay has a feature that
allows prospective sellers to locate a trading assistant. "Trading Assistants are
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be able to quickly provide an estimate of its costs.
Nevertheless, while this eliminates some costs uncertainty,
if the estimated costs are prohibitive, it also means the
secured party will not use the online auction. 267
Second, the costs associated with the investigation,
assessment, and use of an online auction would be reduced
if there was a specialized online auction for selling Article 9
collateral that was explicitly constructed in a fashion that
maximized the possibility that a court would find the site's
use commercially reasonable, and that provided the secured
party with the technical assistance and empirical data
required. No online auction the author has found explicitly
demonstrates that it has thought about and addressed the
type of Article 9 legal, business, and empirical data issues
discussed in Part IV. In contrast, there are specialized
online auctions, like Bid4Assets.com, which sell bankruptcy
estate assets,268 which may help explain why bankruptcy
experienced eBay sellers from throughout the eBay user community who have
indicated they are willing to sell your items for you for a fee").
267. The secured party's ability to identify and use the most efficient market
possible to sell his collateral is constrained where the collateral's value is small
relative to the expenses required to repossess the collateral and conduct a
foreclosure sale. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1458. Even where, however, the
value of the collateral sold through the first online auction sale is
disproportionally small to these transaction costs, a large, repeat secured party
seller in theory might be willing to pay for these costs itself and amortize them
over time in future transactions. Under these circumstances, the secured
creditor might be willing to incur the start up costs associated with its first
online auction sale. On the other hand, smaller and one-time-selling secured
parties may not be able or willing to bear the initial costs or amortize them over
future transactions. See Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (And Changing?)
Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 342-43, (1999)
(discussing the costs to secured parties from the implementation of the Revised
Article 9 that "[large banks and frequent credit users may find the added
certainty of the new Article 9 attractive, as their transition costs can be spread
over a good many transactions. Small banks and relatively infrequent credit
users may, however, find the changes less pleasing. Just like their more active
competitors, they will have to change their forms and, in a good many
instances, their methods of doing business, but they will have fewer
transactions over which to spread their costs. At least in the short run, the
change to new Article 9 may thus make smaller creditors less competitive").
268. See AGIN, supra note 54, at ch. 15:9 ("Bid4assets.com, focuses on
auctions of significant bankruptcy assets such as vehicles, real estate,
industrial equipment, and even whole factories. The site provides all the
features needed for a bankruptcy trustee to auction assets over the Internet,
including assistance in scanning pictures of the assets, pre-qualifying bidders
232 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
trustees appear to be increasingly using online auctions to
sell bankruptcy assets. One commentator states that
specialized online bankruptcy asset websites can better attract a
focused audience of individuals and companies interested in
purchasing assets from bankruptcy estates[,l . . . specialized
websites can focus on the specific requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code, [and] . . . the fact that the websites target the sale of
bankruptcy assets can increase the confidence bankruptcy
nrsetitinnprs, trustees, and judges have in the auction
mechanism. 2
6 9
Absent a specialized Article 9 Web site, Derhaus it should
not be surDrising that secured parties lack this confidence
and will not use online auctions to sell Article 9
collateral.270
Third, the secured party could try and use the section 9-
623(b)(3) safe harbor. This couples the presumed
efficiencies of using dealer sale practices with the safe
harbor's shelter from some of the legal uncertainty about
whether the use of the new market is commercially
reasonable. 271 The rub, however, is that this corrective
and obtaining court approval. Such websites are already being used to
effectively auction bankruptcy estate assets and obtain results not possible
using conventional sale mechanisms.").
269. Id.
270. One lawyer/commentator has predicted that "specialized Internet
auctions" will develop to sell Article 9 repossessed assets. Agin, supra note 53,
at 1 (stating, in the non-bankruptcy context, that "[w]hile Internet auctions
seem strange and complex now, that will change. Eventually, as specialized
Internet auction mechanisms like bid4assets.com grow and develop, using
Internet auctions will be as routine a task as is using traditional auctions
today"). One can only speculate why online auctions specializing in Article 9
assets have not developed. Perhaps one reason might be lack of sufficient
demand from Article 9 secured parties. If true, the lack of demand may be due,
in part, to the non-adoption theory's chilling progenitors. This leads to the
possibility that if one removes or mitigates one or more of these progenitors,
secured party demand may increase for specialized Article 9 auctions. But in
some respects, one faces a proverbial chicken and egg problem: until somebody
builds a specialized Article 9 online auction which mitigates uncertainty, few
secured parties will come. However, if few secured parties presently are
unwilling to signal a desire to come, who is going to build the specialized Article
9 online auction site in the first place?
271. See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see also Martin B. White,
Consumer Repossessions and Deficiencies: New Perspectives from New Data, 23
B.C. L. REV. 385, 391 (1982) (stating that "it is reasonable to suppose that a
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measure brings its own doctrinal uncertainties and
normative problems discussed in Part IV, section A.
V. USING "SAFER" BUT LESS EFFICIENT CONVENTIONAL,
TRADITIONAL MARKETS
Part V focuses on the non-adoption theory's second
hypothesis and its interrelation with the third hypothesis to
explore the most problematic theoretical effect of the legal,
empirical data, and/or business uncertainties discussed in
Part IV. Under what theoretical circumstances might non-
or slow adoption of a novel, new market occur even where,
in fact, the new market is more efficient relative to the
conventional, traditional market(s) for the collateral? The
answer is important because such the non-adoption or slow
adoption behavior is normatively undesirable as it
undermines the incorporation strategy's price-maximization
goal and lets slip the opportunity to reduce the number of
low price foreclosure sales and thus the incidence of
litigation.
In its analysis, Part V, section A continues to hold true
the First Basic Assumption that the secured party is a
wealth-maximizer who, in good faith and with due
diligence, tries to identify, assess, and use the market best
calculated to maximize the collateral's net proceeds, and the
Second Basic Assumption (and its two sub-assumptions)
that the secured party has perfect legal, business, and
empirical data information about continuing to use the
conventional, traditional market.
A. The Omniscient Secured Party
What are the circumstances under which this non- or
slow adoption of a relatively more efficient novel, new
market will occur? To answer the question, recall that the
non-adoption theory's second hypothesis holds that for any
dealer will do a better job selling the collateral than will a financier"); Schwartz,
supra note 90, at 131 (stating that "[d]ealers, however, commonly can retail
repossessed cars at less cost than banks or finance companies because
financiers have expertise in the lending business but not in the used goods
business, while dealers commonly have the reverse competencies").
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secured party, as more of these progenitors, in number and
degree, pertain to a new market, the more the secured
party will experience uncertainty about using the new
market for the first time. In other words, as more
progenitors of uncertainty, in number and degree, obtain to
any given secured party, the more she will perceive the new
market as "risky." The third hypothesis holds that for any
given secured party, at some point the legal empirical data
or business uncertainty may become too great, and she will
forgo the too-risky new market and cling instead to the
"safer" conventional, traditional market.
To explore the theoretical interrelated effect of these
two hypotheses, consider this working hypothetical. Assume
a secured party who has never used an online auction
before but is omniscient in that she suffers from none of the
legal, empirical, or business uncertainties discussed in Part
IV. This secured party wants to maximize the sale's net
proceeds (at least up to the value of the debtor's obligation)
in order to be able to use the net proceeds to satisfy the
debtor's obligation. In keeping with the general assumption
of an omniscient, maximizing secured party, invoke these
seven sub-assumptions. The secured party (1) knows of a
certain online auction through which sellers, including a
few Article 9 secured parties, have sold property similar to
hers, (2) knows that sales through this online auction of
this similar property have historically realized prices which
are on-average-over-time higher than the prices realized on
the conventional, traditional market, (3) knows her sale will
also realize such a higher price, (4) knows her sale is
commercially reasonable, (5) knows her sale will not be
challenged by the debtor, (6) knows how to use the online
auction, and (7) knows she can predict down to the penny
her time and money transaction costs related to identifying,
assessing, and using the online auction. Would this all-
knowing, maximizing secured party use this online auction?
Yes, save for some idiosyncratic reason.
But, does such an omniscient secured party exist? This
is highly unlikely in theory. The Interviews suggest that
even experienced commercial actors are far from omniscient
with respect to legal, empirical, and business issues
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surrounding online auctions. 272 Far more likely is that, with
respect to any secured party using an online auction for the
first time, many of the seven sub-assumptions do not hold.
Once one starts to relax some of these sub-assumptions, one
sees theoretical circumstances under which a secured party
intent on price maximization nevertheless may choose the
less efficient conventional, traditional market over the
relatively more efficient online auction. One can construct a
multitude of variations on the less-than-omniscient secured
party hypothetical by creating combinations of held and
relaxed assumptions. Consider one scenario that, given the
Interviews, seems plausible.
Consider a perfectly rational, maximizing secured party
for whom sub-assumptions (3), (4), and (5) do not apply.
Thus, imagine this secured party has chosen eBay to sell
her collateral. Imagine further that she has evidence that
other sellers, including Article 9 secured creditors, have
used eBay to sell her type of property; she has comparative
price data showing that on-average-over-time the Article 9
secured parties and other sellers received higher prices on
eBay than she could receive for her collateral on the
conventional, traditional market; she knows how to set up
and conduct an eBay auction; and she can predict with a
sufficient degree of certainty the amount of her direct costs
of using eBay which she feels are not prohibitive given the
value of her collateral. 273 Will this maximizing secured
272. See supra notes 100, 207 and accompanying text.
273. When a customer lists an item on eBay, she is charged an Insertion Fee
(a listing fee). If the item sells, the customer is also charged a Final Value Fee.
There are also fees for optional features like assistance with photographs that
help to promote a customer's item. Fees vary depending upon the eBay site used
(e.g., eBay.com or eBaymotors.com) and the item's listed category. See What
Does it Cost to Sell on eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/ questions/what-
fees.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). For example, for items listed on eBay, the
highest Insertion Fee is $4.80, which is levied where the item's starting or
reserve price is $500 or more. The highest Final Value Fee rate is for items
equal to or over $1,000.01, and is calculated as follows: 5.25% of the initial
$25.00 ($1.31), plus 3.25% of the initial $25.01 - $1,000.00 ($31.69), plus 1.50%
of the remaining closing value balance ($1000.01 - closing value). See EBay
Fees, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); see
also AGIN, supra note 54, ch. 15:8 (stating that "rslelling through an Internet
auction costs very little," and describing eBay's fee structure).
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party use the eBay auction? In theory, yes, but also in
theory, no.
The theoretical argument for non-adoption runs as
follows. Given the relaxation of sub-assumptions (3), (4),
and (5), ex ante, the maximizing secured party will remain
uncertain about whether such a sale is commercially
reasonable for the doctrinal and empirical data reasons
discussed in Part IV, sections A, B, and C,274 and whether,
despite her comparative price data, her sale in fact will
realize greater net proceeds than could be realized through
the conventional, traditional market.275 Thus she will
remain uncertain about the size of a deficiency and whether
a disgruntled debtor will challenge the sale in court and
possibly win.276
To be sure, the secured party may get some comfort
from knowing that if the debtor challenges the sale's
commercial reasonableness, the secured party can argue
that, given the comparative price data, she, in good faith
and after due diligence, believed that eBay would produce
the highest price possible for the collateral under the
circumstances. But as discussed in Part I, section B,
doctrinally price is not a term of commercial
reasonableness, although a low price will trigger the court's
careful scrutiny of the sale process. 277 Rather, under Article
9 and the incorporation strategy, a sale's commercial
reasonableness is measured by its procedural regularity
and reasonableness as compared against actual market
practices. 278  Thus, with doctrinal authority, albeit
formalistically applied, the debtor might argue that eBay is
not a prevailing, commonly accepted, or well-recognized
method to sell repossessed Article 9 collateral, and that,
under traditional Article 9 doctrine, the sale was not
274. Some Interviewees' comments support this assertion. See supra note
100 and accompanying text.
275. Lawyer #2's comments offer some general support for this assertion.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
276. Lawyer #2's comments offer some general support for this assertion.
See supra notes 100, 207 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
278. Id.
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procedurally regular since there was no way for a potential
geographically distant buyer to physically inspect the
collateral in cyberspace or to attend the sale if the potential
buyer did not have access to a computer and the Internet.
An enlightened court would dismiss these arguments,
especially if, ex post, there is no low price triggering careful
scrutiny. On the other hand, a less enlightened court might
not. The problem is that, ex ante, the secured party cannot
predict the outcome of the trial given the doctrinal
uncertainties discussed in Part IV, sections A, B, and C.
And where the secured party is uncertain whether the
potential costs associated with such a potential lawsuit
outweigh any potential increase in net proceeds from using
the online auction, it is not unreasonable to suggest that
these collective uncertainties might be sufficient to deter
the maximizing secured party from using the online auction
and to stick to the conventional, traditional market she
knows. In this sense, the secured party intent on price
maximization nevertheless may forgo a relatively more
efficient new market for the "safer" market.279
B. Human Error
Consider two ways that human error with respect to
the information captured in the seven sub-assumptions may
lead to non-adoption of a relatively more efficient market.
First, a secured party may have sufficient information to
decide which market is the most efficient for selling her
collateral, but makes a computational error and chooses the
less efficient market.28 0 Second, a secured party may not
adopt a relatively more efficient market over the
conventional, traditional market if she mistakenly believes
she has enough information, but in fact does not, and, based
on the incomplete information, she concludes that the new
279. Outside the context of Article 9, Jody Kraus suggests such non-
adoptive behavior is possible. He argues that evolutionary market forces will
not produce more efficient commercial practices and less than optimal
commercial practices will endure where it costs commercial actors less to use
existing sub-optimal practices than to individually develop more efficient ones.
Kraus, supra note 172, at 383, 405-08.
280. See generally supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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market is less efficient than the conventional, traditional
market when, in fact, it is more efficient. 281
VI. RELAXING THE Two BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
The Article has assumed throughout that Two Basic
Assumptions hold with respect to a secured party. First,
that the secured party is a wealth-maximizer who tries in
good faith and with due diligence to identify, assess, and
use the reasonably available sale method best calculated to
maximize the collateral's net proceeds at the repossession
sale, at least up to the amount of the outstanding
obligation. Second, that the secured party has perfect legal,
business, and empirical data information about continuing
to use the conventional, traditional market. The Article also
stated that this second assumption itself has two important
sub-assumptions. First, that for the secured party's
collateral, there is a conventional, traditional market, and
second, that the secured party has used this market at least
once to sell her collateral. 28 2 A conventional, traditional
market was defined for purposes of the Article as a market
which (1) regularly hosts sales of the particular type of
property the secured party is selling; (2) has either been
blessed by Article 9 precedent or is constructed in a fashion
that maximizes the possibility that a court will find its use
commercially reasonable; (3) is considered prevailing,
commonly accepted, or well-recognized in the relevant
commercial community for the collateral type, or has a
current critical mass of interested potential bidders who
will compete for such collateral; and (4) on-average-over-
time realizes reasonable net sale proceeds (price less costs).
In Part VI these Two Basic Assumptions and two sub-
assumptions are relaxed and the attendant effects on the
non-adoption theory are discussed. The principal question
in each case is what effect this relaxation will have on the
secured party's inclination to use a new market. The
answer is explored in the context of online auctions. Part
VI's discussion is brief and does not seek to prove or
281. See generally id.
282. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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disprove the debates reflected in the various literatures
described below. Rather, it should be understood only as
illustrative of further research questions.
A. The Irrational Decision-Maker
Why else might a secured party choose not to use a
relatively more efficient new market like an online auction?
The answer may be because secured parties, like all human
beings, make irrational choices. The idea of a perfectly
rational, maximizing secured creditor is grounded in
neoclassical economic analysis of law that holds, as a
central tenet, that people's decisions are motivated by "a
rational desire to 'maximize welfare' as measured by an
increase in wealth. '28 3 Increasingly, however, legal scholars
employing behavioral decision theory (BDT) have
challenged the rational actor model and its wealth-
maximization principles as accurate tools to predict people's
decisions.284 In turn, legal behavioral decision theorists
have been criticized from various quarters. 28 5 The author
does not seek to resolve the disagreement. Rather, he
merely asks whether BDT concepts of human decision-
making may apply to the secured party who is deciding for
the first time whether to continue to use a conventional,
traditional market or to switch to a new market like an
online auction that is relatively more efficient. The author
acknowledges that the empirical and experimental data
upon which these BDT concepts are based are not on point
283. Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 717 (2000).
284. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 94, at
445; Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 86, at 1063; Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias
in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 587 (2003); Rubin, supra
note 87, at 1092; Tabb, supra note 94, at 265.
285. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 283, at 718; see also Thomas A. Lambert,
Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response To Professors Feigenson et al.
and Professor Slovic, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1053 (2004); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded For Behavioral Law
and Economics'Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002).
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here, but are tantalizing enough that avoiding them
altogether seems remiss.286
For example, Professors Robert Prentice and Jonathan
Koehler argue that instead of being the perfectly rational
decision-makers of the law and economic literature, people
have a bias in favor of inaction over action due to an
omission bias, 28 7 and a bias in favor of normal over the
abnormal due to a normality bias. 28 8 The authors assert
that although
there are often economic advantages associated with a preference
for inaction over action (avoidance of start-up costs, for example)
and for the usual over the unusual (reduced uncertainty) ...
[r]esearch shows that even when economic considerations are
absent or held constant, peoples' judgments and choices are
systematically biased in favor of inaction and normality.2 89
Further, "a potentially undesirable side effect of this
[normality] bias is that it discourages people from deviating
from accepted protocols of behavior, even when the
individual circumstances would seem to warrant it. ' ' 290
Professors Prentice and Koehler support their analysis
of the omission and normality biases' effects on decision-
making by discussing "related behavioral heuristics and
biases,"29 1 including the status quo bias.292 The status quo
bias holds that .'[p]eople tend to stick to the old, even when
286. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625-26 (1998) (applying a BDT concept
of status quo bias to the preference-exogeneity assumption of rational choice
theory, and stating that "there is a significant body of empirical and
experimental data that, while not precisely on point, at least suggests that the
assumption might be false").
287. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 284, at 587 (stating that the omission
bias is "the tendency of people to find more blameworthy bad results that stem
from actions than bad results that stem from otherwise equivalent omissions").
288. Id. at 595 (arguing that the normality bias holds that "people prefer the
usual to the unusual, the arguments of the majority to those of the minority,
the conventional to the unconventional, and the normal to the abnormal").
289. Id. at 590.
290. Id. at 596.
291. Id. at 588.
292. Id. at 597-99.
A THEORY OF NON-ADOPTION
they would choose the new if they were starting afresh."'293
Put another way by another scholar, "[p]eople
systematically favor maintaining a state of affairs that they
perceive as being the status quo rather than switching to an
alternative state, all else being equal."294 Put yet another
way by yet other scholars, "[i]n appraising a potentially
beneficial but also risky course of action, they [individuals]
fall back on the maxim '[b]etter safe than sorry' to justify
inaction. '295 Professors Prentice and Koehler observe that
"[t]he status quo bias often presents itself alongside the
normality bias because current states are usually normal
states."296
Generally, Professors Prentice and Koehler observe
that "[t]he existence of status quo biases, endowment
effects, 297 and loss aversion 298 . . .challenges the standard
economic model of rational choice. Moreover, these effects
can lead to inconsistent and suboptimal decisions. '299 Put
another way by other scholars, "[i]n tandem, these
dispositions [arising from loss aversion, endowment effects,
and status quo biases] generate a species of conservatism
293. Prentice & Koheler, supra note 284, at 597.
294. Korobkin, supra note 286, at 625; see also Prentice & Koehler, supra
note 284, at 597.
295. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of
Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2006) (reviewing CASs R.
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)).
296. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 284, at 599.
297. "The endowment effect holds that for a given individual, the perceived
value of an item increases when it becomes part of that individual's endowment.
Accordingly, people will demand more to part with what they have than they
would be willing to pay to acquire it in the first place." Id. at 600.
298. Loss aversion
holds that people tend to suffer losses more keenly than they enjoy
comparable gains .... Loss aversion theory's implicit suggestion that
the potential downside associated with new activities is larger than the
potential upside has many implications for the legal world. . . . By
calling attention to the losses that might arise from a change in the
current state, loss aversion reinforces both the tendency to inaction
(omission bias) and a favoritism toward the current state (normality
bias).
Id. at 601-02.
299. Id. at 602.
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that causes individuals to seize on the potential 'losses
produced by any newly introduced risk, or by any
aggravation of existing risks,' to block new technologies
without 'concern ... [for] the benefits that are forgone as a
result."'300
Given this brief glimpse into several BDT concepts of
human decision-making, it seems worth asking whether a
secured party deciding whether to use a relatively more
efficient new market like an online auction will do so as a
perfectly rational decision-maker. Perhaps not. Consider
two examples.
First, as discussed in Part IV, Sections B and C, Article
9 doctrine condones markets that are prevailing, commonly
accepted, or widely recognized. One might ask whether the
secured party who currently uses a conventional,
traditional market that is prevailing, commonly accepted,
or widely recognized will suffer from the normality bias
intertwined with the status quo bias. That is, perhaps the
secured party will consider the conventional, traditional
market as the normal state because it is prevailing,
commonly accepted, or widely recognized and will see the
new market (especially a novel one) as uncommon or
abnormal. Consequently, she will feel comfortable sticking
with the normal market (the status quo market) rather
than switching to the abnormal, new market, even if the
latter holds the possibility of being relatively more efficient
than the former. This inaction might not result if the
secured party could predict with certainty that the online
auction would realize a sufficiently better price than the
conventional market and not be challenged as commercially
unreasonable. 301 But as discussed in this Article, such
certainty may not pertain with respect to a novel, new
market like an online auction.
300. Kahan et al., supra note 295, at 1078.
301. See Korobkin, supra note 286, at 659 (stating that "[i]f regret avoidance
provides the correct motivational explanation for the status quo bias as it
applies to contract default rules, the status quo bias should diminish when it is
nearly certain that the benefits to be gained by deviating from the status quo
will exceed the costs and, consequently, there is little or no reason to fear the
possibility of future regret").
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Second, in Part IV, section G, the Article discussed the
non-adoption effect of some of the legal, empirical, and
transaction costs of investigating, assessing, and using a
new market. Once expended, one might characterize some
or all of these as sunk costs, which is defined as "a cost that
was incurred in the past and that will not be affected by
any future decision. ' 302 One argument not presented in Part
IV, section G was that having incurred sunk costs with
respect to the conventional, traditional market, the secured
party would have a strong incentive to keep using that
market rather than incur those sunk costs again for the
new market.
The reason that this argument was not made in Part
IV, section G is because there the Article still assumed that
the secured party was a wealth-maximizer. Classic
economic theory holds that commercial actors should not
consider sunk costs when deciding whether to engage in a
new economic activity which will incur costs. "Economists
widely agree that sunk costs should be ignored when
deciding whether to take on additional costs." 303 But in this
Part VI, that assumption has been relaxed, allowing
consideration of Professors Prentice and Koehler's
argument that "numerous studies show that people do
allow sunk costs to influence their decisions across a wide
range of situations .... The sunk costs made it difficult for
decision makers to take action (omission bias) to change
what had become the accepted situation (normality
bias). '30 4 Thus, the secured party may indeed feel the
anchor of the conventional, traditional market's sunk costs
and stay moored in that bay.
B. The Non-Maximizing Secured Party
What if the secured creditor does not have the intent to
maximize the collateral's price by using the most efficient
market reasonably available under the circumstances?
There is much Article 9 literature about whether such a
302. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 284, at 604.
303. Id. at 604-05.
304. Id. at 605.
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person exists and the reasons for her non-maximizing
behavior. However, whether a non-maximizing secured
party will or will not use a relatively more efficient new
market like an online auction is not clear and demands
further research. From this literature, some illustrative
examples are useful.
First, one oft-cited reason a secured party may not want
to realize the highest price for the collateral is self-
dealing. 30 5 Imagine a secured party who wants to sell her
collateral to herself (or a related party) at a public sale30 6
for a low price, collect the deficiency from the debtor, and
then resell the collateral for a higher price and pocket the
ill-gained profits. This self-dealing secured party will lack
the incentive to maximize the first sale's price. 30 7 For the
self-dealing scheme to work, the secured party must be able
to collect a deficiency, which means that the sale must be
commercially reasonable, otherwise the rebuttable
presumption rule (or the absolute bar rule), and perhaps
other penalties, will apply.308 That this self-dealing, non-
maximizing secured party wants to be able to predict that
its sale will be commercially reasonable means she too will
be wary of new markets like online auctions for the reasons
discussed in Part IV, sections A, B, and C. This secured
party might also worry that, given the heralded benefits of
online auctions, an online auction might fetch too high a
price for her scheme to be worthwhile.
Second, some commentators maintain that where
secured parties want to sell their collateral cheaply and
quickly they may lack the incentive to use the price-
maximizing sale practices normally used to sell the
particular type of collateral.30 9 Would such a non-
305. See Korybut, supra note 5, at 1427, 1430-31, 1472.
306. A secured party may purchase her own collateral at a public sale.
Revised U.C.C. § 9-610(c)(1).
307. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-615 cmt.6 (1997).
308. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. Even if the sale was
commercially reasonable, this self-dealing secured party also will have to
contend with U.C.C. § 9-615(f).
309. Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will
Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 69, 137-38 (1997)
(noting that "the secured party, for example, might simply wish to sell the
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maximizing secured party forgo using an online auction?
One the one hand, given that online auctions may reduce
transaction costs, 3 10  perhaps even this type of non-
maximizing secured party would be inclined to use an
online auction. On the other hand, these secured parties
will want to use predictably commercially reasonable sales,
and thus they too may be wary of online auctions.
Third, other commentators maintain that a secured
party would repossess collateral even knowing that she may
be not be able to collect a deficiency from the debtor where
the repossession signaled to other debtors the secured
party's resolve to repossess despite the loss. In such
circumstances, one might argue that such a secured party is
less inclined to worry about the sale's commercial
reasonableness or realizing the highest price, 311 and thus
does not care about the uncertainties discussed in Part IV,
sections A-C. But she might care about the uncertainty
discussed in Part IV, section D regarding the question of
whether online auctions realize higher prices than
conventional, traditional markets. If, as Professor Wyld and
collateral as quickly or cheaply as possible"); see also Hillebrand, supra, at 137-
38 (describing different sale practices for repossessed automobiles sold by an
automobile dealer which "included offering for sale all the cars that Ford [the
dealer] owned first, while placing the dealer-owned disposition sale cars at the
end of the dealer-only auction, and withholding dealer incentives normally
offered by Ford on cars it sold for its own account"); McMahon, supra note 141,
at 65 (listing nine reasons why "secured parties do not adopt procedures that
would recover the best value for repossessed consumer good").
310. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
311. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking The Regulation of Coercive Creditor
Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 773 (1989) (stating that "[c]learly, creditors
have incentives to maximize their net returns from enforcing security interests.
But the resale motivation is partially skewed by the need to maintain a credible
reputation for subsequent debtors. Large uncollectible deficiencies signal to
other debtors the creditor's resolve to fulfill the repossession commitment
regardless of the cost. The resulting advertising expense may be a profit-
maximizing marginal cost that generates corresponding revenues through
improved performance of other credit contracts"); see also William C. Whitford,
A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 1047,
1099 (arguing that creditors may choose less efficient collection remedies to
increase their leverage over debtors). Professor Scott further argues that the
secured creditor's maximization intent will be tempered where "[t]o the extent
that repossession despite large deficiencies advertises its resolve, the creditor
can charge the deficiencies off against subsequently successful transactions."
Scott, supra, at 760.
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other commentators suggest, online auctions do in fact
realize higher prices for lower transactions costs, it is
possible that the secured creditor's online sale will realize a
high price. That is not the kind of signal that this non-
maximizing secured party seems to want to send her
debtors.
Finally, the last species of non-maximizing secured
party is one who does not think her debtor will or can
challenge the repossession sale. Some commentators argue
that with consumer-debtor transactions, consumer-debtors
often lack sufficient finances or legal sophistication to
litigate. 312 For this non-maximizing secured party, she does
not feel the potential bite of the litigation costs and
penalties associated with conducting a commercially
unreasonable sale. But does that mean that the secured
312. For consumer-debtor transactions, some secured parties may feel less
at risk where they believe ex ante that financial or sophistication asymmetries
will stop the debtor from challenging a commercially unreasonable sale. See,
e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in
Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 566, (1997) (stating that "[u]ncertainty
in the law about what conduct breaches the peace and about what the remedy is
for a breach ... undercuts this system by making litigation infeasible, resulting
in too little deterrence"); Corenswet, supra note 164, at 1081 & n.3 (1975)
(stating that although the commercial reasonableness standard "is intended to
impose fairness limitations on the creditor's behavior in disposing of the
collateral.... [u]nfortunately, a secured creditor may act within the strict letter
of the law, while the fairness of his actions remains highly questionable"); John
C. Firmin & Robert Simpson, Comment, Business as Usual: An Empirical Study
of Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CONN. L.
REV. 511, 528 (1971) (arguing that "[s]ince 96% of the consumers who have their
automobiles repossessed and are defendants in deficiency suits never retain
legal counsel or even appear in court, the legal rights available to these
consumers are of no practical significance"); Heiser & Flemma, supra note 15,
at 495 (describing the position of the Consumer Debtor Advocates that former
Article 9's default provisions were insufficient to incentivize secured parties to
maximize sale proceeds); Hillebrand, supra note 309, at 133-34 ("[E]ven if the
commercial reasonableness standard should work in theory, it presents factual
questions that can be resolved only through expensive litigation. It can be
difficult and expensive for a consumer to develop and offer proof of a bad sale
procedure because typically only the creditor knows how the sale was
conducted."); see also Lloyd, supra note 213, at 740 (describing how the absolute
bar rule "probably has minimal deterrent effect"); Philip Shuchman, Condition
and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 40-41 (1979)
(describing empirical work that suggests that notwithstanding remedies under
Article 9, debtors infrequently litigate due to lack of knowledge and financial
burden).
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party, for that reason, will choose not to use an online
auction?
On the one hand, this secured party may not be moved
to look into online auctions at all since she knows that the
debtor is unlikely to challenge the sale with the argument
that an online auction would have been the best method to
sell the collateral under the circumstances. On the other
hand, such a secured party's inclination to use an online
auction would not be chilled, or chilled less, by some of the
non-adoption theory's progenitors discussed in Part IV. For
example, she would not care, or would care far less, about
the commercial reasonableness questions surrounding
online auctions if she did not think the debtor would sue.
And for this secured party, if she thought the online auction
would maximize the price, she just might use it for that
reason.
C. No Conventional, Traditional Market
Recall the Second Basic Assumption's sub-assumption
that for the secured party's collateral, there is a
conventional, traditional market that the secured party has
used at least once to sell her collateral. What if there is no
conventional, traditional market for the collateral? Recall
that the Article defined this market as one which (1)
regularly hosts sales of the particular type of property the
secured party is selling; (2) has either been blessed by
Article 9 precedent or is constructed in a fashion that
maximizes the possibility that a court will find its use
commercially reasonable; (3) is considered prevailing,
commonly accepted, or well-recognized in the relevant
commercial community for the collateral type, or has a
current critical mass of interested potential bidders and
buyers for such collateral; and (4) on-average-over-time
realizes reasonable net sale proceeds (price less costs).
Where any or all of the four conditions is relaxed,
uncertainty is introduced with respect to continuing to use
the conventional, traditional market. Where this
uncertainty exceeds that with respect to using an online
auction, even the maximizing secured party may use the
online auction.
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The important empirical question demanding
additional research is how prevalent conventional,
traditional markets are for any given type of collateral. For
the most commonly sold Article 9 collateral like
automobiles, 313 it seems sensible to hypothesize that such
markets exist.314  For unique or not commonly sold
repossessed collateral it also seems sensible to hypothesize
that there is no (or few) conventional, traditional market as
defined above, although some type of market may exist. 315
The author is not aware of any empirical study on these
issues in the Article 9 context. However, it is interesting to
note that outside of Article 9, there are studies that suggest
that online auctions are particularly well-suited for unique
property for which there is a limited and geographically-
dispersed population of potential buyers. 316
D. Imperfect Information About the Conventional,
Traditional Market
Now relax the Second Basic Assumption that the
secured party has perfect information about the costs and
benefits of continuing to use the conventional, traditional
market. Who might this ill-informed secured party be? For
illustrative purposes, take the most extreme example of a
secured party thinking about using an online auction who
has never sold any collateral before anywhere and has
absolutely no information about investigating, assessing, or
using either a conventional, traditional market or a novel,
313. Professor Ronald Mann's empirical study indicates that automobiles
and consumer goods are the most frequently repossessed goods. Ronald J.
Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV.
159, 227-30 (1997).
314. Secured parties have used a myriad of market channels to sell
repossessed automobiles. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450,
547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting secured party's argument that it had sold
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) "'in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among dealers"' since secured party offered little evidence
"as to an accepted commercial practice for the liquidation of CMOs" and because
the bankruptcy trustee's factual findings indicated "a lack of a generally
accepted commercial practice for the liquidation of CMOs" (quoting N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 907(2) (McKinney 1990))).
316. See Korybut, supra note 53, at 44-46.
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new market like an online auction. In other words, both
types of markets are new to her.
Under these facts, with no sunk costs of the type
discussed in Part VI, section A associated with either
market, which will the secured party use? Assuming she is
a perfectly rational maximizer, the one that has the highest
net benefits. Which market that is, and whether such a
calculation is possible given the likely state of imperfect
information about both markets, are complex questions. So,
for example, one might ask for which type of market, the
conventional or new market, would the empirical data
discussed in Part IV be easier and cheaper to acquire? For
which market would it be easier and cheaper for the
secured party to use? The analysis becomes even more
complex if one also relaxes the assumption that the secured
party is a maximizer. Under CBT, would the normality bias
and status quo bias affect the secured party's decision if she
had never used either market?
CONCLUSION
Article 9's harnessing of market-based sale methods
was a great improvement over the rigid and inefficient
leuislativelv mandated sale methods of the old Uniform
Conditional Sales Act and the like. But the incorporation
strategy brings its own limitations, not least of which is its
faith that secured parties can and will in fact use the most
efficient markets possible under the circumstances. The
Article has theorized about some, but certainly not all,
circumstances why non-adoption behavior might occur and
possible corrective measures. What is needed now is a
robust empirical inquiry into how and why Article 9 secured
creditors choose particular markets, and in particular
whether and why, in fact, they are or are not adopting
online auctions which appear to be relatively more efficient,
reasonably available markets for certain types of property.
The author's aspiration is that the Article's theoretical
inquiry, and such robust empirical data when it emerges,
will assist secured parties, debtors, their agents, legislators,
and courts in crafting informed solutions to non-adoption
behavior, and continue the pursuit of Professor Gilmore's
2007] 249
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goal of maximizing the collateral's price for the benefit of
all.
